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PREFACE 
The Americans, today, are In the way, developing 
excep t iona l naval forces i n t o the Indian Ocean a r e a . In the 
changed scena r io of global p o l i t i c s , they can make them 
rega in t h e i r l o s t ground and bes t serve t h e i r s t r a t e g i c 
i n t e r e s t s i ^ n e r a l l y in the Asian region and more s p e c i f i -
c a l l y in v i t a l p a r t s of the Indian Ocean and the Pers ian 
C3ulf. 
Af te r the co l lapse of the Shah monarchy in Iran and 
Sovie t occupat ion in Afghanis tan, the t h e a t r e of cold war 
has v i r t u a l l y s h i f t e d from Europe t o South i^est Asia and 
the Indian Ocean Zone. Such a s h i f t makes i t impera t ive for 
America t o seek more e f f e c t i v e ways t o meet the chal lenges 
of cold war in a new region and a t the same t ime, conta in 
the a l l eged growing inf luence of the Soviet Union in Asia . 
Hence, the U.S. is intended t o s e t up s t r o n g m i l i t a r y bases 
i n the region and i s in sea rch of new front l i n e s t a t e s which 
could replace I ran . I t has e s t a b l i s h e d such a base a t Diego 
Garcia and has s e l e c t e d Pakis tan as an a l t e r n a t e t o I ran . 
The expansion of Diego Garcia as a major nuclear base 
for the U.S. navy m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y p e r c e p -
t i o n s . Indian uneas iness was f i r s t apparent a f t e r the Arab 
o i l embargo when the United S t a t e s augmented i t s presence in 
the Indian Ocean and expanded Diego Garcia i n t o a major 
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l og i s t i c s and naval base in order to deter any threa t 
t o v i t a l o i l suppl ies . Apprehension was heightened af ter the 
Iranian revolution when the U.S. upgraded plans for a Rapid 
Deployment Force into a full-f ledged Osntral Command to be 
headquartered in the Indian Ocean, with the capabi l i ty of 
d i r ec t ly deploying troops to trouble spots in the persian 
Gulf. Thus, the Americans continuously aimed to but t ress 
t h e i r posi t ion in the Indian Ocean region. 
The present study covers the po l i t i co -mi l i t a ry inten-
sions of the United States in the region and the whole global 
p o l i t i c s in India 's secur i ty perspect ives . 
The study would cer ta in ly , have not been completed 
without the able guidance, unconstrained motivation and 
constructive suggestions extended by my superviser Dr. T.A. 
Nizami Reader in the Department of Po l i t i ca l Science, 
A.M.U. Aligarh. 
I deeply appreciate the i n t e r e s t taken by Prof. 
S.A.H. Bilgrami, Chaijrman in the Etepartment of Po l i t i ca l 
Science/ A.M.U. and Prof. A.F. Usmani of the same Etepartment. 
They always showed in te res t in my study and helped me through 
valuable suggestions in developing the present study. 
I am thankfully appreciat ive of the generous help 
and encouragement given by imy brother Rajeev Kumar without 
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which I c - u l d n o t have comcle ted t h i s worlj: a t a l l . 
I am indeb ted t o t he L i b r a r i a n and t h e s t a f f of t h e 
r e s e a r c h s e c t i o n of t h e Mo'^lana Az^d l i b r a r y / A.F.U, '^ i l igarh, 
f o r p r o v i d i n g me t i m e l y h e l p a b o u t t h e a c c e s s i b i ] i t y t o t h e 
r e s e a r c n m a t e r i a l t h e r e i n . I am a l s o t h a n k f u l t o t h e 
L i b r a r i a n of Sapru House, t h e l i b r a r i a n of t h e I n d i a I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l c e n t e r and t h e D i r e c t o r of American C e n t r e l i b r a r y / 
New D ^ l h i , f o r t h e f a c i l i t i e s p r o v i d e d by them t o we a t t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e l i b r a r i e s . 
F i n a l l y / I am d e e p l y beho lden t o r e g a r d my s i n c e r e 
t h a n k s t o my f r i e n d s / r e l a t i v e s and w e l l - w j s h e r s whose 
c o n s t a n t i n s p i r a t i o n and encouragement h e l p e d me t o c o m p l e t e 
t h e work. 
( TAMVEER JAHAM ) 
D e p t . of P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e 
A.M.U. A l i g a r h - 2 n 2 0 0 1 
The Indian Ocean peqlon 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction: Politico-Economic Signi-
Ficance of the Indian Ocean 
and Diego Garcia Build-Up 
C h a p t e r I 
TNTRCDUCTTON : PQ LTTICO-ECONOMIC STGvTFICANCE OF THE TFDTAN 
OCEAN AND DTEGO GARCIA BUTLD-UP 
The name of t h e I n d i a n Ocean i s h i g h l y c a l l e d f o r more 
t h a n h a l f t h e p p o p l e l i v i n g on i t s s h o r e s a r e I n d i a n . The I n d i a n 
Ocean i s t h e t h i r d l a r g e s t Ocean i n t h e wor ld , c o m p r i s i n g more 
t h a n 28 m i l l i o n s q u a r e m i l e s . I n a r e a , i t can accomodate t h e 
e n t i r e North American C o n t i n e n t t h r e e t i m e s ove r and s t i J l have 
room t o s q u e e z e i n a l l of Europe , I t l i e s between A u s t r a l i a , 
Sou th A s i a , A f r i c a and A n t e r c t i ' ^ a s t r e t c h i n g from Suez t o Tasmania 
( A u s t r a l i a ) and cape Town t o S i n g a p o r e and Darwin . The d i s t a n c e 
from t h e cape of Good Hope a t t h e s o u t h e r n t i p of A f r i c a i n t h e 
w e s t t o t h e Malacca s t r a i t s in t h e e a s t i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e d i s -
t a n c e from Los Anoeles t o Tokyo. And t h e l i t t e r a l n a t i o n s occiapy 
one f o u r t h of t h e w o r l d ' s i n h a b i t e d land a r e a . 
The s e t t l e d l i m i t s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean a r e a s f o l l o w s : 
(a) The d i v i d i n g l i n e between t h e A t l a n t i c and I n d i a n Ocean i s 
t h e m e r i d i a n of Cape Agulhas (20° O ' E ) ; (b) t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e 
be tween t h e p a c i f i c and t h e I n d i a n Oceans i s t h e m e r i d i a n of 
t h e S o u t h - E a s t Cape of Tasmania ( l 4 ° O ' E ) , t h e w e s t e r n e x i t of 
t h e Bass S t r a i t and t h e median l i n e be tween Nor th-West A u s t r a l i a 
and t h e p e n i n s u l a of Malaya ( t h e Cape of T a l b o t t h r o u g h Timor, 
Sumba, F l o r e s and Sunda i s l a n d s , up t o Sxjmatra); (c) t h e d i v i d i n g 
l i n e be tween th- A n t a r c t i c Ocean and t h e I n d i a n ^cean i s t h e 
b 
60°0 ' South la t i tude.- ' -
There a re t h i r t y - s i x l i t t o r a l and h i n t e r l a n d s t a t e s 
embracing the s t r e t c h of the Indian Ocean. Afghanis tan, A u s t r a l i a , 
Bahrain/ Bhutan, Botswana, Burma, Egypt, E th iop ia , India , Indone-
s i a , I r a n , I r aa , Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Madagascar, T'alawi, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Maur i t ius , Nepal, Oman, Pak i s t an , a t a r , 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore , Somalia, S r i L^nka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Thai land, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, '^emen (Arab 
Repub l i c ) , Yemen (People ' s Republic) and Zambia. 
India occupies a i^ leading and s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i o n in 
t h e Indian Ocean. I t p r o j e c t s n e a r l y 1,500 miles in to t h e Indian 
Ocean and on both s i d e s i t has i s l ands Andamans and Nicobars on 
one s ide and Lakshadweep on the o t h e r . 
One of the Indian Ocean's p e c u l i a r i t y i s t h a t hov/ever i t 
i s among the s m a l l e s t oceans in the world but i t i s t h e only 
one which has four c o n t i n e n t s - Afr ica , Europe, Asia, and A u s t r a l i a 
on i t s pe r iphe ry . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t has a very few e x i t and 
e n t r y p o i n t s . Among these a re the Cape of Good ^%pe, t h e Suez 
Cana l , the Malacca S t r a i t s and a couple of o the r s t r a i t s . 
K,S, ijawatkar, Diego Garcia in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Diplomacy, 
Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1983,p.26; a l s o s e e , Joachim Alva, 
" Indian Ocean:A Zone of peace: Yesterday and Today/ ' The 
Economic Times, November 24, 1974; M.V. Kamath, "The U.S. 
Case On Diego Garcia : Phony Argxments," The Times of Ind ia , 
March 20, 1974. 
The geographicTl location of the Indian Ocean and i t s 
vas t raw materials always a t t rac ted imperial powers to s e t 
t h e i r foothold in the region. However, the Bri t ish ba t t l e sh ips 
f i r s t entered into the Indian Ocean in the second half of the 
16th century/ i t was in the 19th century when the Br i t i shers 
t r i e d to transform the Indian Ocean into a Bri t ish lake . P a r t i -
cu l a r ly the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf received more 
t h r u s t s . Besides the Br i t i shers / the Portuguese/ the Dutch and 
the French a lso explored and penetrated the Indian Ocean in 
t h e i r own specific time and captured the lajrge area by v i r t ue 
of r ights of war in the region. For most of the nineteenth and 
for the f i r s t four decades of the twentieth centvrYt the Indian 
Ocean was dominated by the European powers which had colonised 
almost ;511 the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the Ocean. 
In t rn th / the Indian Ocean is one of the great seaways 
of the world. Any power which dominates the Indian Ocean commands 
the o i l routes from Arabic and the Gulf/ and these are Europe's 
l i f e - l i n e s . At any time/ f i f t y percent of the seaborne o i l is in 
t r a n s i t t he re . I t provides access routes for the carr iage of a 
Vast amount of raw materials and e s sen t i a l products destined for 
Europe, Japan/ and other areas of the world including the United 
2 
•states . 
2 . The Persian Gulf area is the main supplier of about 70% 
of the o i l requirements of the non-communist world. 
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In teres t ingly / West Asia and North Africa are credited 
with a share of a t least 42% of a l l conventional o i l resources 
of the world, including deep sea and polar o i l . The area accounts 
fo r 60% of a l l proven reserves a t present and that there seems 
t o be considerable scope for upgrading some of the figures of 
. . . -, 3 
ex i s t i ng local reserves . 
Signif icant ly , as much as 135 b i l l i o n tonnes of o i l are 
believed to l i e offshore, by far the larger par t of i t a t r e l a t i -
ve ly modest depths. I t i s important t o note here t ha t the Soviet 
Union's o i l production is supposed to be declining in the 1980s. 
The Soviet Union has been the world's largest o i l producer since 
1974 with an average dai ly output of about 11.7 mil l ion bar re l s 
in 1979. The U.S. s t r a t e g i s t s an t ic ipa tes tha t t h i s downward 
movement in o i l production could compel the Soviets to s t r i ve 
with the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s for access t o the o i l resources 
of the Gulf, In addi t ion, the Soviet Union would have t o import 
o i l to overcome the shortage. For t h i s purpose, western s t r a t e -
g i s t s believe that in future the Soviets could offer arms and 
mi l i t a ry ass is tance to anti-Western or ant i -U.S. regimes around 
4 
the Gulf, of course, in exchange of o i l . 
5 Notably, the Gulf o i l is ex.-^eptionally cheap to produce. 
However, European nations are more dependent on the Persian 
3 . K.S, Jawatkar, op. c i t . , p . 8 . 
4. Richard Burt, "Oil t h i r s t may imperil USSR to Gulf," The 
Times of India, April 20, 1980. 
5. U.S. Congressional Records, Senate, 94th Congress, Vol. 121, 
No. 122, July 28, 1975, p . S13952. 
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Gulf o i l than the U . S . , while the Sovie t s a re less dependent 
on the Gulf o i l then the U.S. Obviously, i t would be h i g h l y 
inconvenient if the U.S. were deprived off t he imports of o i l 
from' the Pers ian Gulf a r e a . I t i s important t o remember t h a t 
t h e o i l c r i s i s fol lowing the A r a b - I s r a e l V7ar of 1973 made c l e a r 
t h a t t he o i l w i l l cont inue t o determine economies of the world, 
e s p e c i a l l y of the developed and developing n a t i o n s . 
Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Indian Ocean region has about 
g 
60% of the wor ld ' s o i l r e s e r v e s . I t i s not only r i c h in o i l bu t 
a l s o in o the r v i t a l raw m a t e r i a l s . I t is known t o be the wor ld ' s 
r i c h e s t r e s e r v o i r of v a s t minera l wealth and marine l i f e , i t 
produces 40% of the wor ld ' s Gold, 60% of the uranium, 90% ofthe 
n a t u r a l rubber , t i n , j u t e and t e a , and 98% of the diamonds, and 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y r ich in c o b a l t , copper, manganese •, s i l v e r , 
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s a l t , su lphur , and c o a l . 
6 . s e e , K, Subramanyam, "The Indian Ocean P o l i - t i c s , " Link, 
May 20, 1973, p . 15; Motherland, February 27, 1972; s . S . 
Bhatacharya, "Econonic I n t e r e s t s of Big Powers "in the Indian 
Ocean," IPSA J o u r n a l , New Delhi , January-March, 1978 
7 . The Pe r s i an Gulf Region woodefined as an " i n v i o l a b l e sphere had 
of U.S. I n t e r e s t ; See, R. S p i e r s , "U.S. Nat iona l S e c u r i t y 
Po l i cy and the Indian Ocean Area, "Department of S t a t e 
B u l l e t i n , Agust 1971; Asian Survey, Apr i l 1980; D ie t e r Braun, 
The Indian Qcea; Region of c o n f l i c t o r Peace Zone?, Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Delh i , 1983, p p . 30-34. 
8 . K.S. Jawatkar , o p . c i t . , p . 2 7 . 
9 . D, Kaushik, The Indian ^cean; Towards A Zone of Peace, Vikas 
P u b l i s h e r s , Delhi , 1972, p p . 49-50 . Also s e e , K.R. Singh, The 
Inc3ian Ocean: Big Power Presence and Local Response, Manohar, 
New Delhi , 1977, p p . 270-271; pepartrrent of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 
October 2, 1972; K.S. Sidhu, The Ind ian Ocean: A Zone of Peace, 
Harnam P u b l i c a t i o n s , New Delhi , 1983, p p . 6-7; M.K. Chopra, 
Ind ian And the Indian Ocean S t e r l i n g Pub l i she r s Pr" 'v i te 
Limited, New Delh i , .19B2, p . 2 l 7 . 
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In adr'jAion/ the African l i t t o r a l s con ta in t?ie wor ld ' s 
53 most important m i n e r a l s , inc lud ing 34 pe rcen t of i t s b a u x i t e , 
23% of i t s uranium, 50 pe rcen t of i t s gold and 96% of the wor ld ' s 
dxamonds. Many of these n a t u r a l resources a r e located In Southern 
Af r i ca , and are v i t a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t t o the U.S. 
The Indian Ocean sea f l oo r a l s o con ta ins l a rge depos i t s 
of manganese, nodu le s . These pota to-shaped nodules (average 
s i z e 5 cms) con t a in manganese (9 t o 37%), i ron (1 t o 22%), 
n i c k e l (0.8 to 1.4%), Copper (0.2 to 1.8%) and c o b a l t (O.l to 
1% bes ides t r a c e s of z i n c . These nodules a re be l i eved t o s t r e t c h 
over 10 m i l l i o n square kilometr^Bs of t h e Indian Ocean. These 
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nodules e x i s t in deep sea as we]l as even in 300 metres of wa te r . 
S jgnif i c a n t l y / • j u s t one sqgare mile patch of the sea-bed co'ild 
produce as much as 30,000 tonnes of manganese, 3,600 tonnes of 
aluminium, 2,300 tonnes of cadmivm, 17,000 tonnes of i r o n , 400 
tonnes of c o b a l t , 12,000 tonnes of n i c k e l and 650 tonns of copper . 
The p r i c e of manganese nodules e x t r a c t e d from ane square mile is 
12 
approximate ly one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . 
In add i t i on / t h e sea-bed in t h e Red Sea a rea i s be l i eved 
t o have underwater thermal sp r ings which a r e h e a v i l y impregnated 
10. "U.S. S t r a t e g y in the Indian Ocean," I^^sued by the Information 
Branch of the USSR consu la t e General in Bombay, May 27,1974. 
1 1 . G.V. J o s h i , "Our Ocean i s Wealthy," The Times of I n d i a , 
December 7, 1980. 
12 . P .K.S. Namboodri/- "T^dian Ocean: The Real S t a k e s , " s t r a t e g i c 
Ana lys i s / Vol . I I , No. 8, New Delhi , November, 1978. 
with suspended zinc, copper, lead, gold, and s i l v e r of an estimated 
value of two b i l l i on d o l l a r s . Similar deposits of manganese and 
other r? re metals hove been found in underwater ridaes Pnd shallows 
m the Indian Ocean. 
Notably, the U.S. overseas investments are increasing 
a t a fas te r ra te in Africa and Asia than in VJestern Europe, 
American cap i t a l investments in the o i l industry of the Persian 
14 Gulf Countries exceed $ 2,000 mi l l ion . The U.S. has a lso 
subs t an t i a l l y invested i t s c ap i t a l in the countries s i tua ted 
on the perimeter of the Indian 0-ean i . e . in Austra l ia , the 
Republic of South Africa, South and South-East Asian and East 
Africa s t a t e s . Following th i s policy, the U.S. government has 
provided recently very "enerous economic aid to Zia regime in 
Pakis tan . Apart from the current $ 3.2 b i l l i o n aid package, 
Pakistan wil l net the new $ 4,020 million aid package from the 
15 
U.S. on highly l ibera l i sed terms. 
Mi l i t a r i ly / the geographical location of the Indian Ocean 
t o the south of the Soviet Union rrakes i t an area of great 
imiDortance for Washington's new underwater nuclear s t r i k e s t r a -
1 f\ 
t eqy . The Indian Ocean a lso expects to play a v i t a l ro le in 
17 the current "Star W r^" p ro jec t . 
13. Basanta Ghatterjee,"Indian Ocean: Zone of Peace or Future War?" 
Mainstream, Vol. Xi I, Mo. 51, August 17, 1974, p . 13. 
14. K.S. Jawatkar, o p . c i t . , p . 12; a l so see The Pa t r i o t , 
January 17, 1975, 
15. TheTimes of India, May 27, 1986. 
16. The Pa t r io t , January 17, 1975. 
17. I-bre de ta i l s in II-GhaDter. 
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Thus, the Indian Ocean has tremendoxis p o l i t i ' ^ a l , economic 
and m i l i t a r y importance due t o i t s va r i ed p e c u l i a r i t i e s . I t / 
t h e r e f o r e , a t t r a c t e d the ou t s ide powers t o e s t a b l i s h and to r e t a i n 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e inf luence in the r e q i o h . L'ost s i c n J f i c a n t among 
t h e outcorros of super povv'er r i v a l r y an t h e Indian Ocean is the 
convers ion of Diego Garcia by the U.S. as an s t r ong a i r - n a v a l base, 
No s tudy n-n the Ind ian Ocean can be regarded completo without a 
look a t the development on Tiego Ga rc i a . 
Dieoo Garcia is impottant for the U.S. and for India as 
18 19 
w e l l . The Diego Garcia bu i ld up, f a r avjay from the U .S . , is 
the p a r t of over a l l U.S. Indian Ocean p o l i c y and must-be con-
s ide red as an outcome of the U.S. super power t h r u s t in t h i s 
r e g i o n . To r e c a l l , t he i s land '.'"s used by the U.S. Seventh F l e e t 
when i t v i s i t e d the area during 19"/l Indo-Pakis tan c o n f l i c t . 
F a c t u a l l y , the Anglo-American dec i s ion t o s e t up a major 
a i r - n a v a l base on Diego Garcia which has now become o p e r a t i o n a l , 
have enhanced super power r i v a l r y in t h e region and brought the 
Indian Ocean area wel l wi thin the cold war p o s t u r e s . 
20 Diego Garcia , the horse-shoe-shaped c o r a l a t o l l has 
become very popular and c rea ted an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o v e r s y . 
18 . See, Br ig . A.C. Cariappa ( R e t d . ) , " How Does i t Affect 
India?"_, The Hindu, February 27, 1974. 
19. K .P .S . Menon, "Local and Fundamental I n t e r e s t s , " The 
P a t r i o t , Apr i l 29, 1974. 
20 . However a t o l l is a Pac i f i c tei-m but l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s around 
Diego Garcia c a l l t h a t an i s l a n d . Also s e e , Hari Sharan 
Chhabra, "Diego Garc ia : Cora l A t o l l As Ocean Base,"Hindustan 
Times, January 18, 1971. 
' ' i 
The i s land is s i x f e e t above s e a - l e v e l and high t i d e s wash 
over i t a t s e v e r a l p l a c e s . I t expresses f requent d e s t r u c t i v e 
cyclones . 
The i s land i s 20 km (14 miles) long and 6 Km(4 miles) 
wide in a r e a , i t has approximate ly 10 square miles of land and 
i s in a "half new moon shape , " more l i k e a V w r i t t e n by a shaky 
22 
Hand. The i s land i s about 1,200 miles n o r t h - e a s t of Maur i t iu s , 
about 700 miles south-west of Colombo/ 1,000 miles south-wes t of. 
Kanyakiomari/ and located almost a t t he c e n t r e of t he Indian Ocean. 
The i s l a n d ' s d i s t ance from Seychel les is 1,150 m i l e s , Dar-es-Sal lam 
2,350 mi les ; Aden 2,500 mi les ; Bahrain 2,900 m i l e s ; Maldives 
650 mi les ; Singapore 2,250 mi l e s ; North-West cape 2,750 m i l e s , 
23 
Pe r th 3,400 mi l e s ; and Djakarta 2,400 m i l e s . 
Diego Gardia is now u n i n h a b i t e d . There were about 1,200 
t o 1,400 i nhab i t an t s v;ho were working as fisherman and con t r ac t ed 
l a b o u r . But these Diego Garcians were f o r c i b l y e j e c t e d t o smooth 
25 
t h e way for a U.S. base c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
2 1 . See , The Times, May 17, 1966. 
2 2 . U.S. Conaress iona l Record, s e n a t e , 94th Congress , Vo l . 121, 
No. 122, Ju ly 28, 1975, p . s 13931. 
2 3 . S.K. Ghosh, "Diego Garcia and super Power R i v a l r y , " Motherland, 
March 3, 1974. 
2 4 . Diego Garcia passed from French t o B r i t i s h sove re ign ty l i k e 
a l l o ther French possess ions in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia 
has been a B r i t i s h possess ion s ince 1810 when B r i t a i n took over 
Mauri t ius and o ther neighbouring i s l a n d in the Ind ian Ocean. 
However, some h i s t o r i a n claim t h a t Diego Garcia o r i g i n a l l y 
belong t o India and had h i s t o r i c l inks with Ind ian m i l i t a r y / 
see Captain R.L, Rau(Retd . ) , "The Indian Connect ion, "The Hindu, 
February 27, 19 74; a l e t t e r t o t h e Ed i to r from Pra t ap Singh 
Sengar, dated March 30, 1974, The Nat iona l " e r a l d , Apr i l 8 ,1974. 
25 . David B. Ottaway, " i s l ande r^ Were Er i c t ed For U.S. Base,"Washin-
ton Pos t , September 9, 1975, September 11/ 1975, a l s o s e e . 
New York Times, December 25,1975, January 25,1976;Sunday 
mimpQ. ,Tannar-v 2 5. 1976. 
The Chagos Archipelago, consis ts four islands - Aldalra, 
Farquahar/ ' Desroches and Diego Garcia, located in the VIestern 
Indian Ocean, This newly formed island group colony was established 
in l a t e 1965 under the name of Bri t ish Indian Ocean Terr i tory 
(BIOT) . The BIQT was se t up as a separ i te colony by an order- in-
"^ouncil in 1965 by detaching the Chagos Archipelago fran Mauritius-
and the islands of Aldalra, Farquahar and Qesroches froF Seychelles . 
These islands are scat tered over a lar^e region( over 1,000 miles) 
between chagos Archipelago and Mahe, the main island of the Sey-
chel les group, with other islands l ike Desroches, Farqualar and 
Aldalra, lying between 100 and 600 miles to the south-west of 
Pahe, Diego Garcia i s the larges t and most southerly of the 
Chagos Archipelago, known as the Great Chagos Bank, the whole 
27 
coA7ering some 21,000 squ-^re miles of the Indian Ocean. 
Factually, Diego Garcia was considered by the Pentagon 
28 
as a good harbour and a su i tab le s i t e for a large a i r f i e l d . A 
26. The Portuguese navigator discovered Diego Garcia in 1532 
and identif ied i t v/ith th i s name. I t is said tha t Captain 
Kidd, a p i r a t e , v;ho created a reign of t e r ro r off the ^^alabar 
coast and elsewhere over two centur ies ago, did hide in i t s 
earth rich amount of the gold, jewels and other valuables 
which Re plundered from captured sh ips . He was, in fact , a 
Scotsman. Actually, he equipped a ship, the "Adventure Gallery," 
and used i t to seize p i ra tes .Also see. Time, April 1, 1974. 
27. Jossleyn Hennesoy," Indian Ocean, Western Security and Sino-
Soviet Relat ions ," Eastern Economist, Vol. 62, No. 22, May 
31, 1974, p . 1076. 
28. Factual ly, since the 16th century when the Portuguese discovered 
the island i t had been regarded by many sa i l o r s as one of the 
f ines t natural harbour in the world. An Englishman, James 
Horsburgh described the island sometime ia the 18th century 
as "one oP the wonderful phenomena of the globe." Sunday 
Times, September 21, 1975. 
i G 
spacious lagoon enclosed by a cora l reef, encircled with dazzling 
sand and coconut t r e e s , s ign i f i can t ly , Diego Garcia had been 
u t i l i s e d as a s t r a t e g i c a l l y located fuel l ing s t a t ion by the Royal 
Navy during the second world war. ^t was a l so used as a sea-
plane base by the Royal Air Force, To r e c a l l , during world war I , 
the German ba t t l e sh ip "Emden" took she l t e r u t i l i s i n g i t s harbour 
29 
in i t s f l igh t from two pursuing Bri t ish c r u i s e r s , 
Now in 80s, the United States has establ ished strong a i r -
naval base a t Diego Garcia which is perfec t ly operat ional today. 
The implementation of the plan to convert Diego Garcia as an a i r -
naval base came a f te r a lono domestic and p o l i t i c a l processes and 
d iscuss ions . In fact , the U.S, effor ts to meet a naval communica-
t i on requirements reached i t s highest point in the ear ly 1960s, 
the beginning period of the SLBM weapon system. Soon the U.S. 
s t r a t e g i s t s converted i t into plan of the construction of a 
31 
modest communication f a c i l i t y a t Diego Garcia reaching on an 
understanding with Great Br i t a in . Dieao Garcia base, therefore , 
was designed to play an important role in the U.S, global s t ra tegy, 
\4hen Britain began to ta lk about a possible withdrawl of 
t h e i r presence from "E;^st of Suez" in 1961, the U,S. Navy a n t i -
cipated the need for base f a c i l i t y across the Indian ocean. 
29, S,K, Ghosh, op. c i t . . Motherland, ^arch 3, 1974. 
30, Submarine - launched Ba l l i s t i c Missile, have varying ranges. 
The l a t e s t American Trident missi le of th i s '-lass is t r u ly 
in te rcon t inen ta l , i . e . 4,000 or more miles . The Polar is and 
Poseidon missiles are a lso the l a t e s t vers ion, 
31, see , Ronald Soiers , op, cit,, ppo 199-203. 
The jrrper~'t-ive denrmd f o r such p r e s e n c e o r p o s s e s s i o n c o n s i s t e d 
of s u i t a b ] e a n c h o r a q e ->nd a r e f u e l i n g s t e t i o n unde r t h e U .S . 
Cormand. S i o n i f l e a n t IV/ t h e U . S . d e f e n s e s t r a t e a i s t s were 
w e l l aware of t h e c e a ' i r a p h i c a l and p h y s i c a l s u i t a b i l i t y of 
D i e q o G a r c i a laqoon as a c o n t i n g e n c y s u p p o r t b a s e . However, 
Djego Garc ia was am.'-'ng t h e s j x b a s e s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean s e l e -
c t e d by t h e U .S . Navy as s u i t a b l e f o r d e v c l o p n e n t a s f a r back 
a s 1959. F a c t u a l l y , Djeqo G a r c i a was c o n s i d e r e d as " t h e ^ :a l ta 
32 
of t h e I n d i a n Ocean" by t h e fj.S. n a v a l s t r . - ' t eq i s t s . 
I n 1^65, t h e V.5. Navy emphas ized on i t s immutable need 
f o r a mode'it communica t ion f a c i l i t y a t Diego G a r c i a . But i t 
vip.5 o n l y Decem''^er l'^66 vjhen i t s wonde r fu l n a t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s , 
i n c i - Hnq a deep 15 m i l e long lagoon c o u l d av> ' l a b l o t o t'-^ "-
U n i t e d 3 t f^ i unde r a 50 y e a r ag reemen t s i g n e d be tween a j u n i o r 
K i n i s t e r ^ t t h e F o r e i g n o f f i c e . Lord C h a l f o r t / and t h e U . S . 
Ambassador/ David Bruce , f o r " d e f e n s e p u r p o s e s , " w i t h a p o s s l -
33 
^ J i l i t y of renov/ina i t f o r a n o t h e r 20 y e a r s . 
An Anglo-American s c i e n t i f i c m i s s i o n s u r v e y e d t h e a r e a 
i n 1967 and i t p r e f e r r e d A l d a l r a i s l a n d of t h e Ghagos A r c h i p e l a g o . 
Bu t , t h e U . S . s t r a t e g i s t s r e j e c t e d t h e p r e f e r e n c e and s e l e c t e d 
34 Diego G a r c i a , second p r e f e r e n c e , f o r t h i s u r p o s e . 
3 2 , Sunday Times, September 2 1 , 1975; a l s o s e e , J u d i t h VAller, 
" U . S . P l a n s f o r Diego G a r c i a , " Sunday S t a n d a r d , June 16 ,1974, 
3 3 . s e e Annexure I . 
3 4 . Sunday Times , September 2 1 , 1975 . 
1 I > 
I n 1968, t h e U .S . Defence S e c r e t a r y approved t h e Diego 
G a r c ' a c o n c e p t in p r i n c i p l e and d i r e c t e d t h e U . S . Navy t o 
s u b m i t i t s f i g u r e s f o r i n c l u s i o n in t h e f i s c a l 19^0 b u d g e t . 
T h a t p r o p o s a l demanded an a u s t e r e n a v a l cornn^unications f a c i l i t y 
on Diego G a r c i a , e s t a b l i s h e d on a n c h o r a g e s u i t a b l e f o r c a r r i e r 
t a s k f o r c e , an 8,000 f o o t a i r - s t r i p f o r l o g i s t i c s u p p o r t , f u e l 
s t o r a g e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 ,15000 b a r r e l s / and communica t ions 
s u p p o r t . The p roposed s t a t i o n was u l t i m a t e l y t o be manned by 
35 275 Navy p e r s o n n e l . 
Another Anglo-American ag reemen t was s i g n e d in December 
1970 which allowed the U.S. gover-iment t o build a U.S. $ 19 
mill ion naval communications s t a t ion on the island for j o i n t 
use . In the same month, both the governments mnde an a'-'nouncement 
t ha t b ^th the nations had agreed t o the construction of a 
American limited naval communications centre on the island 
of iego Garcia. Construction in t h i s regard s t a r t ed in March 
1971 and the s ta t ion became operational in the spring of 1973, 
Factually such f a c i l i t y a t Diego Garcia was o r ig ina l ly 
intended to close a gap in the U.S. naval world wide communi-
cat ions system and to provide a communication link to ships 
and a i r c r a f t t r ans i t i ng the Indian Ocean. The U.S. , thus , 
became "the f i r s t of the super powers t o es tab l i sh a mi l i t a ry 
35. U.S. Congressional Records, Senate, 94th Congress, 
Vol. 121, No. 164, November 6, 1975. 
( : 
36 b a s e on f o r e i g n t e r r i t o r y in t h e I n d i a n Ocean a r e a . " The 
s t a t i o n was commissioned on March 20 ,1973 b u t w i t h o u t any-
p u b l i c announcement f e a r i n g t h a t t h e s e r i o u s n o t e m i g h t be 
37 
t a k e n by t h e l i t t o r a l n a t i o n s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean. 
However, a s above men t ioned / t h e p u r p o s e of a c q u i r i n g 
f i - j l i t y on Diego Garc i a was d e s c r i b e d as t h e p r o c e s s t o f i l l 
a oap i n t h e wor ldwide U . S . Naval c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , s y s t e m b u t 
i n t r u t h , t h e U . S . p o l i c y - makers d e s i r e d t o m a i n t a i n American 
p r e s e n c e in t h e a r e a in viev/ of t h e B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w l and t h e 
38 
a l l e g e d i n c r e a s i n g s o v i e t p r e s e n c e in I n d i a n Ocean, O b v i o u s l y 
t h e U . S . s t e p d e m o n s t r a t e d growing s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of t h e 
U . S . Navy in I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n and i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o 
39 
c o u n t e r any e x t e n s i o n of S o v i e t n a v a l i n f l u e n c e i n t h e a r e a . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e U . S . Ngvy saw t h e dream which had 
been t o i n h e r i t t h e B r i t i s h I m p e r i a l l e g a c y " E a s t of Suez" 
by work ing q u i e t l y on p l a n s f o r n ^ v i n g i n t o t h e a r e a in s e a r c h 
of new b a s e s a s e a r l y a s 1960 o r even b e f o r e , Diego G a r c i a 
was s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e of i t s c e n t r a l l o c a t i o n and i t s p o t e n t i a l 
f o r a major n a v a l b a s e , r a t h e r t h a n s i m p l y t o s e r v e a s a s i t e 
3 6 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l He ra ld T r i b u n e , June 19, 1973 , c i t e d in 
K . S , J a w a t k a r , o p , c i t , p . 32 , 
3 7 . The Times of I n d i a , J u n e , 1 9 , 1 9 7 3 . 
3 8 . The Times of I n d i a , June 2 1 , 1973 . 
3 9 . New York T imes , June 18 , i 9 7 3 . 
4 0 . S e e , C .L . S u l z h e r g e r , " B r i t a i n , West and E a s t of S u e z , " 
New York Times , June 18, 1 9 7 5 . 
2(y 
f o r an a u s t e r e communica t ions f a c i ' ^ i t y / c o n s i d e r e d t o 
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r e p l a c e t h e Kagnew communica t ions b a s e in E t h i o p i a . The 
w i t h d r a w l from t h e Kagnew base by t h e U . S . i n c r e a s e d t h e 
U . S . dependence upon Diego G a r c i a . To r e c a l l , t h e U . S . Navy 
wished t o s e e Diego G a r c i a what Fialta i s t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n 
42 
f o r i t was a l m o s t e q u i d i s t a n t from a l l s i d e s . 
The B r i t i s h d e c i s i o n in 1967, t h u s , t o w i thd raw i t s 
f o r c e s from t h e a r e a s e a s t of Suez by t h e end of 1971 had 
f a r r e a c h i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s and gave r i s e t o t h e d e s i r e e s p e c i a -
l l y in t h e w e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s t o f i l l t h e 'vacuum' c a u s e d by 
t h e B r i t i s h w r e t i r e m e n t . By t h e end of November 1967, t h e 
B r i t i s h e r s abondoned t h e Aden b a s e . B r i t i s h f o r c e s were a l s o 
wi thdrawn from b a s e s in Malays ia an^ S i n g a p o r e u n d e r a phased 
progra;nme c - m p l e t e d by t h e end c Oc tobe r 1 9 7 1 . T h u s , B r i t a i n 
t r i e d t o a d j l i s t v;ith t h e new r e a l i t i e s of t h e d o m e s t i c and 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n s . I t r e c o g n i s e d t h a t i t s i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l p o l i c i n g days were o v e r and i t cou ld no l o n g e r a f f o r d 
4 1 . The Kagnew base was c o n s i d e r e d t o be an i d e a l p l a c e f o r 
t h e communica t ion b a s e . I t i s s i t u a t e d 7 ,500 f e e t above 
t h e s e a - l e v e l and h a r d l y f i f t y m i l e s from t h e Red Sea 
C o a s t . I n 1953, t h e U . S . a c q u i r e d t h e b a s e f o r t w e n t y 
y e a r s t h rough an agreement w i th E t h i p p i a , But t h e comp-
l a t i o n of t h e communica t ion b a s e on Diego G a r c i a by 1973, 
r educed t h e impor t ance of t h e Kagnew b a s e . S u b s e q u e n t l y , 
t h e U . S . announced i n Oc tobe r 1973 t h a t t h e b a s e was 
c l o s e d down by J u l y 1974 . 
4 2 . S e e , Seymour VJeiss, " U . S . I n t e r e s t s and A c t i v i t i e s in t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean A r e a , " Depar tment of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , A p r i l 8 , 
1974 . 
4 3 . Mulk Raj Anand, "Power Vacuum in I n d i a n Ocean , " I n d i a News 
and F e a t u r e A l l i a n c e , November 2 3 , 1 9 7 3 . 
t o p a t r o l t h e wor ld ' s s e a - ] a n e s . T h i t ' s why, B r i t a i n a l s o 
reduced i t s forces in Hong Kong., withdrew forces from Gan 
a i r base in the ^fa.^dive i s l ands and from Maur i t i i i s , and t h e 
44 b a t t a l i o n of Gurkhas in Brunei, and north Borneo as w e l l . 
Broadly speaking , the Diego Garcia base was needed 
t o depJoy U.S. m i l i t a r y power t o inf luence events in Indiavt 
Ocean r e g i o n . The Ocean was v i s u a l i s e d as the area with po ten-
t i a l t o produce major s h i f t s in the g loba l balance of power 
45 
over the next decade . I t was cons idered in Washington t h a t 
t h e base would s a t i s f y U.S. o p e r a t i o n a l needs without encount-
e r i n g the p o l i t i c a l l i a b i l i t i e s which would be a s s o c i a t e d with 
opera t ions from or over some of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s , for ins tance 
P a k i s t a n . 
In f a c t , t he U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n be l ieved t h a t depr iv ing 
the U.S. Navy of such a base would only give way t o the advan-
t age t o the Sovie ts s i nce they were a l r e a d y cont iguous with 
t h e South Asian land mass. In t h i s r e s p e c t , i t was noted t h a t 
t h e Sovie ts were gu ick ly e s t a b l i s h i n g and s t r e n g t h e n i n g naval 
and a i r f a c i l i t i e s a t Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia; a t 
44 . The Statesman, December 4, 1974, 
4 5 . E.R, Zumalt, " C r i t i c a l Importance To U.S. of t he Ind ian 
Ocean, "Weekly Round Table, J u r e , 9, 1974, p . 6 
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Socotra •'sland and Aden in the Yemen Democr'^tic Renubl ic ; 
and a t Urrm a s r , I r a q ' s po r t on the Pers ian Gulf. The U.S . 
nol icy-makers a l s o had the b e l i e f t h a t t he Soviet h^d obtained 
bunker inn r i a h t s both in Singapore and I^ 'urr i t ius . Tn a d d i t i o n / 
t h e Washington exper t s were w e ' l 'av/are o^  the f a c t t ' " t^ t h e 
Sov i e t s had t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s in the Indian Ocean area which 
they c i t e d the n e u t r a l i s a t i o n of Ch ina ' s p o l i t i c a l in f luence 
and mili-rary power through the expansion of Sovie t power on 
Ch ina ' s southern f l a n k . " The Soviet i n t e r e s t a l s o demanded the 
expansion of i t s inf luence wi tlT the c o u n t r i e s of t h e region 
and i t s enhancement as a g rea t power. In o the r vjords, the U.S. 
decis ion-makers presun^ed t h a t the Sovie t s would be b u i l d i n g 
46 
up an Indian Ocean pi^^ence even without U.S. c o m p e t i t i o n . 
The U.S. Navy, there Fore, became very anxioiiG during the 
i n i t i a l ye-irs of l"70s t o pay fa r more a t t e n t i o n t o the India 
Ocean. The U.S. Navy de l igh ted when J u l i a n Amery, Deputy 
B r i t i s h Foreign Secre tary* announced in the House of Commons 
on Febrioary 5, 1^74 t h a t the B r i t i s h government had accepted 
in p r i n c i p l e the U.S. sugges t ions t o conver t t he communications 
f a c i l i t y a t Diego Garcia i n t o an "naval suppor t b a s e , " extanding 
t h e runway from 8,000 f e e t t o 12,000 f e e t / deepening t h e lagoon 
s o t h a t i t could manipulate a dozen sh ips r a t h e r than two 
4 6 . The TiTes of I n d i a , March 21 , 1974; see a l s o , VJeekly Round 
Table/ Vol . I l l / No. 14 & 15, June 9, 1974, p p . 6 - 8 . 
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or three^ building the fuel storage depot tha t could supply 
an aiircraft can ie r task force for 28 days and enlarging other 
f a c i l i t i e s ]ike constructing new houses for those based 
47 
t h e r e . The g-ceptance of the proposed expansion was ju s -
t i f i e d in the general VJestern i n t e r e s t to balance increased 
Soviet a c t i v i t i e s in the Indian Ocean a rea . Both the govern 
n^ents a lso decided t o arrange per iodica l consul tat ions "on 
48 
j o i n t objectives/ pol ic ies and a c t i v i t i e s in the a rea . " 
These mutual cord ia l arrangements were considored 
j u s t a natural extension of the or ig inal t r e a ty drafted in 
49 1966, However/ i t WPS believed tha t the new arrangements 
was t o button down jo in t consultat ion requirements so tha t 
there could be no more surprise U.S. global a l e r t s of the 
U.S. planes loaded with nuclear weapons, as occured in 1973 
during the West Asian Con-^lict. t ^ i l e the Bri t ish o f f i c i a l s 
argue that the Brit ish in te res t s in Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Australia and New Zealand required secure sea-lanes which 
were threatened by the increasing Soviet naval presence in 
the Indian -^'cean a rea . 
47. K.S. Jawatkar, op, c i t , p . 37. 
48. see . The Statesman, February 7, 1974; The P a t r i o t , 
February 7, 1974. 
49. see Department of State Bul le t in , February 6, 1967. 
50. K.S. Jawatkar, op. c i t , p .38 . 
51 . see, s.C. Gangal, "Britain and the Indian Ocean, "The 
Indian Express, March 4, 1976; (Bombay) The Hindustan 
Times, November 20, 1974; J . p . Anand, "VJhy Russia Sai ls 
Indian Ocean," Motherland, July 15, 1973. 
?A 
Great Bri tain l a te r signed with the U.S. a new 2 2 a r t i c l e 
agreement on 26 February 1976 which formulised previously 
announced arranoements for expansion of naval f a c i l i t i e s on 
Diego Garcia, Under th i s agreennent, i t was decided to provide 
f a c i l i t y of an improved link in U.S. defense corrTPunications 
and to furnish su^nort for ships and a i r c r a f t owned or opera-
ted by or on behalf of e i ther government. I t a l so provided 
t h a t the U.S. would bear the cost of deve,loping/ operating 
52 
and maintaining the f a c i l i t y . 
The Mixon administration considered an adequate U.S. 
presence in the Indian Ocean a c lear s ignal to the Soviets 
of American resolve to insure a credible mi l i t a ry capab i l i ty 
m the area . The U.S. administrat ion sent a conf ident ia l 
exolanatory l e t t e r t o key congressional leaders/ drafted by 
the Defence Department and simultaneously made an appropr ia t -
ion reriuest for $ 32.3 million in the new budget for the f i s ca l 
year 1975 for the expansion of f a c i l i t i e s on Diego Garcia 
in to a permanent naval -a i r base.The l e t t e r argued tha t the 
opening of the Suez Canal w i l l obviously increase the Soviet 
a b i l i t y to influence events v/here major U.S. i n t e r e s t s are 
a t Stake and therefore , Diego Garcia was a mere solut ion for 
54 
maintaining U.S. naval presence jn the Indian Ocean a rea . 
Notably, the movement of the U.S. ships was not basica-
l l y affected by the closing of the Suez canal because there 
52.The Times of India, February 28, 19 76; a l so see . The Hindustan 
Standard, April 25, 1975. 
53. The Statesman, February V, 1974. 
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Was no t much of d i f f e r e n c e in t h e d i s t a n c e t o Diego G a r c i a 
v i a t h e Cape of Good Hope v i a t h e Suez Canal, But a s long a s 
t h e Suez c a n a l was c l o s e d , t h e S o v i e t Union had t o t a k e 
a long r^und a b o u t way t o reach t h e I n d i a n o c e a n . To r each 
t h e Horn of A f r i c a , t h e S o v i e t N o r t h e r F l e e t , b a s e d a t 
Severomorsk in t h e Kola P e n i n s u l a had t o s team 11 ,200 m i l e s 
v i a t h e Cape of Good Hope. While t h e d i s t a n c e v i a t h e Suez 
C a n a l reduced t o 7,300 m i l e s . For t h e S o v i e t B a l t i c F l e e t 
ba sed a t Len ingrad , t h e d i s t a n c e reduced from 10,800 m i l e s 
t o 6 ,900 m i l e s a f t e r open ing of t h e Suez c a n a l . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , 
f o r t h e Black Sea F l e e t , t h e d i s t a n c e v i a t h e Gape of Good 
Hope i s 10,400 m i l e s , vjhile t h e r o u t e v i a t h e Suez C a n a l 
and t h e Red Sea , r educed t o o n l y 3 , 3no m i l e s . The c a n a l , 
t h e r e f o r e , b r o u g h t down t h e d i s t a n c e be tween t h e S o v i e t f l e e t s 
55 
o p e r t i n g in t h e v;est and t h o s e o p e r a t i n g i n t h e P a c i f i c . 
T h u s , a f t e r t h e o p e n i n g of t h e Suez c a n a l , t h e S o v i e t Union 
g a i n e d a b i l i t y t o i n c r e a s e i t s p r e s e n c e s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n t h e 
56 I n d i a n Ocean. 
The U . S . j u s t i f i c a t i o n on s p e n d i n g huge amount of 
money on Diego G a r c i a b u i l d up was q u e s t i o n e d by t h e s e v e r a l 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e w s p a p e r s . They e x p r e s s e d t h e i r s u r p r i s e from 
t h e f a c t whe the r t h e deployment of U . S . s u b m a r i n e s i n t h e s e 
w a t e r s w->s n o t an i n s t a n c e of " U . S . Expans ion ism" s i m i l a r 
t o t h e S o v i e t dep loyment of an a n t i - s u b m a r i n e f o r c e in t i ie 
5 5 . K.R, S i n g h , op , c i t . , p . 189 . 
6 6 . See , David J o h n s o n , "T roub l ed Waters f o r t h e U . S . Navy," 
A f r i c a n R e p o r t , J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y , 1975, p . 1 0 . 
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area as evidence of "Soviet expansionism." 
However, the U.S. decision t o build up a i r -nava l 
base on Dieao Garcia and i t s legitimacy was analysed in the 
House Foreign Affairs sub-committee hearings when i t began 
t o examine the U.S. mi l i ta ry and c i v i l i a n o f f i c ia l s t o deter -
mine whether i t was in the U.S. nat ional in te res t to have 
an a i r nava} base in the area and what the p o J i t i c a l , s t r a t eg i c 
and economic implications and consequences might be if the 
U.S. Congress agreed to fund in favour of such proposal . 
Owen Zurhellen/ Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament, j u s t i f i ed the U.S. proposal in his 
testimony before the House Sub-committee on Near East and 
South Asia on February 2n, 1974, '^ g s ta ted tha t the U.S. 
has continued v i t a l and legitimr^e in teres ts in the Indian 
Ocean apd those in te res t s could b^ t t e r served by continued 
Indian Ocean deployments. He argued tha t the sea belonged to 
overybody av^ the U.S. had to surport trade routes for fr iendly 
count r ies , fte mainly ju s t i f i ed the projected build up of 
Diego Garcia on four considerat ions: (a) t'^e U.S. had long 
and important in te res t s in the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the Indian 
Ocean and since i t had no land bridge in the area like the 
Soviets , the only option to the U.S. was the sea; (b) the 
proposed U.S. deployments in the area were constant to same 
57, Washington Post, January 30, 1974; also see Chester Bowles, 
"A considerable speck," New York Times, l^ ay 13, 19 74; The 
Times of India, February 2, 1974; The Indian Express, 
Febnaary, 1, 1974. 
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long-s tand ing Dr inc ip le s of a c t i o n of U.S. p o l i c y which 
always aimed t o s a t i s f y v i t a l p o l i t i c a l and m i ' ' i t a r y needs 
in the U.S. n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ; (c) t h e U.S. nava l deployments 
in the area did not pose any t h r e a t t o l oca l s t a t e s / i t only 
aimed t o enhance U.S. c a p a b i l i t y t o meet cont ingency s i t u a t i -
ons involv ing t h r e a t s t o U.S. i n t e r e s t s ; and l a s t l y , (d) t h e 
U .S . had no d e s i r e t o get involved in an arms race in the 
58 
a r e a . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , in an another tes t imony on March 6,1914 
Seymour Weiss, D i r e c t o r of the U.S. S t a t e Departments Bi:reau 
of P o l i t i c o - M i l i t a r y Affa i rs admit ted t h a t the U.S . w uld have 
gone ahead with the Djego Garcia expansion even if t h e r e was 
no Sovie t presence in the area without any q u a l i f i c a t i o n what-
59 
s o e v e r . However, he expressed t h a t c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l events 
in the pas t i . e . sudden outbreak of a West Asian c o n f l i c t 
and the subseguent o i l c r i s i s , s imul taneous ly gradua l inc rease 
in the Soviet naval presence in the area have been r e spons ib l e 
t o compel the U.S. t o make an expansion plan of Diego Garc i a . 
The U.S. dec i s ion t o push for an Indian Ocean base had 
i t s roo ts a l s o in the Middle East c r i s i s of 1973, co inc ided 
w i th the energy c r i s i s and the use of t h e o i l weapon by t h e 
5 8 . K.S. Jawatkar , op, c i t . , p . 40. 
59 . Seymour Weiss, op. c i t . , pp . 370-375. 
60 . Ibid . 
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OAPEC when t b e y imposed t h e o i ] embargo on Oc tobe r 17, 
1 9 7 3 . Under t h e embarao p o l i c y , t h e o i l s u - ^ r l i e s t o t h e 
U.S« were t o t a l l y b a n n e d . The a b r u p t i n c r e a s e in t h e p r i c e 
of o i l s i n c e *^ctober 1973 and t h e u s e of o i l as a p o l i t i c a l 
weapon by t h e Arabs t o p r e s s u r i z e t h e world i n t o s u p p o r t i n g 
them in t h e i r s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t I s r a e l fo rced Americans t o 
62 
renew t h e i r s t r a t e g y in t h e I n d i a n Ocean and t h e Gu l f . 
The whole c r i s i s r e q u i r e d e a r n e s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s among t h e 
U . S . p o l i c y m a k e r s a b o u t t h e Arab t h r e a t t o u t i l i s e o i l a s 
a p o l i t i c a l weapon. However/ d u r i n g t h e 1973 c r i s i s , t h e U . S . 
t h r e a t e n e d once t o occupy t h e o i l f i e l d s in t h e Culf r e g i o n . 
I t could no t i n t e r v e n e m i l i t a r i l y a t t h a t moment b u t t h e 
p r o s p e c t s of such a c t i r n i f need a r i s e s , in f u t u r e can n o t 
be d e n i e d . The p l a n s t o s e t up a f u l l - f l e d g e d n a v a l - a i r 
b a s e on Die'^o G a r c i a and t o a c T u i r e more base f a c i l i t i e s i n 
t h e B r e a i o n c l e a r l y r e v e a l t h e new U.'". i n r e r v e n t i o n i s t 
64 
s t r a t e g y m t h e a r e a . 
In f a c t , a f t e r 1973 v/est As ian c r i s i s , t h e emphas i s 
b e s i d e s cc r rmunica t ion b a s e f a c i l i t i e s l i k e an a i r s t r i p and 
l i v i n g accomodat ion t o s u p p o r t i t , s h i f t e d t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of l a r g e f u e l dumps, improv ing t h e h a r b o u r f a c i l i t i e s , l e n g -
t h e n i n g t h e a i r s t r i p / c o n s t r u c t i o n of r e p a i r workshops and 
6 1 . O r g a n i s a t i o n of Arab P e t r o l e u m E x p o r t i n g C o u n t r i e s . 
6 2 , s e e , Ralph H. Magnus, "Middle E a s t O i l " , C u r r e n t H i s t o r y 
F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 5 , p . 5 1 ; K, Subrahmani im, "The I n d i a n Ocean 
P o l i t i c s , "Link,May 20, 1 9 7 3 , p . 1 5 ; M o t h e r l a n d , F e b r u a r y 27 , 
1972; Edward M, Kennedy,"The P e r s i a n Gulf : Arms Race o r 
Arms C o n t r o l ? " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , O c t o b e r 1^75, p . 2 1 . 
6 3 . K.R. S i n g h , o p . c i t . , p . 1 8 5 . 
6 4 . s e e G e n e r a l P a u l K. C a r l t o n , " M i l i t a r y A i r l i f t f o r S t r a t e g i c 
M o b i l i t y , " S t r a t e g i c Review, W i n t e r 1974, p p . 2 6 - 3 1 . 
2'^ 
accnmodatlrn for more personnel. The new developments were 
desioned to enable Diego Garcia to function as a base for 
nuclear submarines, conventional task forces, a s taging post 
for heavy t ransport planes and s t r a i t l y as a base for long-
range domber operat ions . 
However, i n i t i a l l y the U.S. administrat ion denied tha t 
there Vvfere no plans for any s t r a t eg ic nuclear capab i l i ty on 
Diego Garcia, and no provisions for nuclear, miss i le carrying 
' P o l a r i s ' submarines. Signif icant ly , the enlarged a i r s t r i p 
t o be bu i l t on Diego Garcia was capable of i hand l ino the 
Air Force's largest supersonic bomber, the B_52 and huge 
t ranspor t planes l ike the Galaxy C-5 and C-141, Obviously, the 
intensif ied c^nacity of Diego Garcia as the strategic-*nuclear 
base would indubitably provide the U.S. a g i f t of nuclear-
powered naval and mi l i ta ry presence in the Indian Ocean a r ea . 
I t has, therefore , a las t ing value for the U.S. task force 
which constantly v i s i t the Indian Ocean waters. The base would 
be quite competent to demonstrate mi l i ta ry strength s t ra i tway 
t o exer t i t s influence by s t r ik ing appearance of i t s task force 
equipped with sophist icated nuclear weapons, having a i r support 
of the hot war p lanes . Thus, the expansion of the Diego Garcia 
base possesses intensified naval s t rength so that the U.S. 
can project i t s in te rvent ionis t and super power capab i l i ty 
65, K.R. Singh, op. c i t , pp. 192-193. 
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a t any place in the Indian Ocean area . The same was revealed 
in the Senate Sub-comrittee hearinqs on ^1jlitary Construction 
a t Diego Garcia. 
Major General George loving, the Air Force's Director 
of Plans/ disclosed in his testimony before the senate Sub-
committee on April 2, 1974 tha t the U.S. Air Force had consi-
dered p rac t i ca l capabi l i ty of the base of placlna m^clear 
cap^-^bje F-111 war-planes whose squandron norm'^lly comprised 
of 16 planes, havjng a range of b,600 miles. He a lso made i t 
c lea r that the base would be ab]e to manage a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s 
as we ] 1 as KC-13 5 tanker i lanes tha t could be used t o refuel 
the B_52 bombers. 
After Nixon's departure, then the President Ford a lso 
ius t i f l ed Diego Garcia expansion and s ta ted that the proposed 
ex"-^nsion was e s r e n t i a l to the nat ional i n t e r e s t of the U,S. 
and announced that the U.S. would have to ac t ive ly explore 
68 
the d e s i r a b i l i t y of having an Indian Ocean f l e e t . He argued 
in an interview to the 'Sea Power' tha t if the Soviets d i d ' n t 
come to some agreement with xis, there was ample evidence tha t 
they were moving ahead in research, development, procurement 
66. F-111 is capable of carrying s ix nuclear bombs or s ix 
sh'-'rt-range attack missiles (SRAI-l) armed v;ith nuclear 
warheads. I t has a f a c i l i t y of mid-air r e fue l l i ng . In 
recent at tack on L^bya, the U.S. used these p lanes . 
67. K.S. Jawatkar, op, c i t , p , 48; a lso see, K.R, 
Singh, op. c i t . , p . 194. 
68. U.S. Cr>ngressional Records, Senate, 94th Congress, Vol, 
121, No. 122, July 28, 1975, p . S13942. 
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and deployment of n u c l e a r weanons . In t h e s e cirGumstan<'^es/ he 
a d d e d , t h e U . S . must go ahe^d 'vvith i t s arms deve lopmen t 
69 programmes in t h e I n d i a n Ocean A r e a , 
However, i n h i s f i r s t p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e on August 2 8 , 
1974 on becr-ning t h e U . S . P r e s i d e n t , h e had e x p r e s s e d v iews i n 
f a v o u r of t h e l i m i t e d e x p a n s i o n of t h e b a s e . He p o i n t e d out 
t h e S o v i e t s had t h r e e n a v a l o p e r a t i n g b a s e s in t h e I n d i a n 
Ocean Berbera in Somalia, Vmm-Qasr in I r a q , and Aden in South 
Yemen. T h e r e f o r e , t h e u p g r a d i n g of Diego G a r c i a f a c i l i t i e s 
70 
d i d n o t pose any c h a l l e n g e t o t h e S o v i e t Un ion . 
The U .S .^ t h u s , was a la rmed from t h e S o v i e t a c t i v i t i e s 
i n d e v e l o p i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t n a v a l f a c i l i t y a t Be rbe ra t o 
s u p p o r t open '^ t ions Ln t h e n o r t h - w e s t I n d i a n Ocean n e a r t h e 
P e r s i a n GuJf. Signi<^i c a n t l y , t h e U .S . o b t a i n e d a e r i a l r e c o -
n n a i s s a n c e p h o t o g r a p h s - s a t t e l i t e p i c t u r e s - of S o v i e t n a v a l 
f a c i l i t i e s a t B e r b e r a . These p i c t u r e s were t a k e n sometime in 
A p r i l 1975 wi th t h e h e l p of a h i g h a t t i t u d e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e 
p l a n e , p re sumab ly t h e S R - 7 l ( T u r k i s h k a s e d American Spy p l a n e ) 
71 
o r U-2 Spy p l a n e , f l y i n g over I n t e r n a t i o n a l w a t e r s . 
6 9 . The H indus t an Times , August 15 , 1975 
^^- I'^^w.York Ti mes, August 29 , 1974; The Hindu, ^ g u s t 30 ,1974 ; 
a l s o se~e. New York Times, Sep tember 1, 1974, May 2 3 , 1975; 
The Times of I n d i a , Sep tember 5, 19 74 . 
7 1 . New York T imes , June 1 1 , 1975; a l s o s e e , John W. F i n n e y , 
"The S o v i e t s in S o m a l i a : F a c i l i t y Not B a s e , " New York T imes , 
J u l y 6, 1 9 7 5 . 
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72 VJJth the help of these photographs/ the U.S. identif ied 
Soviet f a c i l i t i e s i . e . fuel storage tanks, baracks capable 
of housing 1, 500 men, long-range radio antennae, a 15,000-
feet runaway and missi le storage a t Berbera. The pic tures 
indicated tha t the f a c i l i t y was designed t o handle surface-
to-surface missi les tha t could befired by Soviet warsliips 
against enemy ships and probably a i r - t o - a i r surface missi les 
t h a t could be carr ied by Soviet planes flying nut of Berbera. 
The U.S. oolicy-makers were a l so convinced tha t in some ways 
the Berbera f a c i l i t i e s were larger than those planned at Diego 
Oa re ia . 
James Schlesinqer/ Defence Secretary/ therefore , a l so 
j u s t i f i e d the Diego Garcia expansion for the Soviets were 
already in the Drocess of es tabl ish ing v i t a l f a c i l i t i e s a t 
Berbera. ^e sf^tod that the U.S. could not ignore the Soviet 
build u-Q in the area . He made i t c lea r that in a period of 
histori-^al t r : insi t ions towards a new se t of power re la t ionsh ips , 
only the U.S. among the western powers had the s ta tus to secure 
73 the balance of power. Any how, u l t imate ly , the House approved 
Diego Garcia expansion. 
The U.S. House freed $ 13.8 million author isa t ion for 
74 
the f i s c a l 19 75 for crnstructi '^n of f a c i l i t i e s on the i s land. 
72. In the same process, Americans spotted Russian missiles 
in Cuba. 
73. New York Times, June 15, 1975, a l so see. New York Times, 
June^ 11, 19 75; Richard Hass,"Concept of Peace Zone," 
Survival, ^1arch-April 1978; The Times of India , June 12,1975 
74. U.S. Congressional Records, House, 94th Congress, Vol. 121, 
No. 122, July 28,1975, pp. H 7636-72, 
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The ap'-^roval came t h e day when t h e s e n a t e a l s o v o t e d t o 
r e l e a s e f i s c a l 1975 funds f o r Diego G a r c i a , Thus , i t gave 
g r e e n s i g n a l f o r upgr '^dinq t h e b a s e . The c r i t i c s presumed i t 
a s an e n t r y i n t o t h e second Vie tnam l i k e c r i s i s . A p r o m i n e n t 
Congresrme,n Rober t L, Leqge t t viewed t h a t i t would on ly mean 
e n c o u r a g i n g t h e S o v i e t s in d o i n g t h e s ame . He s t a t e d t h a t 
75 i f you l i k e d Vietnam, you w i l l love Diego G a r c i a . 
However, a n o t h e r p r o m i n e n t Conoressman Samuel s , S t r a -
t t e n who led a U . S . House team a t B e r b e r a , i n fo rmed t h e members 
t h a t Berbera f a c i l i t y was t h e l a r g e s t n a v a l s u p o o r t f a c i l i t y 
a v a i l a b l e t o t h e S o v i e t Union o u t s i d e i t s homeland . The two 
f a c i l i t i e s one a t Aden and a n o t h e r a t Berbera p r o v i d e d t h e 
S o v i e t s an o p n o r t u n i t y t o c o n d u c t u n l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s from 
t h e P e r s i a n Gulf t o t h e Ba]ck Sea v ; ' t h o u t h a v i n g t o r e t u r n 
7fi 
t o e i t h e r V l a d i v o s t o k o r ^ a t r o p a v l o s k . T h e r e f o r e , Diego 
G a r c i a ba se was n e c e s s a r y t n p r o t e c t U . S . i n t e r e s t s , e s p e c i a l l y 
77 
o i l s h i p p i n g , in t h e I n d i a n Ocean. 
The Diego G a r c i a b a s e , which was d e s c r i b e d by t h e U,S« 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a " f i l l i n g s t a t i o n " o r " a d o t of an i s l a n d " 
was c o n s i d e r e d an a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y t o r e t a i n t h e a b i l i t y 
t o keep open t h e s e a - l a n e s l e a d i n g t o P e r s i a n Gulf o i l . Tn 
7 5 . I b i d , p p . H7654-56 . 
7 6 . The S o v i e t Favy h a s m a i n t a i n e d major f o r c e s a t V l a d i v o s t o k 
and o t h e r n o r t h e r n P a c i f i c P o r t s s i n c e t h e end of world 
war I I , s e e Drew M i d d l e t o n , " U , S , S t e p s up Check on S o v i e t 
B a s e s , " The Times of I n d i a , F e b r u a r y 2, 1984 , 
7 7 . U . S . C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d s , House , 94 th C o n g r e s s , . . . . o p . 
c i t . , p . H7656. 
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thruth^ the U.S. aovernment also presumed tha t without the 
base in Indian ^cean, c a r r i e r task forces operating in the 
area v/ould be deron'^ert for supplies on the n-'^ val base a t 
78 
Subic Bay in th'^ Phi l ippines, 3,500 miles away. Consequently 
Senate passed on August 9, l'^76 an another $ 104 mil l ion 
Defence Arpropriations Bi l l for the f i s c a l 1977 tha t included 
funds for a f i f th nuclear powered a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r to pa t ro l 
the Indian Ocean. 
Under the Carter .-administration, the senate approved 
a May 13, 19 77 the en t i r e $ 7.3 mil l ion recommended by i t s 
79 
Armed Services Com i t t e e for the f i s c a l year 19 78, 
Thus, gradually the base became operational and equipped 
with extended runway fuel storage tanks, s a t e l l i t e communications 
system and a sprawling deep water anchorage capable of handling 
the giant a i r c a r f t ca r r i e r s for t h e i r pa t ro l in the a r ea . The 
U.S. spy planes i . e . Orion and U-2, regular ly began to c r i s s -
cross overhead and ground s ta t ions and ships in te rcep t coded 
80 
mil i tary t r a f f i c . Thus, the U.S. rushed to conplete i t s f i r s t 
a i r -nava l base a t Diego Garcia. I t ' s operational capab i l i t y 
78. • Ibid, P.S13951. 
79. K.S. Jawatkar, op. c i t . , p . 7 7 . 
80. Kew York Times, April 7, 19 77; a l so see The Times of India, 
April 9, 1977. 
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was d e m o n s t r s t e d when U .S . Navy p - 3 a n t i - s u b m a r i n e war f a r e 
p l a n e landed a t t h e N a i r o b i a i r p o r t and t h e f r i g a t e "Beary" 
a r r i v e d in t h e Kenyan p o r t of Mombassa on Jnl^' 12, 1^76. 
Bo th , t h e Navy p l a n e and t h e f r i g a t e o p e r a t e d from Diego 
G a r c i a base cam.e in s u p p o r t of Kenya i n t h e d i s p u t e w i th 
Uganda, over t h e J u l y 3 , I s r a e l i r a i d t o r e s c u e h o s t a g e s b e i n g 
81 h e l d by p r o - P a l e s t i n i a n ^^ i jackers in Uganda. N o t a b l y , t h e 
b a s e wQs once a g a i n used by t h e U . S . in an u n s u c c e s s f u l 
go 
a t t e m p t t o r e s c u e 53 American h o s t a g e s i n I r a n , 
F o l l o w i n g t h e I r a n i a n c r i s i s , t h e U . S . v;as shocked 
a t t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n in 1979 . 
I n r e s p o n s e , t h e U . S . unde r took a major r ev i ew of i t s m i l i t a r y 
p o l i c y t o a ] low r a o i d i n t e r v e n t i o n anywhere in t h e wor ld i n 
c a s e of c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e S o v i e t Un ion . I n p u r s u a n c e of t h i s 
p o l i c y , an o u t l a y of $ 170 m i l l i o n was a u t h o r i s e d f o r f u r t h e r 
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e x p a n s i o n of i^iego Garc ia f a c ' ^ i t i e s . The U . S . a l s o p l a n n e d 
t o s t a t i o n p e r m a n e n t l y an amphib ious b r i g a d e mar ine s of a b o u t 
8 ,000 man. On Diego G a r c i a . T h e U . S . a l s o o r g a n i s e d i t s n a v a l 
f o r c e t h r ou gh t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e Rapid Reployment F o r c e 
85 
u n d e r t h e command of c e n t Com. 
8 1 . New York Times, J u l y 13 , 1 4 , 1 9 7 6 . 
8 2 . The Times of I n d i a , May 3 , 1980, 
8 3 . S e e , C h i t t a Bjswas/ " i m p e r i a l i s t must be k e p t of t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean ," New Age, F e b r u a r y 10/ 1974, p . 1 3 . 
8 4 . P . K . S . Namboodri/ " U . S . B u i l d - u p on Diego G a r c i a , " 
Nagpur T imes , J u n e 24, 1980 , 
8 5 . More d e t a i l in C h a p t e r I I . 
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In pursuance of i t s Indian Ocean policy and tho s t r a -
tegy of Diego Garcia build up, the U.S. is a l so providina 
massive and generous arms aid to pro-regines of the region 
besides searching base f a c i l i t i e s -it the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . 
The U.S. decision to rearm Pakistan/ ignoring Ind ia ' s secur i ty 
concern/ with the most le thal modern weapons is the most 
burning outcome of the current Reagan administrat ions policy 
in the region. 
'The new acgujsi t ion of arms by Pakis tan 's mi l i t a ry 
regime, most probably, wi l l be used mainiy to bo l s t e r i t s 
differences against India, The Reagan administrat ion i s supposed 
t o be aware of the poss ib l i t y . But the U.S. act ions in the 
Indian Ocean area including massive shipments of arms to 
Pakistan reveal the emergim U.S. perception of i t s global 
role pa r t i cu la r ly in the 80s. 
The policy decisions of tne Reagan administrat ion has 
obviously exposed the fact tha t the United States of 80s i s 
determined to recapture i t s " r ightful" place in the in te rna t iona l 
a rena . I t ' s massive reairaiment prograirrne reached t o cost upward 
$ -1,3 t r i l l i o n over the l a s t five years . I t led the U.S., 
f ac tua l ly , towrrds tougher policy-postures almost on a l l 
in te rna t iona l i s sues . The U.S. promise of massive mi l i ta ry 
aid to Pakistan as a par t of i t s Indian ocean po"'icy indicate 
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an increase in beJligerency tov;?rds the Soviet Union and a 
revival of the cold war. The Reagan's tough policy-»postures 
and harsh decisions have made i t c lear tha t the U.S. would 
r e s i s t , in comina years, any further erosjon of American 
influence in any part of the world, incJudinq the Indian 
Ocean region. 
This profound turnaround jn U.S. policy cautions tha t 
the th i rd world nations rnust s t i l l contend with the fact tha t 
the U.S. wi l l intervene m i l i t a r i l y in t h e i r local conf l ic t s 
e i t h e r direct J y or through proxies . For instance, the nev; 
aggressive U.S. posture in the Gulf, l i be ra l arms aid t o 
Pakistan, and new nuclear links with china could mean the 
strengthening of a pa r t i cu la r ly hos t i l e U.S.-Pakistan-China 
axis on Ipd ia ' s northern and vjestern f r o n t i e r s . 
Anti-Soviet sentiments i s an inbui l t feature of the 
American system. Signif icant ly , the mil i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l 
complex in the United States st imulate mil i tar ism and escala te 
World tensions t o ensure i t s own surv iva l . 
In fact , the Soviet Union suffered humiliat ion during 
Cuban Missile c r i s i s in 1962 and in response to t h i s psyche, 
i t began irassive build up o^ i t s mi l i ta ry powers. Resul tant ly , 
today the Russian's super ior i ty in several areas of weaponary 
is undisputed. The Reagan administration argued tha t i t 
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coi:ld not iqnore the massive build up of the Soviet Union. 
I t is the feer inspired bv th i s palpable Soviet suoer ioraty 
t h r ea t in arniaMSnts which grirood the two suner powers into 
the second cold war. 
The American fear of the "Soviet throat" has been 
heightened by some of the Soviet Union's actions in the recent 
p a s t . The Russians have demonstr-^ted i t s abj l i t v and des i ra-
b i l i t y as well to u t i l i s e i t s growing might to a l t e r regional 
Dower balances in i t s favour. Tn 70s, the U.S. poJ icy-makers 
had in mj nd tha t the Soviet Union could des t ab i l i s e Sudan/ 
Eaypt and Kenya. Gradually increasing Soviet a c t i v i t i e s in 
Afghanistan/ reaching i t s highest point in the revolutionary 
Coup in 1978, made the T ' . S . more nervous. In addit ion/ humili-
at-'ng at tacks on '^merj'an diplomats such as in Islamabad/ the 
murder of ambassador Dubbs in Kabul, and f ina l ly the seizure 
of American hostages in Tehran created a sense of concern 
and action in the Ameri'^an minds. 
Signif icant ly/ the Soviet int i-us ion in to Afghanistan, 
the f a l l of Shah of Iran, ?, s igni ' ' l eant Washington favour i s t s , 
the exposition of the weakness of U.S. mi l i t a ry forces in the 
Indian Ocean region in the case oi hostage c r i s i s in Iran and 
l a s t l y Iran-Irag war which threatened the flow of o i l po ten t i a l 
from the Gulf to the West co lJec t ive ly and gradually placed 
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the regiop- well within the cold war. But however, the U.S. 
super power thrus t in the Indian Ocean reqion also emerged 
from the politico-economic significance of the a rea . The 
whole scenario has worsened the p o l i t i c a l and secur i ty 
environment of the region. 
I t has been the consis tent fact tha t both the super-
powers kept themselves in the race tn catch the le-id over 
the r i v a l jus t i fy ing i t to maintain the nsutual balance and 
hence posed evergreen danger of emerging a disbalance in the 
global a f f a i r s . Both are anxious t o become the dominant inf lu-
ence in the world. This is the prime source of the t h r ea t t ha t 
cor fronts the whole of the th i rd world. 
As such/ i t is rot the intention the act ions tha t 
mat te r . Tn th i s respect , the Soviets have indtiibitably taken 
a successful lead to sa t i s fy t h e i r expansionist th rus t i n t e r -
vening into the Afghanistan's i n t e rna l a f f a i r s . But, one 
should be ^ware of the fact tha t i t is the regional and 
i n t e r n a l i n s t a b i l i t y which offer a f e r t i l e f ield t o the 
super powers to play t h e i r game on the foreign lands .The 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and vaccum in Afghanistan made i t 
vulnerable to super pov;er a s sau l t . The USSR as a super riovjer 
took the advantage of the s i t u a t i o n . The U.S. armed ass is tance 
t o Afghan insurgents through Pakistan has a l so been responsi-
ble t o preserve Afghan problem even today. As an externa l 
10 
TDower for t h i s region/ the U.S. t h r u s t . In fac t , i s based on 
mi ' i tar^ ' strennth in the Indian Ocean. Pakis tan ' s unstable 
and undemocratic p o l i t i c a l system nrovided fruitf-ul ornortunitv 
to Americans of base f a c i l i t y a t Pakistan. The U.S. has 
tiremendously increased i t s naval presence, estabJished s t r a -
t e q i c a l l y located nava i l -a i r bnse a t Diego Garcia ind obtained 
naval f a c i l i t i e s a t the ports of tlie few l i t t o r a l s , riost 
s ign i f i can t ly , the U.S. ~tiojticuB and controvers ia l "Star War" 
^ ro jec t , in which Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean has pecul iar 
pos i t ion due t o i t s s t r a t eg ic locat ion, has provided great 
impetus to U.S. s tn tus in th i s reoion. To catch and t o re ta in 
the so-called balance of pov/er, the United States under the 
Reagan administration seems determined to run fas -e r than 
the Soviet Union in cold war race, especia l ly in the Indian 
<^cean region. But th i s super-pov;er r iva l ry has put serious 
implij-^ations on India ' s secur i ty , 
India has a vast coastline,- With nev; o i l finds and 
the growing emphasis on the exploi ta t ion of the 200 km wide 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) , an area of two million square 
kilometres, the Ka^v's char ter expanded rrenifold. Besides, 
the U.S. naval presence and Diego Garcia build up have a lso 
threatened the secur i ty of Indian i s lands . The Falkland 
skirmish reminded Indian Pl-^nners of t h e i r own island t e r r i t o -
r i e s . In fact , with the incre'^sing s t r a i n on land res-^J^ces, 
count t r ies look at the Oceans, India, tuerefore , has to defend 
41 
i t s 5.2 million square km. of t e r r i t o r y for which India need 
a blue-vjat^r mvy. The changing geo-s t ra tegic scencirio led 
inev i tab ly to new thinking among the Indian mi l i t a ry planners 
Similarly/ one must be aware t ha t today the catchword 
on the def'ence scene is changed. The weapon technology has 
changed rsp id ly . Systems/ weapons/ s t ra tegy and doctr ine have 
a l l aalloped recently into an en t i r e ly new high technology, 
mechanised world, W-ir-games now proceed on the basis of most 
sophis t icated and highly manoeuvrable vjeapons equipped with 
most advanced computers/ laser guided missiles and modern 
multi-dimensional r adars . The a i r - fo rce of a nation thinks 
in terms of a i r - s u p e r i o r i t y . The F-14, F-15/ F-16 and B-52 
warn lanes of the U.S. ind in res onse, Mig-23/ Mig-25, Mig-27 
and Mig-29 of the USSR are s lnply tr,e issues of t h i s race of 
super io r i ty in a i r and represent a jump in technology. Simi-
l a r l y / the brown water navy's character today is ac t ive 
cont ro l of the blue seas* Since the U.S. navy i s expending, 
building and strengthening base on the island of the Indian 
Ocean in order to sa t i s fy i t s politico-economic and s t r a t eg i c 
i n t e r e s t s , the Indian defence horizons geographically have 
considerably and strenuously widened. Thus/ the secur i ty 
environment in the subcontinent i s gradually becoming more 
complex. To understand the whole p o l i t i c a l scenario of the 
12 
re--ion and the exact U.S. intent ions regarding Do igo Garcia 
build up, i t would be apnroniri a te if we proceed in the 
present study fm-ther with a discussion on the U.S. in te res t s 
and i t s s t r a t eg ic nerceptions in the Indian Ocean with 
especia l reference to Diego Garcia. 
CHAPTER 11 
The US. Interests and Its Strate 
Gic Perceptions in the Indian 
Ocean Rigion 
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Chapter - I I 
THE U.S. INTEREST AND ITS STRATEGIC PERCEPrIONS IN THE 
INDIAN OCEAN REGION 
In the recen t pa s t / the s e c u r i t y environment of the 
Indian ocean region has tremsndously d e t e r i o r a t e d due t o 
i n c r e a s i n g deployments of s t rong , naval power by the U.S. in 
t h e Indian Ocean wa te r s . The region f ee l s nervcxisness and 
i n s t a b i l i t y p r e v a i l s in the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . Transforma-
t i o n of the Indian Ocean region i n t o a zone of c o n f l i c t 
b r ings to l i g h t two fundamental i s s u e s . F i r s t l y , the geo-
s t r a t e g i c and g e o - p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Indian Ocean 
region, and secondly, the super power 's t h r u s t t o procure 
favourable r e s u l t s in the a rea in order t o s a t i s f y t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e p © l i t i c a l , economic, s t r a t e g i c and super power 
i n t e r e s t s . 
The B r i t i s h hold over t Indian ocean has s u b s t e n t i a l l y 
reduced. In f ac t , a f t e r the co ld war, the B r i t i s h empire 
r a p i d l y con t r ac t ed and i t became economical ly unbearable 
and p o l i t i c a l l y inadv i sab le for them t o cont inue t h e i r 
c o n t r o l over the reg ion . The, then. Prime Min i s t e r of B r i t a i n 
Mr. Harold Wilson a l so s t a t e d t h a t a l l B r i t i s h " m i l i t a r y 
forces outs ide EXircpe and Meditersanean would be withdrawn 
1. "Indian Ocean : Zone of Peace or Future War", ( E d i t o r i a l 
Mainstream, August 17, 1974. 
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by 1971," because they h^d "no t a n g i b l e r o l e t o njay in the 
2 
Far East and gulf" a-^ter the sa id d a t e . 
The gradual imoortanoe of the Indian Ocean had been 
3 
i .ncre»sing becau=;e of t r a d e and corrnierce. Later , t h e advent 
of s teamship , r i s k y and complicated land rou tes and the 
b u i l d i n g of the Suez canal caused t o i n c l i n e t h e s t r a t e g i c 
ba lance in favour of the Indian Ocean. However, t h e geo-
s t r a t e g i c importance of t h e Indian ocean i s a t t a c h e d t o the 
4 
a r r i v a l of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n in Europe and t h e wes t . Siib-
s e a u e n t l y , B r i t a i n maintained i t s supreme and e x t e n s i v e 
p o l i t i c a l and naval dominion and abso lu t e sway over the 
Indian Ocean w a t e r s . The Indian Ocean* t h e r e f o r e , was 
reaardod as the exc lus ive " B r i t i s h waters o r a " B r i t i s h 
Lake". After 150 ye-^rs soverei t n ty , t h e withdrawl of the 
B r i t i s h mi^ i tFry and naval p-resei-ce from t h e e a s t of Suez 
and the Indian ^ceen in the J a t e l°6ns c rea t ed a s o - c a l l e d 
"oov.'er vacuum" -'n t h e reg ion . Sim\iltoneous ly , B r i t i s h e r s 
a s s i s t e d the U.S. in the process t o r e t a i n power i n f luence 
i n t h e area thro\igh the manipula t ion of B r i t i s h Indian Ocean 
2 . Mart in , L.W',,"The Str?i tegic Consequences of B r i t a i n ' s 
r ev i s ed naval r o l e , " Edmond A. GulUon (ed.) Uses of 
t h e s e a s , London, 1 9 6 8 , p l l 3 . 
3 . s e e , Pannikar , K.M., Indian And t h e Indian Ocean, 
Bombay, 19 71, pp . 22-2TT 
4 . s e e , s r i d a r a n , K. A Maritime Hi s to ry of I n d i a , D e l h i , 
1965, p . 3 . 
5 . s e e , , Devendra Kaushik, The Indian Ocean Towards A Zone 
6f Pea^-e, Delh i , 1972, p p . 6 - 7 . 
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Ter r i t o r i e s and the indi rec t t ransfer of Diego Garcia for 
milit.-'ry purpose to the United S ta t e s . The Bri t ish withdrawl 
VMS/ therefore , only a tr^nsiSormation in to a '•Jestorn Alliance 
rrerriber's presence and a c t i v i t i e s . " Inevitably, the Soviets 
a l so t r ied to meet the U.S. challenge with counter moves. 
I t brouaht, obviously/ substant ia] presence of the external 
forces in the region which have been responsible enough t o 
maintain the v/hole ^eqion disauie t and desta i l i s e d . 
The Bri t ish naval presence in the Indian ^cean, 
in the past/ could be justi*-ied and had i t s legitimacy in 
a pa r t i cu la r sense because the Bri t ish empire posrossfd. 
Indian soverelonty, besides of several other l i t t o r a l s , in 
tho i r hands. In addii ion, India war a lso framed the cen t ra l 
par t of the imper ia l i s t pol ic ies of the Bri t ish empire in 
tho Indian ocean region. Rut in the la te 196ns a l l the larger 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the area had gainec'' independence and 
^ther few micro-states were fas t ly goino to achieve sovereign 
s t a t u s . Then, they had the option, therefore , t o pursue 
po l i c i e s favouring the i r observed nat ional intej-ests and keep 
adequate and required secur i ty forces in order t o safeguard 
these i n t e r e s t s . But the "pov;er vacuum" mvth overshadowed 
6. J a s j i t Singh/ Indian Ocean In Global Strateqi<-.. SOTO 
Perspectives/ IDSA New Delhi 1084 p . 2. 
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;s the leqitimote r ight r-.^- the Indian ^cean l i t t o r a l str-tef 
beJonnina excTusively F>S t he i r own and a t t rac ted outside 
big rnv/ers v;ith respective strong naval presence. TTactually/ 
the con-ept was simnly a oart oP the s t ra tegy to jiistiEy 
and Jeaitiniise the presence of externa] forces in the Indian 
ocean in pursuance of the ob-joctives to influence nnd r e -
arranne the a f fa i r s of the Third World in si-'poort of t h e i r 
own nat ional i n t e r e s t s and if necessary a t the cost of the 
Third Worid. If a power vacuum actxially existed/ the naturaJ 
r i g h t to f i l l tha t vacuum re s t s with the J i t t o r a l s t a t e s and 
7 
not powers external to the region. 
Thus, t'ne Bri t ish dominance on Indian Ocean waters, 
as already mentioned, vjns remained f=stablished comparatively 
more due to i t s pre-eminence over th"^ sovereignty of the 
i i t t o r n l c r u n t r i e s . I t ' s naval forces ^nd mi l i ta ry bases at 
Tinr.T-^ore and ^den ass is ted such maintenance. 
VUth the end of colonialism in the Indian ocean 
l i t t o r a l , there has been an in tens i f ica t ion of big power 
r i v a l r y , causing threa t to regional peace and s t a b i l i t y of 
8 the region. The raoid race of r i v a l r i e s under the ijmpact 
of strll<ing chanaes in technoloay and s t ra tegy , the mi l i ta ry 
7 . lb 1 d, 
B. "The Indian Ocean: UN Report, •' Link, June 16, 1974, 
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The United States Oil routes 
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i n t e r e s t of t he suoer po'A'ers i s g radua l ly Dncre^3inQ jn the 
Indian Ocean, F p c t u a l l y , the second world war revf^a led t h e he lp-
l e s s n e s s and rhe f a i l u r e of western naval armed deployed 
in the nort^'ern reaches of t hp ^rblan sea in an e f ' o r t t o 
main ta in cont inuous sirooly of o i l throuoh the Pe r s i an Gulf 
V7hen Janan nurzled them durinn the vjar obvious ly , in t h e neo- , 
c o l o n i a l i s t e r a , the U.S. search for base f ac j l i t i f ^ s and 
1 inkaoes in t h e Indian oce^^n reojn^ a re the r e s u l t o '^ i t s 
9 
s t r a t e a i c pe rceo t ions based -^ n p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t s , 
10 A s u b s t a n t i a l flow of o i l t o the west and t h e U.S. , 
and the U.S. f ea r of i t s i n t e r r u p t i o n in the event of c r i s i s 
i n west Asia, as lonq as I s r a e l i s cont inued i t s an a l l y , 
i s p e r s i s t e d by t h e Americans "^ o j u s t i f y U.S^ rriTlitary presence 
11 In t h e roq ion . However, the oi"" suop l i e s v;cr^ d i s i i io ted 
only in 1°73 follovjing Arab- Is rae l c o n f l i c t when few Arab 
12 
na t ions appl ied o i l embarao on western n '^ t ions . The a c t u a l 
s toppaae o-" o i l suno l i e s was witnessed cTice for a per iod of 
9 . s e e , L.W. Martin and Hedley Bul l , "The S t r a t e g i c Consequences 
of B r i t a i n ' s revised naval r o l e , " Kdrnord A. Gui l ion (ed.) 
Uses of the s e a , London, 1968, p . 124. 
10. In 19 75, t he crude o i l product ion from t h e vjest Asian 
c o u n t r i e s was 1,104 m i l l i o n me t r i c tons Wi ich w^s 36.37 
percen t of w o r l d ' s t o t ? l crude o i l p roduc t ion . See, K.S. 
Sidhu, The Indian Ocean: A Zone of peace P. 2 1 . 
1 1 . s e e , s . S , Bhatacharya, "Economic I n t e r e s t s of b ig powers 
in the Indian 0^ean,"IDSA J o u r n a l , New Delh i , J anua ry -
March, 197S. 
1 2 . s e e , Mohd, Jamshed, "o i l -The s t r a t e g i c Vfeapon of l"70,and 
Future Trends , " Vikran t , o-t-^^er 1973, p . 10. 
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S/kV.01 ARJkSiA 
ihc Persian Guif. 
S3 
_1_ 
The Pers ian Gulf 
r^o 
One week, from Februarv 25 t o M^^ irch 6, 197Q by Tr-^n. As 
f a r p>s, the sh ipping rou tes are concerned, t hese have been 
thr^-^tened on t h r e e ^-ccassion, ( l ) as a r e s u l t of I s r a e l i 
m ; 1 i t a r / ac t ion closi'"'"' "nez Canal f o r nea r ly seven y e a r s , 
(2) Ourina I ran-Traa w-^ r where the o i ] t-inkers were f r equen t ly 
a t t a cked in the Pers ian Gu]f and, (3) mines drooped jn the 
Red Sea which were destroyed by invo lv ing the Sovie t v e s s e l s , 
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mjne-sweepers and supoly ships near the Suez. Rut, in f a c t , 
t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n in o i l surioly much more badly a f fec ted t h e 
l i t t o r a l s t a t e s economically because of t h e i r heavy dependence 
on west Asian o i l and the s t a t e s where the c o n f l i c t occured, 
l i k e Egypt, I r an , I r a q , exnerienced comparat ively more loss 
and dan^ages. 
Thus, the a e o - s t r a t e q i c impera t ives which p l ay bas i c 
r o J e in the formulat ion of super power p o l i c i e s or ig ina te 
f i r s t from the d i r e c t c lashes apd r i v a l r y amongst t he two 
super nowers and second from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e compe t i t i ve 
r e l a t i ons with the Third Worlc^ c o u n t r i s s which a r s , howsvejr, 
o r i e n t e d t o s a t i s f y the f i r s t . 
The Indian Ocean, t h e r e f o r e , i s considered as t h e 
most important a '^a of the world today/ both p o l i t i c a l l y and 
14 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y . The magnitude of U.S. i n t e r e s t i s dependent 
13 . See, Ju rg Meis ter / "Spo t l i gh t on t h e Indian '-'cean," 
Swiss Review of World' Af f a i r s , March 1975, p . 18, 
14 . s e e , Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1974, p , 31 , 
Also see , STPRI Year Book, 1975., Stockholm I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
fieace Research I n s t i t u t e , 1975, p . 7 0 . 
r: 1 
upon the smallness or greatness of a country th-^t affects 
internat io '^si environinent. I t is incorporeal, whether the 
country is near or remote. ^s U. Alexis Johson/ former 
under secretary of s t a t e for p o l i t i c a l Affairs described 
i t , "we have an i n t e r e s t , a l so , in that small, remote country 
because i t has some influence. I t i s l ike the neighbour 
s i x or seven blocks down the road that vjell, he l e t s h is 
house run down? h i s kids are running around; he does not 
bother us much, but if you le t tha t kind of thing grow and 
you have more and more neighbours of that kind, i t tends to 
16 destroy the environment in which you are seeking t o l i v e . 
Tn addit ion, the U.S. f a i lu re in i t s p a r t i a l intervent ions 
in the regional conf l ic t s of the region also raised the need 
for more re l i ab le arrangements deploying more nava-air forces 
in the Indian Ocean. Tn 1971, in the event '^ f Indo-Pak wer, 
the presence of the U.S. task force headed by strong nuclear 
pov/ered a i r c ra f t c a r r i e r "US^ Enterprise" could not save 
the downfall of Dacca. The U.S. could a l so not reverse the 
decisions of o i l embargo imposed by the few Arab nations in 
15. See, l e t t e r from America by T.V. Parasuram,"America Will 
Stay at Diego Garcia," The Indian Express, March, 18,1974, 
16. U,S«/ Congress, House.' Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on 
National Security Policy and Scient i f ic Developments: 
Hearing Symposium: Natic^al Securitv Policy and the 
Changing World Power Alignment, Washington, 1972, p.382. 
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1973 and nor could resupply I s rae l in time during 1973 war. 
I t mereK' highligbted the U.S. impotency to safeguard i t s 
i n t e r e s t s in the region. The U.S. policy-makers/ therefore , 
rea l i sed the s ignif icance of bases, f a c i l i t i e s and access to 
f a c i l i t i e s in the Indian Ocean and the U.S. s t ra tegy has 
been gradually indulged in sa t js fylna these needs. The U.S. 
s t r a t e g y and i t s i n t e r e s t s , therefore, are d i r e c t l y attached 
with the th i rd world countries which they are facing and t ry ing 
t o asse r t the growing super power tension in the a rea . 
Tt is to be remembered that the cold war has the 
evergreen danger of i t s escalat ing into a hot war a t any time 
and the prospect of t o t a l annihi la t ion "-f the human race 
17 
hanging as the sword of Democlesalheit, a nuclear one. Th^ 
tens ions and race amongst the Big Two, re f lec t s i t s e l f in 
mi l i t a ry p fo r t i f i ca t ions and postures , p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t a ry 
alignments, nuclear and conventional arms race, m i l i t a r i s a t i o n 
of outer space and so on. The s t r a t eg i c areas and key resources 
of the Third World, provides b a t t l e ground of th i s cold war. 
The Indian Ocean i s believed as an area possessing the 
po ten t i a l to bring about major sh i f t s in the global power 
s t r u c t u r e . 
The super power's ambition, therefore , i s to add more 
and more s t a t e s in the i r respective camps to obtain greater 
control and influence in t he i r favour to win the cold war. 
17. J a s j i t Singh, op . c i t , p . 5 . 
18. Pobert ^^anning, "U.S. Presence in the Indian Ocean," 
The Times of India, December, 1975. 
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They also h i^ve been successful to maint^i^'n/ through the 
re la t ions with the th i rd world, t h e i r prosper i ty and p o l i t i c o -
econ'-^mic dominance. 
In addition/ numerous th i rd world countries ask for 
support and assis tance from the super-pov/ers in t h e i r own 
c o n f l i c t s . This obviously leads to the super power interference 
in the i r in te rna l / regional and b i l a t e r a l a f f a i r s . Notably, 
arms t ransfer i s the most powerful tool in the lands of the 
super powers to exploi t the thi rd v;orld count r ies . That ' s 
why, af ter the Bri t i sh withdrawl, the big powers entered 
in to an unending race to expand t h e i r influence in the Indian 
Ocean regi'^n i - order to secure markets, neu t ra l i se the 
p o l i t i c a l influence of the other and thj/s, forced regional 
s t a t e s to purchase t h e i r obsolute weapons. 
However, having tremendous, nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s any 
(''irect conf l ic t between the two super powers may be only 
inc identa l in nature, thaoagh, in fac t , "nuclear winter" may 
destroy large proportion ot the under-developed world more 
rap id ly since the third world is character ised by lower 
s t a t e of preparedness and high vu lne rab i l i t i e s t o the effect 
of nuclear conf l i c t . 
The th i rd world countries sense these tens ions . Many 
of them have increased tremendously t h e i r mi l i t a ry capab i l i -
t i e s . B u t , i n s t a b i l i t y continues t o be the main cha rac t e r i s t i c s 
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of p o l i t i c a l sys tem i n t h e s e c o u n t r i e s which o f t e n e x i s t 
a s t h e outcome of t h e co ld w a r . A,rmed c o n f l i c t s a r e c o n t i n u e d 
t o t a k e p l p c e in t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of t h i r d w o r l d . N o t a b ] y , 
a l a r a e number of m a j o r i t y of such c o n f l i c t s h a v e a l s o appea red 
due t o c h a J l e n q e s t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y or l e g i t i m a c y of power 
w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y . The U . S . had f r e q u e n t l y i n t e r v e n e d in 
t h e s e c o n f l i c t s , somet imes had r e a c h e d v e r y n e a r t o d i r e c t 
m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e s e c o n f l i c t s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y / t h e 
s u p e r powers a r e q u i t e cap^-ible t o u s e t h e i r f o r c e s a s a 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t r u m e n t w i t h o u t e n g a g i n g d i r e c t l y i n armed 
c o n f l i c t . Dur ing t h e p e r i o d 1946-82 , t h e r e were 259 i n c i d e n t s 
of t h e U . S . invo lvement of i t s armed f o r c e s w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g 
t o armed c o n f l i c t : -
U . S . ^^^LOY74ENT OF ARMKD F^^ RCES WTTHOUT 
19 
P e r i o d 1946-48 1949-55 1956-65 1966-77 1978-82 
Number of 24 24 120 53 36 
i n c i d e n t s 
Average f r equency 8 .8 3 .5 12.0 4 . 4 7 .2 
p e r y e a r 
Today, t h e second co ld w r h a s appea red on t h e world 
s c e n e and i t s focus i s on t h e I n d i a n Ocean r e g i o n . I t i s 
1 9 . J a s j i t S i n g h , op . c i t p . 1 2 . 
The U . S . i nvo lvemen t i n Libyan a f f a i r s and i t s t h r e a t e n i n g 
•- o o s t u r e s r e v e a l t h e U . S . i n t e n t i o n s t o i n t e r e f e r e i n 
t u r d wor ld a f f a i r s . R e c e n t l y , t h e t h r e e c a r r i e r U . S . 
b a t t l e g roup - r o s s e d G a g g a | i ' s l i n e of dea th '^of f t h e 
Libyan Coas t and i t s navy j e t f igh te rs f lew deep i n t o t h e 
Gulf of S i d r a . 
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prestmied t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e " I n d i a n Ocean i s d e s t i n e d t o 
20 
p l a y an i m o o r t a n t s t r a t e g i c r o l e In t h e f u t u r e world p o l i t i c s . 
The second c o l d war v;as b e l i e v e d t o be i n a u g u r a t e d 
when t h e S o v i e t s deployed t h e Cubans in E t h i o p i a i n 1 ° 7 8 . 
L a t e r , t h e l o s s of t h e SALT, t h e coup i n Aden i n v;h ich Rubayya. 
A l i was e l i m i n a t e d and s w i t c h ove r of S o v i e t s u p p o r t frrjun 
SomaJia t o E t h i o o i a in t h e Horn of A f r i c a g r a d u a l l y h e i g h t e n e d 
t h e t e n s i o - ' s be tween t h e t w o s u p e r p o w e r s . A f t e r t h e f a l l of 
s h a h of I r an and t h e S o v i e t i n t r u s i o n i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n was 
21 
c o n s i d e r e d a s " t h e f i n a l n a i l on t h e c o f f i n of d e t e n t e . " 
A f t e r Vietnam war, I r a n i a n tanglf^ and S o v i e t p r e s e n c e i'-
A f g h a n i s t a n remained t h e v i t a l f a c r o r s * which n e c e s s i a t a t e d 
a r ev i ew i n U . S . s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y towards t h e -'•ndian Ocean 
22 
r e g i o n as a w h o l e . 
In a d d i t i o n , t h e U . S . i s av;are t h a t now t h e S o v i e t 
Union has a s e v e n - o c e a n b l u e - w a t e r navy and m a s s i v e a i r l i f t 
c a p a b i l i t y which i t was l a c k i n g d u r i n g t h e f i r s t c o l d war , 
t h e r e f o r © / i t s r e a c h of i t s i n f l u e n c e c o v e r e d a l m o s t whole 
t h e w o r l d . The S o v i e t a s s i t a n c e t o Angola and Mozambique 
i s c o n s i d e r e d by t h e Americans as an a t t e m p t t o d o m i n a t e 
2 0 , B u r r e l , R.M, and C i t t r e \ A . J . , " S o v i e t - U . S . Nava l 
C o m p e t i t i o n i n One I n d i a n Ocean , " O r b i s , Phi H a d e I p h i a , 
W i n t e r , I^IS, 
2 1 , K. .Subrahmanyam, The second Cold War p-»4, 
2 2 , Quincy M i t c h e l l , "Big Poxver R i v a l r y i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , " 
New Age, New D e l h i , F e b r u a r y 10, 1974, p . 1 3 . 
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t h e s o u t h e r n s e a s . Thus , t h e S o v i e t b a c k i n q t o t h e E t h i o p i a n 
reg i i r e^ t h e coup i n South Yemen and t h e Saur r evo lu t i ' - . n in 
A f g h a n i s t a n may have been r e g a r d e d by t h e U . S . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
i n 1'^ '78 as a p r e l u d e t o c l o s i n g in on S a u d i A r a b i a , a s t r o n g -
a l l y U . S . a l l y and c o n t r o l l i n g t h e Bab e l Mandeb wa te rway . 
I t c r e a t e d more d i s t r u s t of S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e , 
t h e U . S . t e n d s t o look a t t h e deve lopments in t h e t h i r d world 
t h r o u g h t h e d i s t o r t i n g p r i sm of b i p o l a r i t y . B e s i d e s , i n t h e 
p o s t - c o d o n i a 1 e r a , t h e t h i r d world c o u n t r i e s have acQ'uired 
p o l i t i c a l and l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t t o c o n t r o l ove r t h e v i t a l 
na tur^-1 r e s o u r c e s , w i t h i n t J i e i r ov/n t e r r i t o r i e s . However, 
many of t h e s e c o u n t . "563 depend on m u l t i n a t i o n a l s of b i g powers 
f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n ^ and e x t r a c t i o n of t h e s e r e s o u r c e s . S i g n i f i n c a -
n t l y t h e U . S . a lways keep i n mind t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union i s 
c o n t i n u e d a s an onti^^n s c u r c e of t e c h n o l o g y f o r e x t r a c t i o n 
and e x p l o i t a t i o n of nnturriT r e so \ . i r ce s . The U . S . , t h e r e f o r e , 
h a s c ^ n t i n e u o u s t 'enr of d e n i a l of t h e s e minera ' r e s o u r c e s . 
T h u s , t he d e v e l o p i n g world i s now t h e a rena of t h e second 
c o l d wa r . 
In a d d i t i o n , d u r i n g 7 0 s , t h e Americans b e l i e v e d t h a t 
t h e S o v i e t Union i s s p e n d i n g h e a v i l y on m i l i t a r y R & D and 
h a s been c o n t i n u i n g t o p roduce s o p h i s t i c a t e d weaponry long 
a f t e r t h e Uni ted st^^^tes s t o p p e d t h e p r o d u c t i o n of TCBMs, 
23 
s u b n a r i n e , m i s s i l e s and bombers . 
2 3 . K, Subrahamanyam, The Second Cold VJar, ABC P u b l i s h i n g 
House, New D e l h i , 1983, p . i n . 
O t 
In a^r i i t ion/ t h e United s t a t e s (ievploped i t s Mlnuteman 
24 
I I I mjsgi le and i t s P-iseidom C-3 submarine m i s s i l e in 1970 
and t h e r e a f t e r t i l l the Tr ident C_4 conversion and Minuteman 
ITT imprnveinent in 1979 d i d ' n t qo in for any major s t r a t e g i c 
weapon programme. The Sovie t Union, on the other hand, produced 
t h e four th genera t ion of TCBMs/ the SS-17, SS- l8 ,SS- l9 land-
based m i s s i l e s . Hotel T l l - c i r s s , Delta I , I T and i T I - c l a s s 
and Yankee iT -c l a s s submarines, SS-N-6 convers ion , and SS-N-8, 
SS-N-18 nev; long range submarine m i s s i l e s a f t e r 197ri. The 
S o v i e t Union a l s o t e s t i n g another SLBM the Typh'^on, fo r 
deployment aboard a new c l a s s of submarines . Obviously, i t 
proves t h a t t h e Sovie t Union has g e n e r a l l y been t r a i l i n g 
behind the U.S. in high technology weaponry by a t l e a s t 
f i v e t o SIX y e a r s . 
S iqnlf i c a n t l y , the arman.'^nt became the c e n t r a l ir;sue 
in the second coid VJ^ r s t a r t i n g in 1978 w^s presumably 
t h a t a --umber of weapon techno l o r i e s v,*iich were under deve-
lopment reached a s t age when iJaey could be converted i n t o 
deployable weapons. For i n s t a n c e , t h e Tr iden t submarine 
and m i s s i l e , the ten-warheaded MX m i s s i l e , t he s t e a l t h 
technology bomber, the c r u i s e m i s s i l e , the ABM system, the 
neut ron bomb e t c . 
24. s e e . S u r v i v a l , July-Auoust , 1975, p . 194. 
2 5 . K. Subrahmanyam, The Second Cold War, . . . . o p . c i t . pp . 10-11. 
26. I b i d . , pp . 10 -11 . 
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Signif icant ly/ the nuclear forces ^rogr?rm^ accounts 
fcr only 17% of the tot-i 1 U.S. defence e>cpend3 t u r e . This 
27 h-is fTipde the U.S. a t e r ro r in the nuc]e--ir f i e l d . ' The second 
cold w?=r/ therefore, possesses i^sue o^ nucle;=r '-JP^ ons -"ind 
the r^'^id "^ j ] i t a r i s^ t ion of space. The Soviet Union, however 
h^s achieved an anoroxi'^c-ite equation in nuclear armaments 
capab i l i ty except space weapons and there is a nuclear arms 
race in a t rue sense. With th i s nuclear arms dr iving the 
r o s s i b i l i t y of a major d i rec t war between the two super powers 
in to the realm of the improbable, the technoloaical arms race 
i t s e l f hns become the pr incipal mode of contest which can 
not be brought to a judgement of winner or loser vjithout 
endangering the world. 
Thus, the cold war and the consequent arms race have 
t e r r i b l e risks for the whole world including the Indian '^cean 
region. 
In f a -1 , the U.S. policy is directed tov/ards domestic 
upheavals in the th i rd world na t ions . The pos t -co lonia l era 
i s one of turbulence for most of the developing coun t r i e s . 
Various re l ig ious , t r i b a l , ethnic and other antagonism which 
27. Letter to the ed i to r by Lt. Col. M.G. Abky^nkar, The 
Times of India, September 6, 19 84, 
Notably, tine Reagan's defence department Presented the 
conaress with a $305 b i l l i on budget for f i s c a l 1985, 
q hefty 13 percent boost over 1^84 budget. The budget had 
a $ 926 b i l l i on spending plan and $ 180 b i l l i o n de f i c i t 
and record mi l i t a ry increases . 
See, The Times of India, February 2, 1984, 
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were a l l a lona there during the colonial oer-'"od, surface 
and d i rec t themselves aoainst the new post-colonial nat ional 
governments. The colonial occupation s t i f l ed the na tura l 
evolution of na t ion-s ta tes in the developing world and the 
process of cohesion and consolidation into na t ion-s ta tes has 
beoun only in the l a s t two or three decades. Endemic violenc 
and upheavals are to be exr^octed in this c-mnressed ^eriod, 
and these s t a t e s , therefore,v;ouId be extremely vulner^'ble 
28 
t o external in te rvent ions . 
e 
FTowever, third world countries ?^re asser t ing themselves 
in in terna t ional a f f a i r s , but in fac t , i::he growing power 
of th i rd world c-^untries is assumed in Washington as a 
challenge to v.'^. Coh-T] influence and i n t e r e s t s . Notably, 
the U.S.r ' : -n3 r i tv considerably dej^ends upon the consumption 
of d isr rooor t ionate am-^unts o^ olobal resources bv a r e l a t i v e l y 
small ner^entage of the world looula t ion . The present system, 
therefore , fan not be sustained v/ithout having the necessary 
i:orce a t the coirmand of the U.S. to enforce i t . That ' s why, 
the U.S. i s very much concerned to oi-eserve the s ta tus-quo 
in the third world. For th i s purpose, the pentagon i s busy 
in the develooment of l igh t , mobile and f lexible U.S. forces 
for deployment in Kiddle East or Persian Gulf and conduct 
29 
operations without relyino on permanent bases in those a reas . 
The above thrus t of the U.S. administration led the 
crea t ion of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in 1979 
which have over 400,000 personnel assigned to i t for global 
GO 
responses. The U.S. further established cent Com (cent ra l 
Comm'-^ nd) on Janu-iry 1, 1983, the second American comm^md 
a f t e r Y^ATO, as the comrand ^nd centrol irfrastr iTcture for 
cordiart of r - ' i i t a ry ooerations in areas not soecif ic?. l ly 
under the ju r i sd i c t ion of AtlantiCand Pacific Comrmnds, 
with provisions for the RDF and other forces being a-signed 
to i t , if need a r i s e s . The focus of U.S. cent Com or the 
R.D.F, is the Indian Ocean region as a whole. 
I n i t i a J l y , the U.S. nronosed t^ ra i se such a force 
of 100,000-man to respond to mi l i t a ry aogression in remote 
a reas , primarily the Gulf, a t an estimated cost of around 
$3n b i l l i o n . The U.S. -^olicy makers have laid the in f ras t ruc -
ture of the RDF by way of credib]e US naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean consis t ing of 37 sh ios in October 1^80, 
inc]udino two to three a i r ca r f t c a r r i e r s , the presence of 
a more or less permanent marine amphibious force of about 
1,800 troops wliich can rapidly be reinforced, the preposition-
ing of cargo ships around Diego Garcia carrying enough 
equipment for an enlarged to 10,G0-inan marine force for 
two-weeks, plus some a i r - force squadrons, arrangement of 
bases and base f a c i l i t i e s in Oman, Egypt, Somalia, and kenya 
and t r i a l - f l i g h t experience for U.S. a i r fo rce planes to 
operate in the region from a i r - f i e l d in Egypt and Saudi 
a rab ia . 
30 . The Tjmas of India, September 22, 1980. 
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The R .D.F , w s o f f i c i a l l y o r g a n i s e d i n M^^rch 1980 
u n d e r t h e comma'^d of L t . Gen. P a u l K e l l y rf t h e mar ine 
c o r p s ^nd has i t s h e a d : u a r t e r s a t K a c d i l l a i r f c r c e b ^ s e i n 
T i^TTipa. I t has no f o r c e of i t s own b u t draws on t h e f o u r 
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s e r v i c e s f o r t h e p e r s o n n e l needed f o r a g iven o p e r a t i o n . 
A c c o r d i n g t o t h e b r a i n beh ind t h i s t a s k f o r c e I d e a , R o b e r t 
Krmer/ unde r S e c r e t a r y of Defence f o r p o l i c y , t h e b road 
s t r a t e g y arnund which t h e P . B . F , i s d e s i u n e d i s " f i r s t t o 
32 d e t e r , t h e n t o d e f e n c e , " 
However, t h e U . S . p o l i c y m?kers a c c e p t t h a t i t w i l l 
n o t b r i n g a b o u t a change in t h e S o v i e t p l a n s . F o r i n s t a n c e , 
R o b e r t Koraor a g r e e s t h a t i t would be no f a n i c f o r t h e S o v i e t s 
t o a e t l a r c e f o r c e s i n t o t h e Gul f . P r i ' ^ a ry p u r p o s e of t h e 
RDF ] S , t h e r e f o r e , no t t o d e t e r t h e S '^v ie t s b u t t o p r o t e c t 
t h e e x i s t i n g r ea imes from i n t e r n a l c h a l l e n g e s and i n c a s e 
t ^e^' c^n n o t be saved f ron i n t e r n a l e r u p t i o n o r r e v o l u t i o n , 
33 thf-^ Tf^  t o move in t o s e c u r e th-^ o i l f i e l d s . 
S i a n i f i c a n t l y , t h e U , S . army i s a l s o p l a n n i n g s m a l l e r , 
more mobi le d i v i s i o n s s u i t a b l e f o r r a ^ i d dep loyment o v e r s e a s , 
by cu+-t ing d i v i s i o n a l s t r e n g t h t o 10 ,000 men and e l i m i n a t i n g 
t a n k s and armoured p i^rsonnel v e h i c l e s , which a r e now p a r t of 
s u c h u n i t s , ^ t w-iuld e n a b l e dep loyment of p e r s o n n e l t o a 
d i s t a n t t r o u b l e s n o t in f - u r days wi th 478 s o r t i e s by C-141B 
3 1 . R icha rd P a l l o r s o n " U . S . T r r o p s t o J o i n Manopurres i n 
E o y p t , " The Times of I n d i a , Sep tember 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 . 
3 2 . The Times of I n d i a , September 22, 1980. 
3 3 . I b i d . 
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tr'=»nS'-ort pl'-Ties. The new l i a h t (i- 'visions xvill r-rovjHe t h e 
"core" which can e a s i l y be adODted to a snpc 1f j c , t a sk or 
a rea by adding elenients , such as the TLAT (t^^- "i;'~'>^ + ^.-
tank) u n i t s c o n s i s t i n g of 60 jeep mounted tow m i s s i l e s , 
heavy t r u c k s , a i r defence b a t t a l i o n s , corps a r t l ] l e r - y br igades 
34 • 
and CH-70 medium h e l i c o p t e r ba t t a J i^-ns . 
. In the recen t p a s t , t U,S, has m--^ !inta jnod a s t r ong 
nucJet^j- powered naval a i r task f<^ ze in the Indian Ocean. 
The U.S. s t r a t e a y has i t s p-k ir to deploy approximately 600 
warships with 13 t o 15 a l r c r a t c a r r i e r s t o be deployed in the 
Indian Ocean, a t the same t me. without reducing forces in 
35 
o t h e r a r e a s . Obviously/ the "n i t ed S t a t e s has esta'-~ l ished 
i t s naval s u p e r i o r i t y i n th r rea ion which provide smooth 
s t r a t e g i c m^bi l i tv and c o n t r o l over the "choke Doints" 
(Suez and Penama Canals , anr^  Hala-^'-a s t r a i t s ) and southern 
"Ocean aatr--.'ays" (a t the southern ex t remet ies of South 
Amer-!c-i, South A.frica and Aus t ra l i a ) t o t h e United S t a t e s . 
The U.S. c e n t r a l command a c q u i s i t i o n of base and o the r 
f a c i l i t i e s in var ious Indian Ocean l o t t o r a l s t a t e s i n d i c a t e 
the kind of p r e s s u r e s . On tho developing world . Thus, t h e 
whole Indian Ocean area i s exper iencing the dangerous manoe-
u v r a b i l i t y of t h e U.S. fore ign p o l i c y b a s i c a l l y emerged 
from the economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The U,S, t h r u s t of t he 
34 . The Times of Ind ia , Apr i l 29, 1984. 
35 . J a s j i t Singh, . . . . . . . . op. c i t , p . 16; 
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cjo^pl strategv', therefore, to est^'^lish nnlitico-G-:onom:^ 
dominance in the reaion has i t s d i s t i n c t i v e diniensio'-s. 
The vast untanped mineral resources and raw rri-Lerials 
of the reaion a lso offer an allurement t o the developed nations 
located outside the region. Their efforts t o explore and 
exploi t these resources not only oteate tensions ;=imom the 
big powers but a]so lead to provocp ions t o the reaio-^al 
s t a t e s , culmjn-^tina into conf] i r t3 if regional and i n t r a -
regional character . 
The American strateCii'5''T assume tha t the In te r io r 
legions of the world wi l l probr-^bly be developed and populated 
by th" middle of the 21st century. T-t i s a l so presumed tha t 
economically rich natural res'^urces w^uld be extracted 
through modern technology in the easteri Soviet Union, 
the polar reaions and the deep oceans. Tn addi t ion, a sJncere 
beginning of the indus t r ia l iza t ion and economic exploi ta-
t ion of space durina t h i s period is also an t i c ipa ted . Signi-
f i can t ly , the exploi ta t ion of new areas and f ront ie rs has 
had a ma]or impact upon the geo-pol i t i ca l perspect ives 
of s ta tus and t h e i r p o l i c i e s . The Soviet Union, in t h i s 
respect , is perceived to possess an inher i t advantaae in 
t h e sovereignty over the larae Siberian and the eastern 
region with t h e i r vast potent ia l wealth. The completion of 
36. K.S, Sidhu, op. c i t , , p . 6. 
G 1 
the Baikul-Amur Mainline Railroad and aas oipel ine t^ weastern 
Europe in stJite of U.S. objections, are oreconcerted signs 
conveylno direct ion of a radical change in the econonic and 
poli+-ica] significance of eastern S iber ia . The U.S. policy 
makers believed/ therefore , tha t the Soviet Union v;ould 
c e r t a i n l y beable to play a nev; role as a pacif ic power with 
gained cap=^bilities. The construction of a 75,000 ton d i s -
placement a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r " i th an acc mpanying task force 
group, by the Soviet Union enhanced %ierican f ea r s . Indubita-
bly , the Soviet Union possesses vast resource base in ""ts 
t e r r i t o r i a l i u r i sd i c t ion . However, the U.S. has acquired 
technological ledd in the sphere of outer space and ocean 
technology, therefore , exploi tat ion of Indian ocean v;^ters by 
the U.S. could "a l t e r -the geo-pol i t i ca l map by the ear ly 
twenty f i r s t century and extend American pov/er in to new 
dimensions. 
Besides technological advancement, the free and 
favourable extraction and e>:ploitation of Indian Ocean waters 
a lso demand politico-economic control and dominance through 
subs tan t ia l mi l i t a ry presence. The basic roots of U.S. 
s t r a t egy in the Indian ocean l i e in th i s f ac t . 
The U.S. econonic i n t e r e s t apart fron o i l and secured 
o i l routes , therefore , are closely attached with economic 
37. J a s j i t Singh, op. c i t . , p-16. 
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p o t e n t i a U t i e s - rich marine minerals and sea food resources-
in the Indian Ocean. Signif icant ly , the U.S. h^s tremendous 
advancement in Ocean engineering technologies. But the nev. 
regulat ions on the Law of the Sea through the U-ited Nations 
Conference and gro^^Jing ;,vareness of the le t toraJs in respect 
o£ marine resources which led an application of 20n-mjle 
exclusivr^ ec-noinic zone rroviding the right of exploi ta t ion 
and extr^- t ion of marine re5r.urces exclusively to the l i t t o r a l 
s t a t e s , "^ ^ increased the nervousness o£ the Americans and 
thus , forced than; towards rar id mi i i t a r i sa f ion of the Indian 
Ocean, 
Of course, the extension of oceanic economic zones 
may escalate regional disputes or jeopardise the regional 
peace or world. No l i t t o r a l s t a t e of the Indian ocean aiming 
a t more rapid economic progress, however, can forego her 
39 
claims t o s"ch extended ju r i sd ic t ion in sp i t e of the U.S. 
oonosition and efforts to confine the oceRnic t e r r i t o r i a l 
boundaries of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean, In 
f ac t , the U.S, has the in tent ions to explore and exploi t 
the marine wealth of the Indian ocean without any hinderances 
or excitOTent created by the l i t t o r a l s ta tes and therefore , 
indulged in increasing i t s naval force in thr region. 
38. The^imeg of India, September 14, 1978 
39. J.N# Chaudhary, **NaVal forces in the Indian Ocean Conflictin< 
a t t i t udes of l i t t o r a l s t a t e s , " The Times of India July 8, 
1971. 
GG 
Apqrt fri^ m deep Ocean engineerinq/ the U.S. has an 
upoer hand and advancement in space based high technology 
which is especial ly disturbing the nuclear balance jn the 
Indian ocean region. In the second cold war/ in fact the 
outer space is the new front ier to be conquered. The Pentagon 
has included the Indian ocean in i t s space weapon s t ra tegy . 
The Indian Ocean has i t s peculiar imnortunt place 
in U.S. space s t ra tegy . Besides/ industr ia l exploi ta t ion of 
outer space, the new advanced space technologies have trem-
endously increased U.S. mi l i tary c a p a b i l i t i e s . The space 
stiibtegy is e s sen t i a l ly assis ted by extensive network of 
lard based command/ controls / communication and reconnai-
ssance network. Anproximf te ly / 70 percent of the pentagon's 
communications are performed through the space. For instance, 
the U.S. has i t s Ground - ba^ed Electro-opt ical Deep Space 
Surveil]=»nce (G^ODSS) system w^ich wil l scan l ike radar 
u'ith the s e n s i t i v i t y and ranae o'" a Baker Nunn Camera v^ ich 
has the a b i l i t y to spot a one foot diameter object a t 2 5,000 
miles a l t i t u d e . An affect ive space coverage is required 
a t leas t f ive GEODSS system to be planned. The Indian Ocean, 
due t'-^  i t s s i ze and area i s believed to have a requirement 
for at least one of then to be located in th i s region. Signi-
f i can t ly , ^^ ne out of five DEODSS system planned b" the U.S. 
40-. See, Jasj i t Singh, op. c i t . , p .18. 
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41 has established at Diego Garcia in 1985. Diego Garcia 
foims an significr>nt link in U.S. Communication network and 
i t s a i r f i e ld i s regularly used by lona r?nae a i r c r a f t on 
electr^'nic and maritime 'reconnaissan'^e missions. I t is 
s igni f icant to note here , tha t U.S. T P V / S present d i f f i cu l -
t i e s of i n s t a l l a t i on of a powerful EIF (extreme low frequency) 
system necessary for fas te r communications with deep-submeroed 
nuclear-armed submarines may require another low-powered 
system to be ins ta l led in the Indian '-^ cean region. 
In addit ion, s a t e l l i t e s are playing extremely s ign i -
f ica t ion role in super power s t r - t egy of nuolear and conven-
t i o n a l war/ for gathering early warning/ reconnaiseance 
informations/ communications and navigation. Satei H t e s / 
therefore , framed an important element in the exploi ta t ion 
of space for mi l i ta ry and s c i en t i f i c '^urp'-'Ses. In other "Words, 
the canabi j l ty of a suner-power of being used these s a t e l l i t e s 
compar^t-'vely more in number and efficiency/ would provide 
de f in i t e edge over the other . However/ s a t e l l i t e s a lso 
cons t i t u t e the most vulnerable part of the s t ruc ture for 
s t r a t e g i c v/arfare/ and destruction of the opponent's s a t e l l i t e s 
would ajjnost cert^^inly precede any major w^r between the 
superrovjers. Soviet a i i t i -sa te i l i t e weapon development r e l i e s 
on the technique of using a s a t e l l i t e for in tercept ion with 
4 1 . Ibid. 
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the intercept'-'r s a t e l l i t e havjna to make more than one 
o rb i t before i n t ^uen t iop / and th i s orbi t c^iild le^ve 
the i n t r r o e r t o r - s a t e l l i t e vulnerable to h o s t i l e ac t ion. 
For effect ive a n t i - s a t e l l i t e operation to be executed, the 
offensive wi l l need to be launched in a coordinated concurr-ent 
mode spread a l l over the globe with the object of destroying 
almost a l l s a t e l l i t e s almost concurrently/ within a time-
frame measurable in a few minutes at the most. At any one 
point in time, the actual position of s a t e l l i t e s (of different 
types and on dif ferent orbits} , would be spread out in space 
spanning a l l ar'^und the globe. And t h i s is where the importance 
of Indian Ocean l ies with i t s vast expanse at the Equator 
42 
and the southern hemisphere. 
The United s t a tes has been developing various techno-
logies in support of a n t i - s a t e l l i t e warf=ire i . e . l ase rs / 
directed eneray weapon, and homing interceotor technoloay 
( H I T ) . The HIT/ ^special ly, offers the greates t pay-offs . 
The present HIT based ASAT programme has many s ign i f ican t 
advantaoes, i t does not need a nuclear warhead, i t e s sen t i a l ly 
remains an earth-based system overcoming both the l imi ta t ions 
of space t r e a ty obliaation as well as making i t almost 
impossible to ascer ta in the exact location of the system. I t 
a l so r e l i e s on the use of well t r i ed and tes ted sub-systems. 
The system provides tremendous f l e x i b i l i t y since i t can be 
42. Ib id . , p . 20. 
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launched f r'-^ m mi l i t a ry and c i v i l a i r f i e ld s and a r e l a t i v e l y 
swift attack could be launched aqainst a whole range s a t e l l i t e 
a t low o^bit hejqhts . The miss i le under t h i s system could 
-ISO be launched aqainst s a t e l l i t e s a t greater a l t i t udes 
with the he]p of powerful rockets Dike those of the TCBKS 
43 
or SIPMS. 
Diego Garcia and the Indian ^cean have pecul iar 
importance end luc-§tiveness in U.S. s t ra tegy for employment 
of airlaunched AS^ T^ system. Notably^ ASAT s t ra tegy of the 
U.S. wil l need to be g]obaZ in its aonroach. The ASAT systems 
w i l l plso need for maximijn effect/ t o be launched in a mialti-
direction-> 1, multi-mode/ co-ordinated integrated operation 
t o intercept almost a l l , Soviet s a t e l l i t e s simultaneously. 
Soviet land mass and the regions south of i t including the 
Indian Ocean cons t i tu te approximately one thirH of the e a r t h ' s 
sur face . I t means a large number of Soviet s a t e l J i t e s may be 
expected to be over th is par t of the globe, a t any one time, 
which may take as much as 90 minutes to get to areas under 
the d i rec t jur i sd ic t ion of the U.S. and i t s a l l i e s , an 
unacceptable level of time - leg for successful ASAT 
s t r a t egy . The imperative for the United States to be able to 
launch AIASAT weaoons in th i s par t of the globe, therefore , 
are obvious. Hence, the ijnportance of the Indian ocean and 
i t s l i t t o r a l is very c r i t i c a l . The U.S. we^ experts a re 
43. Ib id . , p . 21. 
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modifyina NAIO 'S Tornado i n t e r c e p t o r s for ALAS^T r o l e . 
Obviously, IT,S. Favy ' s c a r r i e r - b o r n e F-14 Tcwcot i n t e r -
cer^tors may a l s o be modified for t h i s r o l e . N a t u r a l l y , i t 
w i l l provide addi t iona? f l e x j b i t y . These i n t e r c e p t o r s could 
b e deoloyed aboard U.S. a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s , expected number 
2 t o 3 with surge c a p a b i J i t y formino p a r t of U.S. a i r - n a v a l 
p ^ s e n c e in t h e Indian ocean. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the a i r f i e l d 
a t Diego Garcia c uld a l s o be used for F-15 ALASAT launch 
b e s i d e s any f i g h t e r s opera t ing from A u s t r a l i a with a i r t o 
a i r r e f u e l l i n g . Coupled with SLBM-launched ASAT m i s s i l e s 
such forties deployed in the southern hemisphere, of \vhich 
t h e Indian ^cean c o n s t i t u t e n e a r l y o n e - t h i r d area and provides 
t h e only base for ASAT-missile launch in t h i s segment of 
t h e g lobe , would provide s i g n i f i c a n t s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y 
t o t h e United S t a t e s . Above d e t a i l s t e ] l t h a t a p re -empt ive 
s t r i k e t o d e c a p i t a t e t h e Soviet s a t e l l i t e systems would 
s e r i o i i s l y deorade .Sov ie t c a p a b i l i t i e s t o f i gh t a s t r a t e g i c 
nuc l ea r war, thus making a nuc iear v/ar "wi-nable" by t h e 
45 U.S . 
I t is a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t t o no te t h a t t h e U.S . considered 
the Indian ocean as " the bes t p lace f o r launching under-water 
46 
nuclear attack on the nerve centres of the Soviet heartland. 
45 , I b i d . , p . 22. 
4 6 . s ee , A.K. C h a t t e r j i , " I n d i a n Ocean and I n d i a , " India and 
t h e World (Ed. A . P . J a i n ) , New De lh i , 1972, p . 211 . 
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In f a c t , the U.S. Dolicy a l s o aimed a t Containment of 
t h e Sovie t inf luence through t h e deployment of i t s sub-
marine launched B a l l i s t i c t ^ i s s i l e s in t h e Indian ^cean 
w a t e r s , ' \ccording to the war exper t s t h a t t h e deployment 
of m i s s i l e system in t h e Indian Ocean by the U.S. p rov ide 
47 
an "a rq l e" / i t d i d ' n t have before , on t h e Russian t a r g e t s . 
In additJovi/ t h e Peagan government i s s e r i o u s l y 
working on S t r a t e g i c Defence I n i t i a t i v e p r o j e c t a 26 b i l l i o n 
48 d o l l a r s research programme, popu la r ly known as "S ta r Wars" 
programme. 
P re s iden t Reagan c a l l e d on American s c i e n t i s t s on 
Mnrch 2 3, 1983 t o bu i ld a m i s s i l e d^fen^e in space so as 
t o render a l l p r e sen t and fu tu re nuc lear weaoons " JmDf^tent 
49 
and o b s o l e t e . P re s iden t P.eagan beJJeved t h a t t h e sai'"' 
p r o j e c t v;il] b r i no the Russians back t o the n e g o t i a t i n g 
50 
t a b l e t o c o n t r o l nucle=>r war h e a d s . The S t a r War sys tan 
involves p-iacing s a t e l l i t e s in p lace t o d e t e c t an i n t e r -
c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s i l e a t launch. Ear th-based weapons such as 
l a s e r beams, bounced off g ian t mi r ro rs in space , would 
4 7 . U.S. News and World Report , Vol . LXIII, No. 9, Washington, 
August 28, 1967, pp. 32-33. 
4 8 . The Congress had approved $2.6 b i l l i o n fo r research in 
1986 for t h i s p r o j e c t . B r i t a i n and Germany has o f f i c i a l l y 
en te red i n t o t h e programme. 
4 9 . See, Maya Chadda,"Star Wars Programme: I d e o l o g i c a l and 
^ar - t i san ," The Times of I n d i a , ^arch 3, 1986. 
5 0 . See, William J . Broad, "European Worry on Reagan's 
SDI."The Times of Ind ia , May 27, 1985. 
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h i t t h e r o c k e t in t h e 180 s e c o n d s . I t needs t ^ b o o s t t o 
^ 51 
i t s e ] f from t h e ground i n t o o r b i t , 200 'km h i g h . 
As a p a r t of St^-^r VJ-^ rs programme, a c c o r d i n g t o 
P r e s i d e n t n e a g a n ' s t o p s c i e n c e a d v i s o r I'-r. George Keyworth, 
t h e Uni ted St-^tes w i l l be ;qble t o d e m o n s t r a t e b e f o r e 1^84 
t h a t i t can d e s t r o y an i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l m i s s i l e w i t h i n t h r e e 
m i n u t e s of i t s l a u n c h . In J u n e 1985, t h e U , S . e x n e r i m e n t e d 
w i t h b u n c i n g a l a s e r beam off t h e s p a c e s h u t t l e i n Sentember 
1085 , w i t h d e m o l i t i o n of a s t a t i o n e r y m i s s i l e i n -^ ew Mexico, 
and i n November 1^85, a l i t t l e b e f o r e t h e U . S . - S o v i e t summit 
w i t h d e s t r u c t i o n of a mock s o v i e t m i s s i l e by a s p e e d i n g 
• ^ . 1 53 p r o j e c t i l e . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , ^ p a r t Frnnn t h e a n t i - s a t e l l i t e weapons 
sys t ems somet imes c a l l " k i l l e r s a t e l l i t e s " by t h e Pen tagon 
o f f i c i - ^ l s , t o be i n s t i l l e d a t t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y b a s e s and 
aboa rd t h e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s i n t h e I n d i a n ocean , a gr-ound 
based s t a t i o n f o r e l e c t r o n i c pnd o p t i c a l t r a c k i n g of fa raway 
s p a c e o b j e c t s w i l l be b r o u g h t t o Diego G a r c i a , I t may be 
u s e d as an a n t i - s a t e l l i t e weaoons s y s t e m . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
a sy s t em which w i l l d e b i l i t a t e s a t e l l i t e s a t a l t i t u d e s u p t o 
2 4 , 0 0 0 km i s supposed t o be b u i l t in t h e I n d i a n Ocean by 
1990 . Thus , t h e U . S . p l a n s p-^se new t h r e a t s t o t h e v^;hole 
54 
r e g i o n , 
5 1 . S e e , "st=ir W.-^ rs System f o r U . S . by 1874 l i k e l y , "The 
Times of I n d i a , J u n e 10, 1984 . 
5 2 . I b i d . 
5 3 . Maya Cht,dda, op . c i t . 
5 4 . l e t t e r t o t h e e d i t o r by J . V , P r a s a d , TheTjmes of I n d i a / 
J u l y 1 1 , 1985 , 
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\nY 'now, ^'t r^r^sent t h e Un i t ed s t n t e s seerns t o hnve 
s c o r e d a s p e c t a c u l a r s u c c e s s in a d v a n c i n g i t s "S t ' - r W^rs" 
progrnmme. The Pen tagon clRirmed t h . i t i t h.-<d become t h e f i r s t 
m i l i t a r y power t o d e s t r o y a warhend in o u t e r s p a c e 1-^y h i t t i n g 
i t With a n o t h e r war h e a d . The Americans S^P t h e s u - ^ e s s in 
t h i s nr^oramme as an ach ievement t^v/ards d e v e l o p i n g a jjac 
55 
sys tem of d e t e r r e n c e . But , t h e g u e s t i o n a r i s e s t h - t if one 
of t h e s e d e a d l y weapon makes t h e k i n d of weapon t h a t i s beyond 
t h e scone of r e p r i s a l from t h e o t h e r * i t i s no l o n g e r a 
d e t e r r e n t b u t a c l e a r a t t a c k weapon which c o r s e g u e n t l y p o s s e s 
an i n d - ' r e c t t h r e a t t o t h e r e s t of t h e world and which would 
c e r t a i n l y c r e a t e a d i s b a l a n c e of n u c l e a r weaoons in t h e I n d i a n 
56 Ocean . 
In f a c t , t h e U . S . " S t a r W^rs" n r o j e c t w i l l p c - e l e r a t e 
t h e n u c l e - r arr^s r a c e in SDnc--, ]ead t o decades o^ i n s e c u r i t y 
and ^ e s t r ^ y p r o s p e c t s f o r an arms l i m i t a t i o n aa^-eement between 
Washington and Moscow h e a d s . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , b e l i e v e d t h a t 
Reagan i s n o t o n l y p u s h i n g t h e U . S . t o t h e b r i n k of n u c l e a r 
war b u t i s a l s o t r y i n g t o i n v o l v e i t s o t h e r a l l i e s in t h e 
p r o c e s s of e s c a l a t i o n . I t seems t h a t s i n c e t h e r e was n o t 
enough room f o r m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of t h e e a r t h , t h e U . S . i s 
t r y i n g t o m i l i t a r i s e non o u t e r s p a c e i n t h e hope of c o n q u e r i n g 
t h e e a r t h from a b o v e . Th is i s t h e l o g i c of a c a n c e r c e l l 
57 
which e a t s av/ay e v e r y t h i n g a e a t h y and t h e n k i l l s i t s e l f . 
5 5. D e t e r r a n c e means t h a t n e i t h e r s i d e can d a r e t o u s e i t s 
d e a d l y weapons f o r f e a r of r e p r i s a l , 
5 6 , The Times of T n d i a ( e d i t o r i a l ) , J u n e 20, 1984 , 
5 7 , l e t t e r t o t h e e d i t o r by Vikram I^^h;:?shay, The Times 
of I n d i a , June 16, 1984, 
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Tlowever, the pent=!gon h^s a l so s ta ted f^ n the bas is 
of i t s study thnt the Soviet Union could deploy anti-s- i tel l i t e 
lasers ^t several qmund s i t e s durinq the next 10 ye-^rs. The 
Soviet Union/ they believed, could have sa t e l1 i t ^ s ^aujoped 
wjth l^ser weaDOns ei ther avai lable for launch on co'imand 
58 
or maintained in o rb i t . Even the Soviets lack the techno- _ 
logy and the resources to fight on eau-'l terms v/ith the U,S. 
in ST ?^ce w^-rfare. 
Thi's, the Indian Ocean reoi on forms an important 
element in U.S. p o l i t i c s of intrusion and the concomitant 
mi l i ta ry oresence as par t of i t s global strcTteqy. The Indian 
Ocean, therefore, may play a delic=.te .md s ign i f i can t role 
in s t r a t eg ic and space war scenar ios . 
The most s igni f icant i n t e re s t s of the U.S. had 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y centered in the Atlantic rnd Pacific bas ins . 
However, the U.S. had a long connexion with -che Indian Ocean, 
t t h^s been active in the reaion and had majretained close 
and varied t i e s with the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean. 
Basically, the U.S. in te res t s have been re la ted t o 
key resources especial ly the west Asian o i l , of the region 
and i t s transformation routes which carr ied them to the 
U.S. and i t s a l l i e s . Inaidi^ion, the sea bed area contains 
58. The Times of India, April 12, 1984. 
59. See, Donald TrelporS "As the Soviets See i t Danger of 
U.S. Super ior i ty ," The Tjmes of India, April 17, 1984. 
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vast reserves of energy and minerals which are needed in 
the economic advancement of the super power. Besides, the 
crntroversy over the Law of sea and the absence of high-
techn^loaical know-how among the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s t o explore 
and to eX'-loit marine minerals have also enhanced super DOwer 
pre-^sure and presence in the -,rea. '"Jhile, the incre-^sing 
technological sophis t ica t ion and the consequent indus t r i a l 
expansions in the developed nations l ike the U.S. made i t 
imperative for/ them to capture m'~'re and more areas under 
t h e i r ir)d-^ rect, if possible or d i r ec t , if necessary, control 
for exploring and exploit ina vsri^^d rich resources to keep 
the wheel of t h e i r industry movina towards more advantei,,ont. 
Further , the U.S. is engaged endeavouring in t o obtain more 
advance in nuclear and space wea-^ on svstem ^s compared to the 
Soviet Union. 
The U.S. s t r a t eg i c f ront iers have fu l ly extended 
towards the c-^u-^tries bordering the Soviet Union af te r 
t he second cold war. The fa i lure of U.S. secur i ty and mi l i t a ry 
a l l iances l ike SEATO and CENTO and the s t r a ins within the 
NATO shifted the U.S. s t ra tegy into new or ien ta t ions and 
emphasised in option the more need for encirc l ing the U.S.S.R. 
Besides, the increasing third world asser t ion to adopt 
independent pol ic ies made them unre l iab le in Wash-ington. 
Later, the rapid technological advancement in the range 
of mi l i t a ry power led the U.S. towards strong a i r -naval 
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deplo^^ent in t h e Indian Ocean. In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e Diego 
Garcia w~uld p lay f r u i t f u l ro l e in U.S. s t r a t e g y t o counter 
and conta in the Sovie t in f luence and would be able t o provide 
proper s e c u r i t y to U.S. economic i n t e r e s t s in t h e r e a l on. 
l a s t l y , in the po'^t c o l o n i a l e ra , a f t e r t h e f a i l u r e 
of reo ion^ l na t ions t o e x t r a c t or t o e x p l o i t r i c h and 
enor^'^us rnirer'=ls and food resources ex i s t ed in deep v/aters 
of t he Indian Ocean, i r f a c t , has " a t t r a c t e d the covetous 
eyes of c o l o n i a l f ree hoo te r s " t o secure t h e i r hegemony in 
t h e r e a i n n . The miTi t^ry and nava] presence having sunpor t 
of s o p h i s t i c a t e d space technolony i s a major ins turment o£ 
t h e su ^r pov/ers, e s p e c i a l l y of the U.S. in t h i s r eg ion , for 
t h e r e a J i s a t i o n of t h e i r p o J i t i c a l , economic and s t r a t e g i c 
a ims . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Indian ocean region provides t h e 
U .S . s t r a t e a i c a l l y s u i t a b l e ba-e f a c i l i t i e s for the advancement 
of second s t r i k e c ^ p ^ b i l i t y . The super pov;er i n t e r e s t s of 
t h e United s t a t e s and the d iveraence of reg iona l p o l i t i c a l 
a s p i r a t i o n s tend t o conver t t he Indian Ocean i n t o an a rea 
fin 
of m u l t i - p o l a r i s a t i o n and m u l t i p l e r i v a l r i e s . The U . S . , 
f u r t h e r , has presumed t h a t the naval superemacy in the Indian 
Ocean i s e s s e n t i a l t o r e t a i n the o i l r o u t e s ' s e c u r e ' and t o 
make a v a i l a b l e the enorm'^us marine v^ealth in i t s economic 
advancettient. The U . S . , t h e r e f o r e , did f e e l a g r e a t noed t o 
60 . J . D , S e t h i , "The Indian Ocean,The Statesman, March 25, 
19 7 1 , ^ 
acquire bases in the Indian Ocean and turned there strong 
sophis t icated nuclear, base to threaten soviet expansionism 
in the region. In this respect the U.S. ser ious effor ts to 
convert Diego Garcia base into an nuclear-powered air-naval 
base should be viewed and further analysed U.S. s t r a t eg i c 
perceptions in the region which have been responsible to 
create a nuclear disbalance in the Indian Ocean. 
CHAPTER i l l 
U«S. Naval Preparations and Its 
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Reference to Diego 
Garcia Buil^p 
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U . S . NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS; WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DIEGO GARCIA BUILD-UP 
The s u p e r powers , t o d a y a r e m e r r i l y c ru i s i ng i n t he 
I n d i a n ocean a r e a . The U . S . p r o p o s a l t o c o n v e r t Diego G a r c i a 
i n t o a f u l l - f l e d g e d a i r - n a v a l b a s e has c o m p l i c a t e d t h e s t r a -
t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t i n t h e I n d i a n ocean r e g i o n . 
The U .S . p o l i c y - m a k e r s b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U . S . needs base 
f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e Ind i an ocean t o o f f s e t t h e m i l i t a r y a d v a n -
t a g e t h a t t h e S o v i e t Union now p o s s e s s e s f o l l o w i n g i t s 
i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . In a d d i t i o n , b o t h t he s u p e r 
powers wish t o b u i l d up t h e i r n a v i e s t o p r o t e c t t h e s e a - l a n e s 
f o r c a r r y i n g o i l and raw m a t e r i a l s , i tecent d i s c o v e r y of o f f -
s h o r e o i l and immense m i n e r a l nodules i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
w a t e r s have enhanced i t s s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e . But, the U . S . 
d e c i s i o n t o u p g r a d e i t s ba se f a c i l i t y on t h e i s l a n d of Diego 
Garc i a has l e d the o t h e r powers n o t a b l y t h e S o v i e t Union, 
F r ance and China e t c . t o e i t h e r j o i n t h e e x i s t i n g power i n 
t h e r e g i o n o r a l t e r n a t e l y e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s 
i n t h e a r e a t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e move a n o t h e r power . The 
1 . P r e s e n t l y , F rance m a i n t a i n s t h e second l a r g e s t n a v a l a irmadi 
i n t he I n d i a n Ocean and i t has c r e a t e d i t s cwn 4 ,7000 s t r o n g 
Rapid Deployment Force f o r m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e s i n t h e T h i r d 
World and a l s o m a i n t a i n s 5,000 r a p i d l y d e p l o y a b l e t r o o p s i n 
D j i b o u t i . S i n g n i f i c a n t l y , w i t h t h e r e o p e n i n g of t h e Suez 
C a n a l , t h e French Government s t e p p e d up i t s m i l i t a r y ne twork 
i n D j i b o u t i . 
Gen. J . N . Chaudhur i ( R e t d . ) , "Power Race i n I n d i a n Ocean", 
The I n d i a n Expre s s (Bombay), Feb rua ry 15, 1974; The P a t r i o t , 
J u l y 9, 19 7 5 . For t h e s t u d ^ of French m i l i t a r y invo lvemen t 
i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean, s e e a l s o . E d i t o r i a l , "Hands off I h d i a n 
Ocean, "The T r i b u n e , November l 9 , 1974; The Times of I n d i a , 
September 4 & December 5, 19 75; The Times of I n d i a , June 27 
& J u l y 5, 1977. 
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U,n, report visualised t l 'at if the U.S. proposal to convert 
Dieqo Garcia in to a strong a i r naval base with nuclear implications 
is carr ied through then one areat power wi l l have establ ished 
a major s t r a t eg ic naval base from which i t would deploy, 
conveniently and economically, i t s s t r a t eg ic nuclear submarines 
in the Indian Ocean. The other great power w i l l then a l ros t 
c e r t a in ly search for a s imilar base in the area ahd a new 
2 
s t r a t e g i c naval arms race wi l l have begun." Tn the context 
of t h i s super power r iva l ry and prevai l ing animosi t ies , the 
tendency is to hedge one's bets and acquire capab i l i t i e s which, 
while being excessive t o requirements, might be needed to an 
unpredictable fu ture ." The U.S. ship dn th is process, are 
continuouc;ly kept in nood number anc" the U.S. navy is considered 
t o be superior in f i r e pov;or, l og i s t i c s and the a b i l i t y t( 
operate for extended cer iods . The U.S. maintains tha t the 
U.S. naval presence and Dieqo Harcia base are in the U.S. 
r a t i ona l i n t e r e s t s . 
:o 
Since the e a r l i e s t days of the cold war, the U.S. 
has maintained a ring of bases envire ling the northern 
4 
hemispnere around the Soviet Union and China. Currently, 
2. l].^\ Report of Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 
6 & 7 of General A<--embly resolut ion 3080 (XXVTII) , A/^C , 
159/1, May 3, 1974, p .20 . 
3 . G.S, Bhargava, "Fu t i l i t y of Indian Ocean Build up, "The 
Hindustan Times, October 11/ 1975. 
4 . see , K.p. H^sra, Quest for an Intgnational ^rder in the 
Indian Ocean, New Delhi, 1977, p . 25. 
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the U,S, has ovpr 3,0'''0 n i l i t a r y , nnva] , and a^'r m s e s 
s c a t t e r e d thr'-^ugoout the \,'orld/ o' t hpse , JOO are CTBSS-
f i ed as '-3 J or ins ta ] l a t i o n s . Pore than ^eJZ a m i l l j o n 
American marines a re s t a t i o n e d a l road , inCudinf^ '^'",^00 
5 
aflo^Jt -with i t s f l e e t I'n a l l the seas of t h e world. 
The t-acif ic and the At l an t i c^ which clo-^ely wi tnessea 
t'^e two 'JorJd Wars, and t^e >TC'' 'jterr^nean were perceived 
by the U.S. polic^/rrakers -'s a reas 0"^  1ah p r i o r i t y . The 
U .S . , t b e r e ^ o r e , t r a d i t i o n a l l y maintained a lev p r o f i l e 
in the Indian Ocean with u t having s a c r i f i c e d any v i t a l 
i n t e r e s t . In o ther words, the U . s , overseas base s t r u c t u r e 
was designed for c o n f l i c t s in the A t t a n t i c and P a c i f i c , 
not "^or the r^ ^TPotc Indian Orean, In f a ^ t , the U.S. had no 
v i t ' l i n t e r e s t s -^t stal:o in the region dur ing the i n i t i a l 
years of the cold w^r and 'ler s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s in the 
rea ion be inc l i " i t e d w^re bes t nc^iev^d th-'-oU'^ h non-ni l i t a r y , 
6 
e c o n o " : : , and d:plom^tic r e a n s . 
The TJ.5, did f e ^ l uncomfortable in the r^old v^ '='r 
v;'"en the B r i t i s h e r s decided t o conclude i t s empire and 
began t o withdraw i t s armed forces from t h e i r world-wide 
b . The vew York Times, Mar-^h 24, 1°74; U.S . Congress i ona l 
Record,Senate , f^4th '"oncre3s,Vol . 121, No. 122, J u l y 
28, 1975, p . S 13942. 
6. h^eeklv Round Table, Vol . T I T , nos . 14 & 15, June 9, 
1974, p . 15 . 
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r o l e . The U.S. nolicyrna''<ers soon perceived t '^at t h e e x i s t i n g 
arranae'Tients with B r i t a i n un-^er '-/hich the "British c a r r i e r 
A-force based '^t Singapore was the only VInstern f l e e t of any 
s i z e in the Indian Ocean were not r'^mained capable enough. 
The fir-^t i r d i c ^ t i o n of t!^e U.S. unders tand ing in t ' is regard 
came in 1*^ 62 when Pentagon persuaded i t s a l l y in t'lO a,rzU3 
Pac t , A u s t r a l i a , t o lease i t aP-u t 2B square mi les in Fo r th -
I'jest Cape on t h e ^-jest Aus t r a l i an coas t for t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of a naval r a d i o s t a t i o n Ge t t ing 75 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . The s t a t i o n , 
one of the most powerful in the world, v/as designed to m a i n t a i r 
co-itact with the ' P o l a r i s ' su'^marines in the a rea an^ be-^ame 
operated in 19 68. The sa id s t a t i o n v/as bel ieved t o be supp le -
mentary the KaPnew cor~unica t ion base a t Asmara, in E th iop ia / 
which was considered usefu l l o r naval and ; , i r ope ra t ions in 
the western Indi.'^n Ocean.DurincT t h i s per iod , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
tow-irds t-^e m d ot l ?b3 , t he ^T,;^, announced i t s dec i s i on t o 
7 
send u n i t s of the seventh F l e e t t o the Indian Ocean. The 
p roposa l of developing the base f a c i l i t y a t Diego Garcia 
in the chages Archipelago , t h e r e f o r e , is a l o g i c a l c o r a l l a r y 
7 . See, Devendra Kaushik, "Ocean of Anxiety o r of Peace , " 
Sovie t Pa view. Mo. 4 6, Vol . 10, London September 27, 197 3, 
p . 5 3 . 
8 . The B r i t i s h Goverrment in 60s had turned the group of under 
-popu la t ed Indian Ocean i s l ands as a new colony of c a l l e d 
t'-'e B r i t i s h Indian Ocean T e r r i t o r y . The new colony c o n s i s t e d 
of the :::hagos Archipelago, e a r l i e r adminis te red " rom 
Maur i t ius , and the i s lands of Aldabra, Farquhar , and Desso-
ches , p r ev ious ly adminis tered rom Seyc e l l e s . The i s l a n d s 
were taken away from y a u r i t i u ^ and the Scycl ie l les paying 
them $63 m i l l i o n as compensat ion. In 1976, t h e i s l a n d s 
ot Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches were r e t u r n e d t o the 
Seyche l l e s , which was granted independence on June 28, 
197 6. Thus, the B r i t i s h Indian Ocean T e r r i t o r y became 
l imi ted only to "hages Arch ipe lago . 
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t o tne e a r l i e r moves, 
'Towever, i n i t i a l l y , the R r i t i s h Foreign spokc-'an Kept 
onsayinc f i a t the i n s t a l l a t i o n s on the i s l and of Dieco Garcia 
were a very l imi ted f a c i l i t y and hence did not amov.nt t o a 
naval base . Factua l l y , the niego Garcia ivTse has s t reng thened 
t h e U.S. caioacity r o r subrnarine o p e r e t i o - s i n the Ind ian 
Ocean. The base was considered as the n a t u r a l hub o^ t he snb-
d i a r y U.S. bases in the Indian Ocean a r e a . The s t r a t e g i c impor-
tance of -Hego Garcia , t h e r e f o r e , i s c r u c i a l t o r t h e uni ted 
s t a t e s . 
Tne U.S. WPS thr' only super power having i t s presence 
in the area and t h a t too on a temperate l e v e l . The p r e p a r a t i o n s , 
t h e r e ' o r e , v/ere made t o r x commissioning a low frequency 
commu->ication s t a t i o n a t Nor t - - 'es t Gape in pursuance or an 
agreement signed Detvjeen;^ the U.S. and A u s t r a l i a in 19b3, 
T'^is t a ' ^ i ' ' i t y vjas designed t o r-o'-'imuricate with submerged 
m i s s i l e - T i r i n g nu'^lear submarines and was expected to serve 
P o l a r i s , Posidorr)^ and otner nuc lear submarines ope ra t ing 
in the Indian Ocean a r e a , 'Tence, i t has now become a p a r t of 
the U.S. worldwide communications systemj^ which inc ludes 
11 
s t a t i o n s a t '^onolulu, Giam, tne P h i l i p p i n e s and Deigo Garc ia , 
t 
9 . E d i t o r i a l : "Search '^nr Ba.-.os," The Times of India (Bombay), 
Apr i l 2J, 19bb. 
10. Sunday Times, September 21, 197 5; a l s o see Phe Times of 
Ipdi^* August 18, 1976. 
1 1 . The V\^ashington Pos t . January 11, 1974. 
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I t is believed that the unique posi t ion ot Austra l ia , as tne 
connecting link betv/een tbe South Pacir ic and the Indian Ocean 
became s ignif icant in American eyes, with the increis ing 
signif icance ot the inf^ian Ocean^ area in the U.S. olobal 
s t r a t e g y . 
In addition/ the United States also s-^inres with 
Australia a jo in t defence rerearch f a c i l i t y a t Pine Cap, Alice 
Springs, which provide control s ignals and read outs tron 
an American ear ly warning s a t c J l i t e s tat ioned over the Indian 
1? Ocean, to monitor Soviet land based mi-s i le attar-k. A 
rommunirations stati-^n at TTorth-VJest Cape, a bor.e on Di'^ go 
Garcia, a jo int research t ac i i ty a t Pine Gap and tu r the r , 
control f a c i l i t y a t ^Mrrungar rear Woomera, AustraJia, are 
the f a c i l i t i e s be'ieved t o be pad'^ avai lable to the United 
States to r s t r a t eg ic nuclear war. NrtabJy, a U.S. s a t e l l i t e 
control r a c i J i t y a t Nurrungar receives photographs transmitted 
rrom reconnaissance s a t e J l i t e s shor t ly af te r they pass over 
the People's pepubl-!c of Ghina. 
Thus, Australia provided i t s subs tan t i a l support to 
America's new mi l i t a ry s t ra tegy in the Asia-Pacific region, 
1 2 . S e e , The Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 3n & >july 2, l 9 ' / 7 . 
13. K.S, Jawatkar/ Dieao Garcia in In ternat ional Diplomacy, 
Popular PraVashan Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 1983, p . Ib^i, 
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D T qn •• • T'^'.ir'tJy, as ^.^r i" as V / h , i t '-a-^  ap rnvorl f^o f-ij-'n to 
develop 3 rpval 'ranp in CoC^i^ii'^ Soiin^ on f'^p ror-t'^-w^st '^o^st 
o' ^vu^tr-Plia. The Austral jan '--ovprnf^^err ".as a Jco r '^'^n : r s 
areon sicn"'] t o r '^or'~t'-\ioti "-n of irr-j i^-t^es ^or^port^'-i '-nth 
the Oirega w c i d - w i d p nav io-^t iona 2 a i^ ' -Tyst^r . Or^rgn '---^  in-^os 
cjg"!t su^h s t a t i o n s t o r glo '-al coverage, one oe"'no in 3v"^ utn-» 
e a s t AustraJ-ia near i^eni l inuln . T'^us, the TJ .S , ronco J i^^ated 
i t s sur--io^t in A'lJistra l i a . i t aJso a s s i s t e d in mo^'^r-n-'s i^ ^^ t h e 
14 
r n i l i t - r y ard naval s t r eng th ot A u s t r a l i a . 
In f a c t , t n e in t ronuct i ' -n ot tne P o l a r i s su i^ar - 'nes , as 
an in^^rt '^nt pa r t o^ the str"it'='cic nuc Jenr ^ o t e r r a n ' o , v/ltn^ssed 
an oraanjsed e t t o r t on t h e p a r t o*" t*^e United S t a t e s t o 
oonsoJi "t'^ i t s in Inonce jn o i i c e s v;hirn vjo^ild *a^' ' i t a t e 
t n e srrooth '-^p'^ration o* th'^ new v;eapon systerr . In o the r 
wor ' s , '.'it''"- t^e -^  * tr'"^''"'cti'-n o' t '^ese svhra^ inPs , f ' p J i t t o r a l ' ^ 
Mr^ ^^^^ T --.-r. t o c o n t r o l t 'O sea an'~< t o "r '^serve ' .";. pFiVPi 1 
lb 
s'^: r e r acy ^n t'^e A'-ea . Tne U.S. / f^ere ' ore , sta-ri:ed c o n s t r u -
c t i n g the conmunication iiase in North-West Cape in A u s t r a l i a , 
The introductio'-i ot the P o l a r i s suomarine a l s o concided with 
t h e re^ I'-'s^'tion in GT-eat B r i t a i n t h a t "'"t could no Jonger p l ay 
i t s t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e in the a r ^ a . The East o-*- Suez p o l i c y 
14. K.R, Singh, The Indian Ocpan, New n e l h i , l"^W/,p.27. 
l b . I b id , pp . 2c3-2M, 
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was enviously , a n^ r t of t h a t r e a l i s a t i o n . But t o rr^^'all, the 
B r i t i s h withdrawl a l s o c r inc ided with the c r e a t i o n o' the 
B r i t i s h Indian Ocean T e r i t o r y and t a e agrp<^ment t o es t ib '^ i sh 
a j o i n t Anglo-^^mf^rican base in Diego Garc ia . Thus, t he confined 
nuc lea r c a p a b i l i t y of B r i t a i n and the p a r t i a l B r i t i s h wi th-
drav/1/ has project '^d t h e U.S. as tho dominant western pov/er 
in t h e a r e a , in a^ 'di t ion, the United S t a t e s wants t o beef i t 
up in the southern hemisp'-^ere as p a r t of i t s s t r a t e g i c counter 
t o i - c r e a s i n g Sovie t naval p ope ra t i ons in the Indian C^ean and 
t h e Pac i t ic . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Sovie t navy have a l s o bf^°n a c t i v e l y 
encaged in a progra'^me of expandino many of i t s f a c l l i t i f ^ s 
in thi-^  hc^^ '"ount^-ies. I t hr^s s e t up, r e - e n t l y , ^ pi^rmanent 
17 
mooring buoys good f l e e t anc 'o rage po in t s or be r th i ' - a s t a t i o n s , 
near the i s land of Socotra , e a s t of ^den, in the r^^i lak i s l ands 
In the ^r^r] Sea, in the 'Thagos Ar'^hipeleao i t s e l f wh«^re ^-liego 
19 
Garcia is Ir^cated and in th^ Arabian Sea, south of Seyche l l e s , 
Mozambique channel , Mad=igascar, Gargodos i s l a n d s and e l sewhere . 
The American observes bel ieved t h a t t h e Sov ie t Union 
has t h r e e -^ajor naval opertting bases in the Indian Ocean, 
16 . Amrit Bazar P a t r i k a , yarcl- b, 197 6, Tne;?* Times of Indla» 
October 4, 19B0, 
17 . The Western Press descrifies t^'ese st-^tions as " f l o a t i n g 
bases ." 
18 . U.S. Congressional Records, Senate , 94 Congress, Vol .121 , 
Ju ly 28, 1975, p . 513029. 
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(1) ^ -^ r - r) 5 uth ^"iTon/ (2) Tprr Casr in Tr.^q r^^ (3) in the 
Dahl,-v isl^r-^s in Etl i iopi?* '^'^^ '^nssian^. hivp a J so o taino-^ 
nava l md a i r ^ r ^ i l i t i - s ot civD^'^^n ^^ ny in ^'ir'-.^n;, -n^^.-^ncinQ 
t'-Qir s t r a t e g i c cana ' l i t i e s bot''^ in t'.f^  i ' ac i f i c T-XI f-^ o 
Indian O-^can. 
To "'•ach, t' c u , S , epjovs '::o"verti ^na 1 ba^e ' - ^ c i l i t i e s 
a t Ras Banas, Eqypt. Egypt had -ir-nrr^ t-^p ^ ' .S , t o ungrc^e 
a i r - n a v a l - a - n j t i - s a t t^" '^r'yption '^pd s"a r^o-r of h-^-
BanaG ^nn u t i l i s e i t f o r '"h'^  de-^once of the reninn aaa in3 t 
19 Sovie t th ' -eats . 
"^ •"p "n i t ed S t a t e s ^Iso enjoys base In the is land 
o" ' ' "as i ra i , Orvin. Lon" .^etore the Sovie t i n t e r v e r t ^on in 
Af "'-ani'^t^n =>.nd t h r con^motion in Tr^n, t'lo i s lnn^ of " a s i r a h 
o^f thr the coas t o ' fman vz-'S u t i l i s e d b-- F . s , m i l i t a r y 
*^  •^ r int'^ T ] iopnce aa-f- ^•'^7 and su rv i lla-^-^e '-.npport fo r naval 
t ach fo^^'-e ope ra t i ng in tno -^-^ntraj Indian Orean, Under 
an agr^er-ont \vith Oman/ U,S. ^.hips oichf^d ur^  mai l df^livered 
by U.S. planes t o the i s l and t o r the t l e e t based in f^e Indian 
Ocean. I t is be l ieved t h a t t he American s t r a t e g i s t s seen i t as 
21 
an appentage of the s t r a t e g i c ^iego Garcia base* 
T-^ e f 'asirah i s land is s t r a t ag ic - i l l y l o c a t e d . The i s l and , 
about 400 square mi les in a r e a , l i e s f i f t e e n mi les souf" of 
19. The Times of India# Septemoer H, I'^SO; The Times pf Ind ia , 
January 20, 1^81. 
2 0 . s e e , Alvin J . C o t t r e l l and R.K. B u r r e l l , "Sovie t U.S. Naval 
Competition in the I n d i m Ocean," Orois , Winter 1975, 
p . 118. 
2 1 . The Times of I n d i a , ^-Vto-^er 9, 1980. 
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t h e Omn '^oast , ^t lies 560 km, south-west of the vit-^I 
str'it^-^ of ormiis wH i^h is i t s e l f a t the en t rance t o t'^e 
i^ersi-^'n Gulf. I t has a 2460 metre long a i r s t r i p v/- 1--^ ^ can 
handle even t h e bj ges t t r a n s p o r t plane l i k e t h e C-S. THO 
tori^^r B r i t i s h a i r bare , ^'asirah has no harbour an^ "" sh^'ps 
'-'ave to ani^hor a t some d i s t a n c e with t la t-oot tomed "oarges 
f e r r y i n g s u p p - i e s . The 58 km long and 16 km wide Kasirah 
i s l and i s t'-^e wor ld ' s l a r g e s t breeding around t o r t u r t l e s . 
Although Oman Government VJ-^  s r e c e p t i v e t o t h e f u l l use 
of t h e i s land by the American, s t h e r e was a se tback fol lowing 
the unau taor i so use o Onani a i r r^^^~^s by tne u . s , d'lrinq 
t h e a b o r t i v e atte-^^t t o rescue tne hostages in I r a n . '""ota^-lY/ 
s i x g-130s U , 1 . t r a n s p o r t p l anes , c i r r y i n g t h e ciO-mcn r a i d i n g 
p a r t y weapons and e* ^-ir^rpent, involved in f^e rescue miss ion 
r e fue l l ed ^t riasirar« on th-^ir way to I ran in \pr-il 1980. I t 
-as or i r - !na ' ' iv renor ted t h a t the planes n-^ d r e t u e i l ^ d in 
Panrai- ' , "^  "ha'n of is ' i -^as jn t'^e Pers ian Huif, The Di=ne 
t a c i l i t i e s in Kasirah i s l a n d , t h e r e f o r e , 1s cons idered u s e t u i 
t o the U.S. t o r i t s opera t ion in t^e Gult a r e a . 
Soon After f-ie breaking out of ^ ' ^ ' ^ t i l i t i e s between I ran 
and Iraq in the Gulf^ th'- U.S. -sdministraf i en made ove r tu r e s 
t o t h e Oman Government t o co"3v^er wnetner t n e i s l and ^ouid 
oe converted i n t o an important TJ ,S , base t o r a ' r a p i d deploy-
m n t f o r c e ' . Gen. Davj d C. J c^es , Chairman of t h e U.S, 
22 . The Statesman, yay 5, I9b0, 
23. I b i d . 
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U,S» J o i n t C l e t ot s t a t t v i s i t P d t n e i s l a n d in e ^ r J y October 
1980. S i a n i f i c a n t iy , h i s v i s i t c o i n c i d e d witli t h e a r r i v a l 
o^ t o u r U . S . sup]. l i e d a i r b o r n e warn ing and c^nt^-o ny^trm p l a n e s . 
'"•owevpr, when t h e U .S . gover'^ment s ^unh t s p o c i a J t a c i -
J i t i f ' s on t h e isl-=ind/ t h e Oman government had an improv'^nent 
programme f o r t h e i s l a n d . I t inclu '^ed an e x t e n s i o n t o t h e 
runway an'^ c o n s t r u c t i o n ot a new one , b e t t e r t - a c l l i t i e s t o r 
2 b p e r s o n n e l an"^ s t o r a g e a^eas L or p l a n e s and arnpur^itio'^. 
In a d d i t i o n / t h e U . S . o-^fered $ BOO m i l l i o n t o Oman '^or 
t h e irrprovement o^ t h e i s l a n d t o r t h e nex t f i v e y e a r s in r e t u r n 
- o r I t s u s e . The \ n e r i c a n o f f e r w^s v e r y a t t r a c t i v e t o t h e 
Oman g o v e r n n e n t be'^ause i t was s p e n d i n g '•'^ a If of i t s Inoome 
on de t ' ^nco . T h r e a t e n e d by South ^encn in t h e West end more 
r e - e n t l y , b-'- f^e ^ r a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n and t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y 
i n t r ^ ' s i o n in Af n ' a - i s t a n , Oman i s report-^d t o "'ave anrecd 
t o 11 low i e n t a a o n t o devo iop t h e i s l a n d on t h e l i n e s of 
Diego ' h a r c i a . 
The Uni ted S t a t e s has t h e c o n v e n t i o r a l b a s e t a c i l i t i e s 
a t rxompassa/ Kenya, as w e l l . I t p r o v i d e d m a i n t e n a n c e and 
24. T'le T i r e s ot India . 0--^ober '1, 19H0. 
25 . Ib id . 
26. The Times of India. January 1, 1^01. 
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s t o r ^ a e t a c i J j t i e s in forpba^sa, ' s 'enya 's p r i - ' - i p a l n-iian 
Ocpan P'^'^t in r e t u r n t o r $ 50 m i l l i o n e c o n ^ n i c ajM t o K'^nya 
FoJIov/ ino Oman, ^onya i s t h e second nro-wpct '^ rn Trr''iari Oooan 
s t ^ t O / wnich PS become t ri^ '^ n'"'* ly t o VJ-'nh 1-loton t o orrwi^jc-
a^ifiit i '^n^l " a c i J I t i e s t o r s u p r o r t of oxoa'^ried ' t , s . m i . ' i t ^ r y 
a c t i v i t i e s in t n e G\ilf r e a i o n . ^Yninontly, a s t r o n g p r o t a g o n i s t , 
o' t '^e c a p i t a l i s t sy s t em, kenya has c o n s i s t e n t l y t^ ' -en a p r o -
27 
w e s t e r n s t ^ n d on c r v c i a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s . 
As s ' :cn, t n e u , S , s o u q h t K e n y a ' s t a c i ] i t i p » s occause 
i t s neig'-boiir-^Somalia was p e r s u a d e d t o t u r n o v e r S o v i e t biaj I t 
f a c i l i t i e s a t Berbera f o r t h e u s e of t h e ^\3, n^vy and 
a i r t c r c e , l u t , s i o n i f i c a n t ly , any A ^ r n c a n arms t o Sor-a l ia 
v;ould c a u - e concern t o Kenya because of Somal i i r r e n ^ e n t i s t 
c l a i m s . A'^'^ordirg t o Somal i a , B r i t a i n ignored t h e " i r h ^ s of 
0oma] i s l i v i n o i n n o r t h - e a s t Kenya t o be u n i t e d wirn t l e i r 
Kins-ren. Sin ' -e S o r i l i a makes a s i m i l a r irr<^ndent i s t o ia im 
t o ^ t h i o r ^ a ' ' 5 Oga "On r e g i o n , t h e Kenvan and i^ th ipp ian 
govern '^ents f a c e a common prcblem which makes •f"or a s t r a n g e 
28 
warmtn oetvjeen a p r o - w e s t e r n r eg ime and a S o v i e t a l y , 
2'i, See , K . S , J a w a t k a r , o p . c i t , p."^''9. 
2 8 . D i l i p m i k e r j e e , "Kenya ' s Oilemme On Pa<=es ^"or U . S . 
Navy," The Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 22, 19B0; A l s o s e e . The 
Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 24, June 29, and Dec^'^oer I D , 1980. 
Somal ia and E t h i o p i a "-ought a bo'-der war in 1°77 ov^r 
S o m a l i a ' s s u p p o r t f o r e t h n i c Somali t r i b e s , s e e k i n n 
s e p a r a t i o n from E t h i o p i a in f^e Og^den r e a i o n . 
90 
In a - m t i o n / the U.S. enjoys convent ional t^ase 
t a c j i i t i e s a t Snbic Bay, tbe i^hilip-^inf^s, nc-si^ies Diego 
Garcia , which is capable ot support •'no a nava J fn,-: i-nr'''e 
©•• t ic ia l ly , f-ie U.S. d o e s ' n t fiave a naval bnse in Tln^apore 
but i t s warships o"^ten c a l l t h e r e t o r r e : u ' ^ l l i n o . 
Under the c a r t e r adn in T i t r a t i o n , the "".S. arrnn'red 
a i r an'^ naval t ac i liti^^^s a t ' ^ rnera , m r e t u r n -^or $ 4^ 
m j l l l o n ot cr<=dit t o r defens ive m i l i t a r y pnuipment s a l e spread 
2y 
over tv7o y e a r s . A t t ^ r tne aar'^ement s ign^^d between tne two 
c o u n t r i e s in August IVbO, -cne C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n assured 
tne .'on'-re'-s t h a t Somalia r> lonoer was f i g h t i n g Sovier 
backed troop's in d-^sput^d 0 jan ^n re^-ion in the s t r a t e g i ' 
orn o- S i r i c a . 
' ' o tap iy , SOT' 1 • i has i n s i s t e d on $2 b i l l i o n , half 
of i t in m i l i t a r y hardware, as the p r i c e fo r a l lowing access 
t o American forces and v e s s e l s . But the Ca r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
was not w i l l i n c t o give more t'-.an |100 m i l l i o n by way of 
econonic a id t o Somalia and supply i t with defens ive m i l i t a r y 
g o o d s . I t was a l s o r e l u c t a n t t o get embroiled in any c o n f l i c t 
31 
in the '-^orn of Africa invo lv ing Somalia and E t h i o p i a , 
In f a c t , access to m i l i t a r y ""ac iHt ies in ^gypt , 
Oman, Kenya and Somalia by the U.S. i s t o o f f s e t the Sovie t 
29 . yhe Times of Ind i a , January 2 and i^ebruary 8, 1931. 
30. The Ti res of India February 8, 19 8 1 , 
3 1 . The Times of I n d i a , Apr i l 24, 1980, 
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mj T i t a r y arlvantaqp in the Pers ian Gulf f o l l owi r a i t s pr'^n'^nce 
i n Af qi^anistan. 
The United S t a t e s h?s a l s o ac'^ess to some "-^ s^r^ s in 
fr ie 'ndly -countries, a r Por t Sudan in ^udan; a t '^odeida 
in North Yemen and a t Guader and Karachi in P a k i s t a n . Fost 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , "USS E n t e r p r i s e , " t h e b i a g e s t a i r c r a f t c a r r i e s 
of the world, accompanied by the U.S. naval v e s s e l s i n c l u d i n g 
a nuclear submarine, tow c r u i s e r s , tvjo d e s t r o y e r s e t c , ancho-
red, re^ 'ent ly, f i ve miles west of ^^arachi on Mar'^ h l'^, 1986 
and departed on Farch 19, I'^'^b, Nearly, 4, bOO U.S. ' ^ i J i t a r y 
personnel were bel ieved t o be on t he se s h i p s . Notably, Pak is tan 
and the U.S. h=ive reached t o an aajjeement p e r r n i t t i m v i s i t s , 
naval a c t i v i t i e s and por t s s e r v i c e s t o ea 'h other-, ''^^{s was 
the l a r g e s t c o n t i n e e n t t o have v i s i t e d Pa'i'istan inrccent 
32 
t i P"e s . 
In Bahrain t oo , fhe TT,S, warships con t ' nue t o make 
por t c a l l s , a l thouah the - ah ra in government has withdrawn 
the U.S. base f a c i l i t i e s in 1977. The previous arrangement 
with the Bahrain government was under an agreement signed 
December 2 3, 19 7 1 . P r io r to t h i s agreement, t h e U.S. 
* 
hared B r i t i s h f a c i l i t i e s a t ^^iahrain. During the 1^73 Arab-
I s r a e l i war, Bahrain noverrm-^nt had asked the U.S. t o leave 
i t s base by October 1974, Rat as a r e s u l t of t h e s h i ' t in 
i t s po l i cy , the Bahrain government reversed i t s d e c i s i o n 




b e f o r e t h e e x p i r y o^ t h e d a t e l i n e arr^ ^' ' lowed t h e ^I .S, 
tiavy t o r e t a i n p o r t - ^ a c i l i t i e ? = t^ J r f a i r , t h e h- i rh^nr ' ' " T 
i t s c a p i t a l ^•'an^'^ra u n f l June 1077, 'T'hc around ^ n r t i l l a -
t i o n s , t a k e n o v e r when t h e B r i t i s h e r s l e f t t h e a---^^, in-hi'- ' 'ed 
j r n p n r t a r t e l e c t r o n i c i n s t a l l a t i o n s t h a t m o n i t o r m i l ' t - ' r y 
33 
t r a f f i c thr'^T.igh^ut f^e a r e a . 
^ In f a c t , S o v i e t s were - ' r a d u a l l y : r^^reas j-^a s ea and 
a i r a c t i v i t y in and around t h e P e r s i a n '-iulf and t h e r e s u l t i n g 
Arab conce rn ove r t h e o i l r i c h a r e a ' s s e c i i t i r y / some saqaciovis 
Arreri-^an and I r a n i a n p r e s s u r e s , i n ad - 'Ht i^n , a p p a r e n t l y 
34 
c o r b i n e d t o make t h e r^a'^rain <'overnment c'^anqed i t s mind . 
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o remember ^^ere, t h a t t h e S o v i e t s 
s u p p o r t "a g u e r i l l a movement w'lose aim is t o g a i n c o n t r o l 
of t h e sun-bach-ed S^uth Arabia l i t t o r a l and t h e o i l rii^h 
S5 
P e r s i a n ^ u l " , .n t h e Gul^, t h e S o v i e t Union a l l i a n c e with 
South ^cmen i s t h e mr-st - 'mpnr tan t . I n South ^emen.The S o v i e t s 
a^e u t i l i s i n g Aden a s a s u b m - r i n e base and a l a r g e improved 
a i r f i e l d f o r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e f l i g h t s . While S o v e i t IL -38 n a v a l 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n e s occa-Tional ' / f l y out of Aden i n South 
Yemen t o o b s e r v e t h e U , S . f l e e t movements . On t h e i s l a n d 
of S o c o t r a , t h e S o v i e t s have c o n s t r u c t e d g n a v a l r a d i o s t a t i o n 
and ammunit ion d e p o t . N o t a b l y , d u r i n g 1971 , a f o r c e of 
500 S o v i e t s e a b e e s p u t a s h o r e on t h e i s l a n d of S o c o t r a , nea r 
3 3 . The Times of I n d i a , O c t o b e r 5, 1^74 
3 4 . The New York Times, O c t o o e r 4 , 1974 . 
3 5 . K . S . J a w a t k a r , o p . c i t . , p . t i t 
3 6 . Time, J a n u a r y 4 , 1 9 7 1 . 
[)?> 
t h p GO"'+-hern "iV^ro^'Cn o t t h e ocd S^a ^nd begpn rn^'zf^-'i'^tinq 
3/ 
ur^pr '^round o r d i n a n c e depo t s and a corirruni edi t ions - - e n t r e . 
Tn^ Sovj-^t -nar ine j had landed t w i c e i n 1^75 a l s o on t h e 
3 b ' i s l a n d from amphib ious w a r f a r e v e s s e l s r o r e x e r c i s e s . T'O 
r e c a l l , t he Sor^otr?' i s l a n d i s a p a r t o^ S-^uth Yer^^n <"»nd domi-
n a t e s / i n t a c t / t h e approach t o t h e l e d Sea a t t h e ro i : th 
o t t n e Cult o t Aden, -"-t i s a ' s o i m p o r t a n t t ' n o t e ^<^^e th-^t 
a f t e r t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n South Yemf^ n, t h a t t o p p l e d t h e '^Im, 
t h e So"^'"'et ass i i - tonce t o h e r l a s incre^sp^d and ^a -^ tuaJ iy / t n e 
S o v i e t 'ni'on n~s a l m o s t r ' ^p l^^o^ t h e T J . ^ . R , as t h ^ main 
s u p p l i e r t ^ t h e i en- in i n e ^ u D l i c . 
In a - ' d i t i ^ n / I r a q ' s n a v a l por t of T^mm Cas r in t h e 
P e r s i a n ^ u l r i s a l s o b e i n g expanded v,'ith t h e n e ] p o ' S - v i o t 
a s s i s t a n c e . I t i s no l i even ta-^t t h e Russ ians havo depjoyp'd 
tnrre ' o'-n^' ivd ' c ' - ' " lar^r ' n^ i s s i i'^  p a t r o l ' '>oats. ^ i o n T i c a -
n t ly , t ' lo Sr-vie t pr^s '^nco h e r e "-ons' dera ly rodU'^'^s Traniisn 
41 
'"reedo" of a c t i o n i n t-^^ nar^-ow w a t e r s of t h e ^ 'o r s i^n ^ ; 1* . 
3 ' / . i5,obert 0 . H e i n l J r , "Russ i a D r i v e s East ot Suez, " yews week, 
J a n u a r y 18, 19V1, p . 1 2 . 
3 8 . Drew "Hdele toH/ " S o v i e t s a i d t o Expand A i r and Naval 
A c t i v i t i e s i n P e r s i a n Cul+" Area , " ^he Hew York Times/ 
Faroh 8, 1975 . 
3 9 . S.G. ^ 'unagekar , " S o v i e t " a v y ' s Debut m I n d i a n Ocean , " 
Sunoay Star^dard, A p r i l Zti, 19 6 8 . 
4 0 . The n&i) York. TliRes» Hovamber 21,-1974 
4 1 . I b i d . 
J)4 
The ' -or t of Umm Casr i s 20 m-''"'es from Bas ra , I r= '^ , W'T^C""' t h e 
SoviP't TTi i nf'-sw'^er'^rs a r e bpseH an*^ "^orst^^ntJy ma i'^t^^ i rerl 
s u r v o i 1 •'-::.r.ce ^^ t h p s t r a i t o'' 'vormu-^  w'^ -'irh cnnn^-^tr t h p 
^ o r s i'^n ^ j 1^ arv^ t b o ^uJf of Ona r . '^hc s t r a i t has T I S O boon 
To back a a a i n , f^e an- ' ted Stfetcr. ;^  Iso ^rjoy^-^, tf) t h e 
spr-e extf^-r-t, nava l f a c i l i t i e s -^or subrna r i r e s an-" '^t'-'^r v p s ' - e l s 
a t t h e p o r t o"" " a r s a w a , ovP o1 EtT^ioniT'.; oed Sea n o ' - t s . 
" o w e v c - , t b e U . S . m a i r t a i n e d t h a t i t s navy had no t a s i n g l e 
f ' l e l i ' ^ a F a - ^ i l i t v a v a i l r , M o i n t ^ e a-roa apd had t o on ba'-'k 
e i t h e r '"o^^olk i p t h e Atl ' -^t i -^ o r ove r t o Subjo Bay i n t ' l e 
43 
Ph •; liP'-^ i r e s s^rre 3, 5no m i l e s avwy ^or t h e n u r p o s e . 
^"otably ' -e r^ / t h e S o v i e t Union has e s t a b l is-'-'^d a 
base ^n t r ie Dah lak i s l a n d s in t h e Bed Sea, 30 rri l e s '^-f 
I'^-^-'^w-i. "^artu--^ I iy , t'^e lo s s o' Berbera w' e r e t h e So" ' i ^ t s 
h ' d ' i i i l t s t - r ^ p L a ' - i T i t i o s -^or f u ^ l , and m i s s i l e s and 
co- ' -nunica t ions : e n t r e , led t h e Russ i ans towards t h e Dah lak 
i s l a n d s . Kos t s i gn i f i c a n t Jy, t h e h a l t of t h e S o v e i t squad ron 
i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean i s anchored in t h e Dah lak i s l a n d s t o 
44 
t i g h t e n fur-t' e r t h e S o v i e t q r i p on t h e mouth of t h e i^ ed S e a , 
4 2 . See , The ^^ 'ew York Tjm^s, March 8, 1 ° 7 5 . 
4 3 . U . S , Bonor-^^ssional 'Records, '-^onse of P f ^ p r e s e n t ^ t i v e s , 
c?4tn Cn^crer;^, V'^1. 121, ITO. 122, J u l y 28 , 1975, p .H,7656 , 
4 4 . Brew Middlr tov;n, " S o v i e t ""ase i n Red Sea o'' S t r - ^ t e g i c 
Imp '^r tance , "The Times of I n d i a , ^'ovember 1, 1980 , Also 
s e e . The Times of I n d i a , J a n u a r y 29, 1980 . 
95 
ow^vpr, t h p So^ ' ie t r-^va] s'^^ios ''"•=ivr ^ ^ C P ^ S t ^ 1^ 
Unit-"^ S t^ tPS -,rc^ wpl^^p-^e i n 11^ ' o^ tl " l ^ ' t t o - i l <it^t"^ ^^  pr 
4b , 
S e n a t o r ' ^ U I P P F -^lo-i-pd t h ^ t tbp n . S , P n I^' co in 3e f o - t s 
46 
i n 18 '"oi'nt'-i'^'~ of t b e l i t t o r a l . 
Apar t ^ rom -^bpve c o n v e n t i o n a l basp ^ ar-i 2 i t i'=G, th-^ U . 3 , 
has t r a c k j p o BH'^ t e l e r p p t r y •Fpp i l i t i ' ^ s a t th«= " r i t e s ' " "'^v^ i 
• : ; ta t ion ^ t Va'^o^s i n ' ^^ur i t iu ' ^ , ^^esi'-ips ^ i r - ' ^ j p ] ' ^ -^^c: "  • ' t i es 
* or f^p U . S . ^ ' r T^o^^" on t h e •! s lanr^ . S i n c e l<^7P,lbh° U'.S. 
a l s o Tna-i-ti in a s a t e l l i t e t r -^-k i na s f t i ' - ' n it la "^^i>-o i r 
» '^ ' - ,o^ t T^ P ^ ' n n i p i l Ts''?>'nrl -^  p -|-t p S p V ^ h p l l P S P ^ P I T P ' p r-p+-\T]fn 
1 o r w^ •'ch t h p I I .S , '"ove'-nmenr r>-o'^UPes so^p k iC^,'^<^0 n^u^d^ 
1 yp ^ r . '^ '"''^  la ' ' P S P ^ P s tT ' i i ^n o-^' m'n=) ' 1 "• pont rao tp i^ ""'n 197^ 
••^Or "1 0-T^/^"^r^t O*" $ ' " . / n- ' " ' H o n " ( ^ r =^n-,;im a n d r-nx^n-^.n! i n I Q P l 
•^on * ivp ^'p-~rr/ i s ' " o n s t ^ n t l y cr'^vn" no in •'^'^ r-tan-r- •nart'' ' '"ii-
""rly in t i c -^'ont'^xt of Prosi-I nt ^ e a o a n ' s S t a r ' ' 'ars Prooramme, 
'^'^" La T'-iST^p tr==""Kirio '^ t '^ t ior p layed a c a p i t a ] rpl '^ in 
r r o n i t o r i n a d a f d u r i n a t h e s e c r P t m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n of t h e 
47 
U . S . s p a c e s h u t t l e D i s c o v e r y i n J a - u a r y 1985 . 
ThuS/ thc^ a r a d u a l wi thdravj l o"^  t h e U . S . from S o u t h - e a s t 
As ia and E t h i o p i a •* hp i m p l i c a t i o n s o'^  t h e P o r t u a u e s e d e o o l o n i -
48 
s a t i o n and t h e x s l u c t a n c e of t h e NATO n a t i o n s t o f u l l y 
4 5 . U . S . C o n a r p s s i o p a l PePords , S P n a t e , 94th Cona^es s , V o l . 1 2 1 , 
••'o. 122, J u l y 28, 1 9 7 5 , p . S 13^29 . 
4 6 . I b i d , p . s 13936. 
4 7 . The Times of I n d i a , J u l y 4, 1985 . 
4 8 . See , K. S r i d h a r a n , A Mar i t ime " i s t o r y of I n d i a , D ' - l ' - i , 
19b5, p . 2 3 . 
is 
[]{} 
s i ip '^or t U . S . st^pf^r^Y, West A.si=tn C r i s i s i n l ' ^ / 3 , o i l 
e'^par'"'o t o '•"'^P '.;or-t<=^rri '^o^intI ' ies/ t h e '^l'*^ w-f* n^-^ i t s 
in^' l i ' - ^ t i o n s o r t*^e ' i . S , , a r ^ t h e nre '^ence o Sovif^t t^o^'^ 
i n Afc+ianistan nr'^'^vially s"-i^tf^d t h e U . S . '^ .tr'^ <'"^tJY tr-vnr-
= ^er ^ r t t ^ m s t t o r s e J t - r e l i^inre D " e f t n r t s t o ^ t ' "^nnth 
D ieac G--r'1a n-^se. The J-^ieoo "^arcia b a s e , thPr-^^'oi ' ' ' , i s q o i r g 
t o tie an e ^ t i r f ^ l y s t r - ' - e a i c n^iclear i n t e r v e n t i o n s "^t has'=. 
In ot'"'er v»'^i'-^s, 'Oieac Harci.-i i s bo ino "•^nstru'^t'^r' a'^  a 
50 
"tT-ont li/i - " i a H t i n q o a s e , i t may, t ^ e r e t o r e , r^ ^ -o 'T']i"ieo 
t ^ a t t h e " . S . o o l i - ' v tov/^^r^^s th'=^ I n d i a n Oc^an i s a •'nn'^ d 
p r i r r a - i J y ^ t s'^'^'ri'^r- t^e t te r s'-^ o^*^ t - a c i l i t J e s , st^io-ina p ' ^ s t s , 
-c-r-Ti ^1-p J-x^n i-^^''^s a n'^  i'^ r o ' ^ s i n l e , t'^'=' roa '^ ta < ^^ i.-^  qo-o-^sea 
-^  ^ r- --1 ••o-^t. "^ r- t ^ '^ roqari^, in " I '^^ i t io^ , tHp TTp.-fo'-j q t i t e s 
i'^ r>^^r i--o1'in-' or '^O'^t T'"" ' " " ' ^ ' roa t im t ^r-•; ' jf ip-, t o o , '-or 
j t s i.7r-tr~-^n "''"riia'- Oc^-an t orca^. i n t h e '^-i'^n'Sly L i t t o r a J 
s t a t e s . 
The i'^ep o^ 'r--:;t 'n ' ~- t'-^ion' F=^ r i2 i t i e s i s t o 
r e l a x rean 1"; - r o t a t i o n of U . S . n a v a l f o r c e s which i n s i s t 
t h a t each u n i t be sf^^t home f o r r e s t a f t e r a g i v e n t i m e 
and be r e r l a c e d by ^ ' ^o the r . '^'he ^ ."^, f a c i l i t i e s a^" pi^in-^r i ly 
r e ^ u i ^ e d -PC^ t h e Di'^ao ^ a r c i a baser^ p e r s c ^ p a l an'^ t h e r a p i d 
4 9 . "'^iq Fewer "^ iva l ry i n Tr^aian Ocean , " I n d i a n i n '• 'o'-]^ 
S t r - a t e q i c Envi ronment , Annu?-! '^ev i'^w, ' ' ' O I . T J , 1 ° 7 0 - T I , 
>^ ew ^ e ] h i , A o r i l 1973, n . 726 . 
50 . R . P , Sing'^, o p . c i t . , p . 1*^3. 
[)7 
c]er>}o\'V"e^t fnrce v i r h i s r'^T'^'"'nP'rtly an^^ in^^^ i" Tto"'v n + =^tioned 
51 
i n t h e I n d i a n oceon a r e a . 
Tt i s b e ] i e v p d t ^ a t India'-=; c l o s e n '^inbbour "n" lanka 
h a s p r o v i d e d i t s cnr-cf^nt t o ' ' ? , R , ' f ac - ' . l i t i ' ^ s t o t h e U . S . 
52 
t r o o p s . S r i Lanka has a l s o l e a s e an a rea of I'^ OO ' ^ p c t T e s 
53 
o^f t h e s t ^ ^ t e q i c TrJncomalee n a v a l b a s e , on thr^ ^ ^ s t c o a s t , 
t o t h e Few York-bas^d Rizace I n t e r n a t i o n a l t o e s t a n " ' i s h an 
54 
o i l r e f i n e r y a t an e s t i m a t e d c o s t of $ 6000 i r i i l l i o n . 
r e c e n t l y , t h e "USS E n t P r o r i s e " a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r wi th 
s t r o n n nava l f o r c e v i ' s i t e d K a r a c h i , Pakist-'^n governTpent p r o v i d e d 
h i a h s t a n d a r d I n x a r i e s t o U , S , marin'^s w'-)jch s t a v e d f o r a week 
and enjf^yed K a r a c h i s c e n e s as s p e c i a l VTPs . 
Thns/ t h e ^T^S, naval VP-^-^-PJS Rre l a s t l y T^oni ' - inn 
'"or^ '~>in'^ -i no i'^-^''urn'^e ovpr t h e w'^ ^ole In<^ian Ocean r ^ o i o n . In 
t ' - ' i s riroce<55 of arowi na U . S . dominance, t h e Tl .s , has dep loyed 
s t r -^nc naval -^orcps in t h e a r e a and i t s naval a c t i v i t i e s h a v e 
t r e m e n d o u s l y i n c r e a s e d . 
5 1 . The Times of I n d i a , November 18 , 1980 . 
5 2 . To r e c a l l , S r i lanka i n i t i a l l y opposed t h e TJ.S, base on 
Diego f^arc ia . 
5 3 . T r incomalee i s t h e main n a v a l p o r t town o"^  S r i lanka 
and has t h e d i s t i n c t i o n of h a v i n g t h e b e s t n a t u r a l 
h a r b o u r s i n t h e I n d i a n O^ean. 
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l^i l l tarv Prespnce in Tndjgfi Orean 
no 
The U.S. rp^']it--'rY presence in t h e I rd ian Oc^an ^^^n be 
narkprl w"" rn in 50s, t h e Snvi'-'t Union oc-'i)p5p<i northr^rn p T t s 
of I ran and the U.S. sent i t s suppor t rr^t '^r ial 1 n-^"'-^.ti na th'=' 
rlo=;e i n t e r - a c t i o n between th-^ two c o u n t r i P s . ^ovi'^^er, t ^ e 
U.S. naval presence in the Tn'-lian Ocean p re -da t e s th-'^t o^ the 
Sov ie t ^nion. 
The U.S. t ask force named t h e '"Concord Squadron*^ 
c ru i s ed in the Indian Ocean area on Apr i l 5, 1964. I t wis 
composed o'^ the a i r c r a t t c a r r i e r 'Bon Homme '^ic'^ard' , an 
improved Essex c l a s s a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r / c a r r y i n g 'oecni l^s ' 
m i s s i l o s and armed v7ith nuclear warhead, accom,Panier5 by four 
destr^-^yers and o-^ e f l e e t t anke r , '"he task fo rce sr>ent about 
s i x w^eks in f'^e a r e a . The fo rce subsequ<=nf ly, s tearori north 
a ]o"a the ^last Af r i '^ancoast ^n"' then eastward t^'^'ards t h e 'Tu If 
of Ctrar- a-^tP'r the F-irst po r t of c a l l a t i^ i ego Suarez in 
•-^danas'^ar. Simultan-^ous ly, the U,S, was ca^-ryina on m i l i t a r y 
mano^nvros undf=r opera t ion ^ i l a w a r ' , in Cooperat ion with 
I ran which s t a r t e d on Apr i l 13, 1Q64, About 2,300 U.S. troops 
were parachuted from big t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t i n t o t h e Dezful 
area in South west I ran , i n these e x e r c i s e s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
two U.S. des t roye r s and a converted sea -p lane t ende r , based 
in Ba>^rain, r e p r e s e n t i n g the U.S. nav=il presence in t h e Gulf, 
55, K.P. Mishra, op . ^^it . , "^p. 24-25. 
\ ( ) 0 
laupched an amphlbio^'is landinn on the s t r a t -^a i r rh ' - r^ iriarr^ 
in the '3u]f, which is a l s o ?> v j t a ] oi l -por- t of Tran. Aoroxi-
F ^ t e l v , 6,80"^' U.S. armed forces personnel and 124 a' 're ra f t 
took o a r t in these e x e r c i s e s . 
Tn a d ' ^ i t i o ' , in the some 19 64, the thr'^'^ n u o l n r 
r>owered sur face v e s s e l s , ' Ent-^rprj s e , ' ' lona "^e^ch ' , and 
' ^ainbridq"^-*' s t a r t e d or J u l y 31, 19 64 a lona c - u i s o o" 3(^,500 
Tf" ler from the ^' 'editerJare3n t o th ^ U.S. under t h e " o ^ - r a t i o n 
Sea O-t ' it of 1Q64" in t h e Ind ' an O^ean. They c i r c l e d Africa 
v i a the caoe of Good '-^ope, touched KarTchi b r i e f l y w""^-^  le cross incj 
t he Indian Ocean,p roce'''^*^'^ t o Aus t ra l i a and went ^-^r'^nr^ the 
Care ^orn is South A-^erica to r^scti ^"'or''olV. U.S. o'"ter f ' i f ty 
seven d^ys. The U.S. task fo^ce h^s maintained continiious 
hiqh speed apd had completed the e n t i r e c r u i s e withcTit any 
57 l o o i s t i c sup ' -or t . Thiis, the ^\^-, navy demonstrated t h a t i t 
had a t t a i n e d ne^r per'^e^tion i^ inriependence, rno r i l j t y 
ano s t r i k - ' pc power. 
S i c n i f i c a n t l y , t he U.S. naval presence s i n c e 1964 as a 
permanent f e a t u r e in t h e Indian Ocean, hasically, a l t e r e d 
t h e balance of power in t h e a r e a , ^^owever, upto 40s, t h e B r i t i s h 
navy had been t h e most pov;erful naval force in th^ area but 
i t s pr'^sence g radua l ly decl inod and reononal powers l i k e India 
56. K.R. Singh, op. c i t . n . 2 b . 
57. Ibid, p . 23. 
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and i*) ' is tan had st^irted exp lo r ing t h e i r resources t o 
o b t a i n a s u b s t a n t i a l naval s t r e n g t h . Tt i s a l s o w^l l observed 
th- ' t t he U.S -^^ntry jn Indian Ocean in l'^64 w^s a p a r t of 
t h e U.S, endeavour t o secure Indian Ocean area for thp> use 
of i t s nuclear ''"o "''^'^is * siibm"'•^ines which w^ r^e ooe ra t i nn then 
^rom the Arabian 3ca, t he oed Sea and the i^ay ot ^eroa l and 
could ^over, t h e r e f o r e , a cons ide rab le p a r t of the Sovie t 
Union and the whole of China. 
Since 1950, t h e U.S, navy s t a t i o n e d i t s Mideast Force 
(MTD^ A^STEOR) a t Bahrain in the Pers ian Gulf as a ' g u e s t ' of 
t h e "^r-^tish Navy. This t o r c e c o n s i s t e d of two des t rove r s 
and d e s t r o y e r e s c o r t s , on r o t a t i o n a l assignments from o ther 
a r e a , one arr^'-ioinus s h i p , corvertsti t o the f l a g s h i p of t h e 
U.S, ^ ' id-eas t ^ o r c e . This arrangement t h a t cont inued 
u n t i l Jiine 1'^ '77, was n- 'er an agreement s ianed on Decemfoer 
2 J, 1"71 v/ith t h e Bahrain Government when the U,S, -^avy decided 
t o r"^©^aani se its com'~ands in o roer t o sp^ed up i t s a c t i v i t y 
in the a r e a . Ar^miral John S. McCain, t h e commander-in-
Chief of t he Tj,s, forces in t h e P a c i f i c , v;ho was given c o n t r o l 
of t he U.S, m i l i t a r y opera t ions in the e n t i r e Indian Ocean, 
provided s l i g h t ind- 'cation on oecoTber 16, 1971 In Honolulu 
t h a t t he Seventh F l e e t might p lay a g r e a t e r r o l e in t h e 
58. K.S, K Jawatkar , op. c i t . , p . 1(^2. 
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Tpf^jan ocean as t h e Vietnam vp,r carnp t o an ^nd . 
I P A yr ; , r a f t - r , i n 1*572, t h e U . S . c o - t i n o p n t a t th( 
b a s e oT ''Bahrain w-^ s i n c r e a s e d from abou t 2(^0 t o 260 , l e s i d e s / 
i t s ' f l a g - w a v i n g ' f u n c t i o n s , i t m o n i t o r s s h i p rnove-rents, i n 
t h e s t r a t e g i c GUI-F .S i a n i ^ i c a n t l y , d u r i n a -t-he 1973 Yom K i p p u r War 
i n VJpst-Asia, f ' i d e a s t o r d e s t r o y e r s ra^^ed r^ .'-^ und ta-^ t i p of 
Arab ia t o t h e narrow ^ab Al-Mandet S t r a i t s a t t h e Red sea 
60 
e x i t where t h e Ea">^tian navy b r i e f l y operate^i a b l o c k a d e . 
I t w^s c o n s i d e r e d , t^Tere'' 'or^, t h a t t h e f-^ideast "^orce s e r v e d 
an impoH:ant d i p l o m a t i c Purpose by p r o v i d i n g a t a n g i b l e 
61 
S'TTibol of U .S . i n t e r e s t s in t h e a r e a . 
Tn a ' ^d j t i on , t h e Uni ted S t a t e s i s a c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r i n g 
a p r o p o s a l t o c r e a t a s e p a r a t e I nd i a n Oce^ i^n f l e e t , t h e T^ifth 
F l e e t , t o c o n t a i n t h e rowing S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e in t h e I n d i a n 
Ocean/ a r e a . I t ' s n a v a l f o r c e s in t h e a r ea which a r e p a r t 
o^ ^ t n e Seventh ? ] e e t aene r -a l ly o p e r a t e in t h e Pac- '^ ic from 
t h e s r b i c Say b a s e in t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , A c q u i s i t i o n of new 
base f a c i l i t i e s i n f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s - E g y p t i a n Red Sea- p o r t 
of Ras Banas, Kenyan p o r t of Kombassa, Oman's K a s i r a h i s l a n d 
5 9 . J . P , Anand , "U .S . Naval P r e s e n c e in t h e I n d i a n Ocean" 
N a t i o n a l P r e s s Agency, ^^e^ture S e r v i c e , Mew D ^ l ^ i , 
December 14, 1973 . 
6 0 . The Times of I n d i a , Oc tobe r 5, 1974. 
6 1 . U . S . C o n a r e s s , S e n a t e , Sommit tee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : 
B r i e f i n a s on Diego Garc ia and P a t r o l F r i g a t e ; E x e c u t i v e 
H e a r i n g s on A p r i l 1 1 , 1974. 
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and Senna M a ' s p o r t of Berber? - a p a r t from ' ipararl i nq t h e 
e x i s t i n g ones - Dieqo Ga'-cja ann Coc^:burn Soun^f in v jes tern 
A u s t r a l i a , has g iven c r e d e n c e t o t h e b e l i e f t h a t c r e a t i o n of 
'^'ifth (^'lect/ spec i f - jca l l y f o r t h e TnfMTr Hrean is lU'dr-rway 
62 
^nd v ; i ] l o p e r a t e from Diego • " a r c i a . 
The open ing of t h e Suez Cana l has fu-rthp>r " f a c i l i t a t e d 
t o send i t s s h i p s Q-^ t h e s i x t h F l e e t S'^ -^ o j + ica I l y f-or r- ' 'edite-
i^raneau/ v/ith i t s home a t p o r t a t P i r a e u s i n Hre'^'^e intf^i t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean wi th g r e a t e r ea se and c o n v e n i e n c e , "^r^m t h e 
S o v i e t p o i n t of v iew, t h i s r o u t e , though much shc^t^r, i s 
hirjhJv vulnora 'n) '^ ar-, -jf i s dorriinited bv t h e ' i , s . S i x t h ' ^ lop t 
an'"^  i t s a l l i e s . "otTlilV/ S o v i e t n a v a l vess^^is c^n n o t O'-'ter 
63 
t h e I n d i a n Ocean v/ithoi^'t cro'^ '^inc Rosphorus and n^rdamp^l l a s . 
I t is onv ions t t t l ie U .S . main i n t e r e s t i n t h e I n d i a n 
Ocean a r e a i s s t r ^ i t e g •''c, both a t supf=r power an'^ r e g i o - a l 
] e v p ] . In fa'^t/ i'-cr<^ased ' , S . i n t e r^^s t i n t h e a^-ea h'''s i t s 
r o o t s in t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of thf^ l o n g e r ranged U . S . P o l a r i s 
A-3 m i s s i l e s i n t o s e r v i c e t o t a k e t a r g e t s i n S o u t h e r n ^ s s i a 
64 
and China from t h e p o s i t i c - s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean. 
6 2 . ' ' a v i pekye , " U .S . Search f o r ' ^ a s e s , " The ^jm^s of Tndja, 
A p r i l 16, lQ7q. 
6 3 . C o l . " . ^ama 'c^O/ "sTrTt-'^gi c Cons j d e r a t i o n : An Ir^dj^n 
Ocean s t r a t e g y f o r I p d i a , " S p r - i a l i s t I n d i a / Vol V I T J , 
No. 16, V>^T<^'- 16, 1974, D . 4 . 
6 4 . I b i d . 
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'"ov;ever, the exact Gvidep^e of the ac tua ] rienloyrnent 
o*^  see-has'^c? s t r ^ t e c i c nur lea r forces i . e . b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e 
"jv-n^o T-uc le? r rnvicrec'i s^ '-brTires in the Indian Ocp?n ^re not 
a v - i l T b ] e . '^ut t h " cor^rrainlratIOTIS f a c i " ' i t i e s s t t he ro r th -Ves t 
Cane s t - t i o r in Aus t ra l i a an'"" the more sonh isticaff^d one a t 
Diego ^^roia in t^e '^hacos Ar-"^i nel^ao i n d u b i t a b l y v^^-^ nrrr\ 
th-^ ^unct ion of makino poss ib l e r = g u l T p a t r o l s o"^  t he TT,S, 
t 'ol^iris A-3' ©nd 'Poseidon ' s t r a t e a i c nuclear submarines i n t o 
the ocean. The j o i n t s ta tement issued by the A u s t r a l i a n 
•QeDUty ^rii^e Minist'^r and J^inister O"*^  D^^fence-and the T^.s. 
S e c r e t - r y of Defence on M Ja-^uan^ 10, 1Q74 s t a t e d t h a t "One 
im'-iortant ^unction cf the s t a t i o n , a t Norf^-'-Jest '"BVIC, W'-^ S 
t o se rve as a key element in a crsTiiolex system of communica-
,65 
c a t i o n s sui-^rorting t h e g loba l ba l ance . 
I t i s impor tant t o remember t h a t geograph ica l ly the 
no r the rn p a r t of t h e Indian *-'cean a r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e 
Arabian Sea, could be used by the U.S. t o deploy s t r a t e g i c 
m i s s i l e submarines of fens ive ly a g a i n s t t he Sovie t Union 
v;hile s i m i l a r o'^fensive use o^ ^ t h e Indian Ocean by the Sovie t 
Union aga ins t t h e United S t a t s s does not e x i s t a t p r e s e n t 
because the range being i n s u f f i c i e n t t o al low t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y 
The range of e x i s t i n a U.S. Posidon submarine m i s s i l e is 
about 2,800 miles which makes the Arabian Sea the next be s t 
65. The Washington Post , J a -ua ry 11, 1974 
l[)fy 
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r"'eployrierit a r e a t o t h e " a s t y'==r'iterranean Sea , I ^ t ^ s t >"f=i"ort 
s ' ows t^^^t t he U . S . l o n g - r a n a e submar ine laun^herl b a H i ^ - t i c 
r ^ i s s i l e (SIBFs) has a r a n e e of 3000-3500 m i l e s , based and 
66 
o p e r - ' t i n o i n t h e I n d i a n Oc<=an. 
'^owever, t h e S o v i e t Union a l s o m a i n t a i n s s t r o n g 
squadro-^s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n whose normal s t r e n g t h i s 
60 shiDS of a ] 1 t y o e s . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h i s t o t a l - o s e t o 
67 
90 d u r i n g t h e v;est Asian c r i s i s i n Oc tobe r 1973 , ^ a c t u a l l y , 
t h e U . S . S . R . p r i m a i l l y aim t o d e p l o y i t s squad ron i s t o t r y 
t o keep U.S . b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submar ines beyc^d t h e r a n g e 
of i n d u s t r i a l a r ^ a of t h e IT^raine. The Americans were s u r e , 
t h e r e ^ o r i ^ , t h a t t h e S o v i e t TTni 6n would d e p l o y ' K i e v - c l a s s ' 
carT-if=rs, equipped wi th anti-s^Tbrniarine h e l i c o p t e r s in t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean^.^ i^nwever, t h e r e i s a l s o no a u f ' o r i t a t i ve e v i d e n c e 
of t h e deployment of - i v i e t n u c l e a r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e 
f i r i no submari",es in t h e I n d i a n Ocean, But , t h e r - ^ r o r t from 
t h e J o i n t Coi^-mittee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s o n t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
r e g i o n o"^  t h e Aus t r a l i a ) r \P a r l i a me n t p u b l i s h e d i n 1972, 
i n d i c a t e d t h e p r e s e n c e of a S o v i e t n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d E - i l c l a s s 
69 
submar ine in t h e T^c^ian Ocean in A p r i l May 1970 , Here 
6 5 , Wi th in t h e l a s t t h r e e d e c a d e s , t h r e e weapon systems 
c a p a b l e of r o s i n g s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e have 
been p e r f e c t e d . They a r e t h e manned bomber, t h e land 
based i n t e r m e d i a t e r a n g e b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e (TRBM) and i t s 
improved v e r s i o n , t h e i n t e r - c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e 
( ICRM) and f i n a l l y , t h e submar ine launched b a l l i s t i c 
mi-^s i le (SLBM) , 
6 7 . The I^Tew York Times , J a n u a r y 25, l o 7 4 . 
6 8 . I b i d , 
6 9 . K . S . J a w a t k a r , op , c i t . , p , l i b . 
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i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o r'^menber t ' -^ t t h e Sovie t Union is r /^i lding 
nuclear-pcwered a i r c r a f t ca r - r ier . A ma/n-oth 30,000 t^-n rieep 
d iv ina str=>tpaic m i s s i l e f i r i n g n u c l e a r submarine of t h e 
typhoon cla<::s i s a l s o iralievod to be en te r ing th'-^ Soviet Fleet / 
70 
which wou""-^  most r>robably/ be d^^o^oyed in the Indian Ocean. 
Tt is almost c e r t a i n t n a t t he U.S. woxnd d e r l o y nuclear ' 
weapons m o ^ in number in t ime t n come in the reair-n e i t h e r 
a'"oarr! c a r r i e r s or on submarines. Admiral Robert lona, Commander-
in-Chief of U.S. raval "^orces in t h e Pac i f i c had i rd i ' -a ted 
in p o s i t i v e in t h i s reoard blaming the Soviet Union o"" "saving 
deployed planned nuclear v;eapons in As ia . J-t i s widely knovm 
t h a t the Sovie ts had deployed ''or a long time such weapons on 
t h e i r border with China. The United s t a t e s seemed t o e x p l o i t 
i t as a P re t ex t t o ^eploy nuc lear weapons in Tpdian Ocean 
r e g i o n . I t is s icn i f ic^-'nt th^- t^ the Adr'^iral avoided t o r e p l y 
ra i spd in'~^uiry as t o whether t h e U.S. h s deployed nuc lear 
wea-ops a t the Subic ^,ay and "ilark Air Force basf^s ^n the 
72 
P h i l i p p i n e s . 
As fa r as Diego Garcia base i s concerned, t h e base 
with h igh ly s o p h i s t i c a t e d communications and suppor t f a c i l i t i e s 
seemed sure t o be capable t o opide and give s h e l t e r as wel l 
70 . K.Syhrahmanyam, "Mon-?(ligned Nations Up^^r S t r a i n s , " 
The Tim-"s of India/ December 3, I9y0, 
7 1 . Clark is important '-ot only as t h e main bas^ "^  for the 
f i g h t e r and t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t deployed in the --eqion but 
as a c e n t r e for com^^ji-ic^'tions and I n t e l liqc^nce. 
72 . P .K.S, Famboodri / "U.S. Build-up On Diego Garc i a , " 
Fagnur Times, June 24, 19«0. 
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t o irt'='^-Ocean ' ^ a l H s t i c rr'^sslir^ nuc lea r submarines n^ t'^e 
'Fcl='^v"' 'r'os'^-5'ior', ="ic1 1'^^tlYi 'T^-ident' t^'pf^s, ^osi'^es 
na^-i'^c pasy t'-ne o^^ens'•'ve deployment o^ tho-^e s'l hm^^T'ines . 
" o s t s ion i~ i c a n t l y , the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y importan'-e 
of thp Indian Ocoan area increased in f ac t e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 
74 
t h e p e r f e c t i o n of the ' P o l a r i s A-3' m i s s i l e . The i n t roduc -
t i o n o^ the Poseidon and the Tr iden t m i s s i l e s would f u r t h e r 
enhance the s t ra t i^a ic imo^rt-^ncG ot the In^^i^n Ocean area for 
the ru-^lear vjeanon powers. 
4-1 
Besides t he se nuclear m i s s i l e s t h r e a t , t h e e n t i r e Indian 
Ocean coas t is under ^^merican m i l i t a r y s u r v e i l l a n c e . The 
U.S. P-3 a i r c r a f t s , u t i l i s i n g Diego Garcia as the base, have 
been v i s i t i n g r e g u l a r l y t h e i s l and of ^1asirah in t h e nor thern 
Indian Ocean o-^ f the '^o^st of A>rahian pen insu l a . The information 
regard ing these v i s i t s were av=ijlable follow-^nn i n ' n n r i e s 
-^^^, ,^^0^ oy Lee 'J. i-Tamilton, Chairman of the "ouse s o e c i a l 
76 
Sub-committee on inves t i pati'~'ns v^ith th!= Defence nen-'^'tment. 
7 3 . S.K. Ghosh, "Orrinous developments over Dieao Garc i a , " 
Amrit Bazar P a t r i k a , Apr i l 13, 1976. 
74. The e a r l y v e r s i o n of P o l a r i s m i s s i l e , ' P o l a r i s A-1 ' became 
ope ra t i ona l by Ju ly 1960. Later , U.S. conducted experiments 
t o improve the performance of the P o l a r i s m i s s i l e . The 
r-'^nge of P o l a r i s A- l ' was 1200 na i i t i ca l miles* t h a t of 
A-2 was 1725 n a u t i c a l miles and of A-3, 2bOO n e u t i c a l m i l e s . 
Fotably , one n a u t i c a l miles is eaua 1 t o 6,000 f e e t or about 
1.14 s t a t u d e m i l e s . 
7 5. The Times of Ind ia , February B & 28, 19 77. 
/ 6 . s e e . The Times of Ind ia , December 4, 1984. 
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The P-3 recc-na J3F^nce a i r c r a f t a r e used for In te l J iaence 
g a t h e - i r a and P r imar i l y i - tended t o provide surl ace and stf*-^ -
sur-face s u r v i e l lance supoort lo r U.S. task cr-r^vrs o^p^rating 
.n t h e Tnf^ian Oc^-an " rom the n i e a o f-^arcia base . T'l^ planes 
'-^^ve t h e --an-e ot 2,bOO Kin. and a re deco^-ated v;ith s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
equiprrent t o ga ther i n t e l l i g e n c e . One vers ion of t ,e P-3 
a i r c r a f t / P-3 ' O r i e n ' , i s a l s o us^^d as p a t r o l a- '^c-'^tt as 
o a - t of the anti-subrP'-'r-ine s t r a t e a y Tota'-^ly, t h e F-3 a i r c r a f t 
can opera te upto 1,400 nau t i ca l mi J-^ s f-ron nieqo Garcia and 
77 
provide t - u r ho^rs ot on s t a t i o n t ime a t t n ] s range . 
Tn f a c t , t h e U.S. nava] a c t i v i t y was s to rped uv in t h e 
' i r ^ t half o' 1 71 soon af •" <=! the west t ' ak i s tan ; => rmy 'f^ d Dy 
Yahya V^^n bepajn t o ru in East i-aK-^stan. A,'''',5, sau'-'^ron of 
s i x warr '^ips, "four dp^trpyprs and s ^^Tnnaripi^s, Jed d-' the 
a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r . ' T i c o n d e r o a a ' co di:ict"d a brie*^ AS'^ I exr-v-cise 
in t'^'^ '^-•^'-tern Indian ^cean - 1n the whartop Basin, south-v.-est 
of J'-va a-d rorthv;est ot " u s t r M i a - from a p r i l IB t o 23, 1971. 
Tn Septerber l ° 7 l , the wor ld ' s b iooes t nuclear powered a i r c r a f t 
c a r r e e r 'USS E n t e r p r i s e ' accomr^anied by the nuc lear f r i g a t e 
7 8 
'Ba inbr idge ' paid a four-day v i s i t t o the a r e a . 
l a t e r , when the downfall of Dh^k;a was looking very near 
duri'-^g, Tndo-Pak VUr in l"^'/!, t he I T . S . a i r c r a f t i^ar r ior 
77 . See, Co-mander ^avi Kaul ( ^ e t d . ) , " P e n t a g o n ' s P lo t f o r 
niego Garcia , "The Tribune, De-^ember 23, 19 74. 
7 8 . J . p . Anand, "TT.S. Fava 1 Presence in t n e Indfan Ocean," 
'^f.P.A,, op. c i t . 
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'USS v . n t ^ r p r i s e ' '-^e-r^i-.g a t^Ok t o r c e i r c l u ^ i n a pn ;^rr'-^hi':-ioi's 
a s s a u l t s^ iD, • T r : ^ o l i ' ^^it^- a b a t t a l i o n l a n d i n g te^-rr, spven 
d e s t r o y e r s , avd an o i l ^ r , e n t - r e d t h e Bay of Rencp 1 on - e c e m i e r 
14, 1^71 and vas b e l i o v e d t o re.-^rh a o o i n t a b n u t 2^0. m n o s fr-cxn 
c i t t a g o n g , '^angla Desb, m^unt^-g d i s n l a y of s t r e n a t h w i t h i n 
t h e I n d i a ' s de f ence p e r i m e t r e s . Tt w^s f a c t u a l l y , air-^^ n o t o n l y 
t o i n t i m d . - , t e I n d i a hut a l s o t o s'^ow + - i t s ^ l a q j n f - e I n d i a n 
^ ^ ^ P ^ a rea . ' ^^ The t a s k f o r c e l a t o r proved tow,->rds t h e ^^aldives 
80 
p - d w^s steairecl n e a r t h e i s l a n d of Dieo^- G a r c i a . 
Suh .qeguenfy , "^H Ui^m P- f 'ack, •Commander of t h e U ,S , 
Seven th ^ l e e t , d e c l a r e d in " o n e Kona t h a t t h e ^ l e e t s '"loHtinQ 
and oi P e n s i v e c a n o j t y w^^i^d be rnorp s t r e n g t h e n e d . '^ -^  ^'-d-ir^^ted 
t h a t t h e I n d i a n c^ean vnujd be more c l o s e l y shadowed, ^^he 
d e c l a r a t i o n was j u s t a r e f l e c t i o n o*= t h e U . S . n o l i c " th-^t i t s 
81 
w a r s h i p s would s - . i l r e c : T=3rly ir t h e I n d i a n Ocean. l a s t l y , 
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e TT.S. -Seventh F l e e t was ex tended 
i n t o t h e Tnidna L^cean and i n March 1^573, r e s u l t a n t l y , t h e 
82 
U."^. a ^ r c r - l t c a r r i e r 'AmeriCc-'' e n t e r e d i n t o t h e Ifjdian Ocean. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e USSR a l s o s e n t a d d i t i o n a l v ia r sh ips 
i n t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean a f t e r t h e U . S . d e s p a t c h e d a s t r o n g t a s k 
f o r c e headed b y ' u s s E n t e r p r i s e ' i n 'OeoiBmber 1 9 7 1 , The 1971 
Indo-Pak w-^r, led t o r eco rd f o r c e l e v e l s f o r both t h e s u p e r 
7 9 . K . S . S idhu , The Ind i an Ocean; A Zone of P e a c e , Feu n e J h i , 
1983 , p . 14 . 
8n . J . p . Anand, U . S . ^^ava 1 P r e s e n c e i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean , " 
o p . c i t , 
81 . Ibid 
82. The New York Times, March 22, 19 72. 
I l l 
DOwers i . e . 14 w ^ r s ^ i p s f o r t h e U . S , w h i l e 26 -^or t h e S o v i e t 
Union.^'^ I n a r i ' i i t i o n , f o r a b r i e f p e r i o d i n e a r l y l'^V2, 
13 s u r t ^ c e S o v i e t v e s s e l s and 7 submar ines s t a y e d i n t h e 
84 
I n d i a n Ocean w?^ters. 
Apar t from 1971 , Bangladesh w^r, t h e 1^7J We-.t Asian 
c r i s i s a l s o t r e m e n d o u s l y a t t r a c t e d U . S . navy in t h e I n d i a 
Ocean a r e a . Dur ing t h e c r i s i s , an E s s e x - c l a s s a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r , 
t h e 'Hancock ' accompanied by f o u r d e s t r o y e r s and an o i l e r , 
s a i l e d i n t o t h e I n d i a n ocean . Another a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r t h e 
• O r i s k a n y ' l a t e r j o i n e d i t i n December 1'^ '7 3, w i t h f o u r d e s t r o y e r s 
and an o i l e r . S i r ^ u l t a n e o u s l y , t h e U . S . n :c le=, r -powered ' ' r i g a t e 
• B a i n b r i d g e ' was a l s o s e n t i ' - t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean. The R a i n b r i d g e 
was wi thdrawn when in '^^arch 1*^74, t h e more advanced a i r c r a f t 
c a r r i e r K i t t y Hawk' , w j t i 7f-..7nri t o n - d i s n l a c e m e n t w s s e n t in 
86 
t h e ar-ea. 
The U . S . S e c r e t a r y of Defence , James S c a l e s i n g e r s t a t e d 
i n a P r e s s C - n t e r e n c e on Aori 1 22, 1974 t h a t " t h e K i t t y 
Hawk' i s j u s t moving out of t h e I n d i a n Ocean b u t we 
r e i t e r a t e t h a t t h e p r e s e n t p l a n s c a l l f o r o c c a s i o n a l movement 
8 3 . See , Geof f rey J a k e s , "Bia ir'ond Needs Sma l l F i s h , " 
The A u s t r a l i a n , F e b r u a r y , 2 6, 1974 . 
8 4 . A ftjlletin of Uni ted S t a t e s I n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e ( C o n b e r r a ) , 
r 'arch l'^^/4. 
tiS. Bot'-^ t h e 'Hancock ' and 'Oi - i skany ' a r e World War IT 
v i n t a g e s h i p s . 
8 b . K . S . J a w a t k a r , o p . c i t . , p . 10b. 
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of such f o r c e s i n t o t b e I n d i a n Oc^an on an i r t ^ r r ^ i t t e n t 
87 
bas i s . " 
Tn t " i s p r o c e s s , t h e U . S . ouidod m i s s i l e c r u i s e r 
' C ^ i c a a o ' , accorrpaniPd by two r ip ' s t royers and an o-* i^^r-, 
e n t P r e d i n t o t h e I n d i a n Ocean th rough t h e Malacca s t r a i t s 
D O 
on June 30, 1^74. wo tab ly , t h e f o r t y seven ^ ' . S . n a v a l v e s s e l s 
•lad c a l l e d t h e Ipdian Ocean between ^^ovetn'-er 1973 and Anoust 
1^74 v/ '-i le t h e mere s i x w o r s h i o s pa id t h e i r v i s i t durincf t h ^ 
89 
sa'^e p e r i o d i n t h e a r ea i n 1 ° 7 2 . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , in t n e n t t e r ha l i of 19 75 , t h e S o v i e t 
s q u a d r o n i n t h e I n d i a n ^cean c o n s i s t e d of 30 s h i p s d o u b l e t h e 
nxombpr b e f o r e t h e 19 /3 We^t Asian c o n f l i c t . l a t e r , t h e A n e r i c a n s 
b e l i e v e d th^it in t h e n.^ --" f^e s o v i e t or '^sence in t h e I n d i a n 
Ocean had ^ radu^ i i iy i n c r ' ' sf^ d^ by one ^ r two s h i n s p e r y e a r . 
^ny way, t n e TT.S, nav^' m a i n t a i n e d i t s r e g u l a r v i s i t 
i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean, The U . S . '^'avy p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a 12 day 
o 1 
"Mid l ink "74" "- n a v a l e x e r c i s e i n ""fovember 1974 i n t h e I n d i a n 
o c e a n . The a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r "Consta n a t i o n , " w i t h 80 ,000 t o n 
d i s p l a c e m e n t , accompanied bj t h r e e d e s t r o y e r s p a r t i c i p a t e d 
8 7 . K . S . J a w a t k a r o p . c i t . , p . 1 0 5 . 
^6« I n t e r n a t i o n a l " e r a Id Tribun>^, J u l y 3 , 1974. 
8 9 . Rajya sabha DeoatesT V o l . XC, No. 3,November 15 , 1 9 / 4 , 
Slol . 242 . 
9 0 . The Mew York Times , Varch 8, 197 5 , Also s e e . Amri ta Bazar 
P a t r i k a , May 30, 1981 , " 
9 1 . The "Midl ink 74" e x e r c i s e was s p o n s o r e d by t h e CENTO. 
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the exe rc i se f e l=i roes t ever i'.'^l'^ in the p r e a . "'"^,r nxp-rcise 
was 'iP'sione'-] t o b-ilarce an aJ leaed incre<''" ing Sovj'^t 
p f^=>-,i^ nce in f'^e p r e a . ""he S o v i e t s , t h e ^r-'orican arcnjod, had 
deployed a c r u i s e r h e J i - o p t o r c a r r i e r "leninTrari" In the 
Araojan Sea, es ta-:) J i s ied naval a i r t a c i l i t i e s a t Ad^ n^ jn 
Sout -ern Yerren, on the i s land ot Socotr^ as vjeil and a t 
^ ' ^ h e r a , Somalia. Besides , the ex'^rcise was be l ieved v i t a l 
to maintain western naval presence in the Indian Ocean t o 
p r o t e c t - ' e o i l - l a n e s V7hich v.'ere used by 200 western t ankers 
93 
T-er day . '^o r e c a l l , t h " An^lo-American accord on Dieao 
Garcia was a l s o considered d e s i r a b l e in the general west-^'m 
94 
i n t e r e s t to balance Soviet a c t i v i t i e s in the Indian Ocean. 
The U.S. again de rons t - a t ed i t s naval s t r eng t ' i v;hen the 
Vietnam war wa<^  rm'na o an d e c i s i v e •'=nd. The TT,-^,, riav^ ] 
t a sk t o r c e st^^^rted ^^om' Subic ^ay t o en te r i n to t h e Vi f=tnamese 
sea w^t-^r t o s''"ow s^.rno^^; t o South Vietnam aa^in on January 
7, 1975, the day v/nen P^^uoe " i^nK/ the cap- ' ta l of south 
Vietnam'^se Province had ^ a l i e n and thus displayed i t s Force 
as a warning t o comrnnanist su'^ported North Vietnam, "owever, 
92 . s ee . The yew York Ti'-^es, November 21, 1974. 
9 3 . Ed'- ' torial : "Oberation Midl ink," The Tr ibune, November 22, 
1974. 
94 . The New York Times, Doc-m^ ^r 4, 1974; a l s o ^e^ , m'-e ^^ Mmes 
of K Ind ia , June 7, 1974; ^he Statesman, T"'ecember 4, 1^74. 
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sccnrr"' t o Fentaaon, the t a sk grouo was scheduled t o "shov; 
tie ~ 1 .Q" '^ nd t h p r e t o r e , s h o r t l y s tayed a t few Indi^in Ocoan 
nor ts ^v" -^^turned t o t^^e U.^;, throuoh the way of Cape of Cood 
" o r e . The task ^ r rce included the hot a i r c r a f t ca ' " r i e r "IJSS 
En te r i r i ' ^e" a-^roiriDanied by nuclear-powered T i i j e r " lo rg "^each" 
9b 
e 'lipped with oeoulus m i s - i l e , two d e s t r o y e r s , a suoPly sh ip 
a-d a t a r k ^ r . The task group v.'ap a l s o ^-eppi-tedly v i s i t e d the 
•CTI-" of ' 'Ophin, tne C^lf o^ Si?vi o-^ f -Combodia and performed 
96 
'^^ anoc'UVT-Fs with Aus t ra l i an n^^val ^ orces . 
The Ignited S t a t e s s en t "USS E n t e r p r i s e " and an another 
bl^^OO ton c a r r i e r ""idway" i '- to the K'o^ean waters i n Anaust 
1°75 fo''low3nq th'=' KiMi ' " ' s o^  t\;o American army o'f'f liters in 
the Korean demil i tar ise^^ zone. The Carrier'M-,-dway' had 40 
f irhter pla^-^es on i t s ^ ==ck which were ready to t ake off 
97 
m emergency, 
l a t e r , t h e U.S. Mavy under the Ca r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
confirmed t h a t t he t a sk tor^-e c o n s i s t i n g of E n t e r p r i s e and 
Long Beac^ was s en t in to t h e Indian Ocean f o r a " r e ; t i n e 
98 
deployment. 
95. Tt is a sur face to sur face guided m i s s i l e , a c r u i s e 
m i s s i l e with a subsonic speed and a ranne of about 
575 m i l e s . I t can a l s o be armed with a nuc lea r war head, 
9 6 . The New York Times, January 11 St 12, 1Q75. 
9/« -Amrit Bazar F a t r l k a , Auaust 23, 197 6, 
98. The Statesman, January 2'^, 1977; a l s o see The -^^ ew York 
Tjmes, Januarv ^B, 1977, 
Sirr-e 1972 u n t i l l ° / "3 , t h e U . S . ^l^-ot h^d '-'ado i« 
. 99 
voya^-'oc, 1^ t ^ e T^diT-i Ocean i r FTI uneven or^f^r ^nd i n t ^ r - v - i l s . 
Tptp^-'^st i nal y, t h e th- 'n P^es J 'e '" t ^ n r t ^ ' ' ^nr-> . r-^ ^^  - i s 
s i i ' - r n r t t o t n e demand t h ^ t t ' - e T^dian oc'^'^n s'^'^u''^ <"• r-nrrnl^f^Jv 
c5eri "• it=iri<=pd . S imit J t aneous l y , t h e ^'n^r-^'-' s t a t e s s o r t thi^ ^ 
f o ^ r - s h i p t a s k erouD I-^d by a miide^' mjs ' ^ i l e c-^'ois^^r i n t o t h e 
I n d i a " o " e a n . ""he t a s k -^-^oup took n l ^ r e in t ^ e ^ rea ^s s^on a s 
t h e c a r - ' i e ^ - . ' " n t e r p r i s e ' l e - 1 t i e a r ea w i t n other- wa^-s'^ips 
o'^  i t s t a s k "!:orce in e a r l y i^ R^ -c'r^  1^^^. ""he An^er"'"ans pr-rn^d t h ? t 
t h e v i s i t O'' t h e s e t ^ sk f o r c e s woii]d no t be Msniotr -d n n t i 11 
100 
t h e - o v i e t TTnion ^o^-t-• r r e s i t s r^-psf^nee m t h e Tn'^i^n 'Ve^'n. 
'^U'^;'^er, turrroj 1 i n I r a n i n 1<^ V8 i n t e r n a l suhrv-^rsi or 
in Yf^ TOn a^d TT.S , s f ^ "n r i t y rc^rrnrr t i wards S'lrM \r u in 
-forced t h e TTpT ted s t '^ t '^s t o '^-i n t a in L'-s nava l act--'vi t-i P S 
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i n t n e "ndian Cr^-an. 
Tn A,---! 1 1O80, t h e a i ^ ^ r a ' - t ca- r - ie - - ' ' " ^ n s t e l l a t i o n * 
aC'-o!Ppa-led ^y s i x w a r s h i p s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e I n d i a n ocean a r e a . 
S i g n i ' ^ i r a n t l y , t h e o v e r a l l nurrber of t h e U . S . w o r s h i p s o p e r a t i n g 
i n t h e v a s t I n d i a n Ocean Arabian S e a - P e r s i a n Gyif a r e a i n 
. 102 
A p r i l 1"80 touched a r e c o r d l e v e l - 3 4 . 
" 9 . K . 5 , J a w a t k a r , op . c i t . , p . 107 , 
100 . The Tinnes of I n d i a , ^ay 2b, 19 7 7 , 
101. The Times of Inr^ ia, April ", I'^ Vg 
1 0 2 . K . S , J a w a t k a r oo . c i t . / p . 108 . 
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Trie 'Za^riers, ' '^onstel Ja t ion ' and '^isen'^owpr' were 
sent i - t o the Indian '^cean t o s u b s t i t u t e the nuc le^r-rov;^red 
a i ^ ^ r a f t ca^-riGrs '^"iTitz ' and the ' '^oral s e a ' , w'-^  ich were 
deployed in t h e Arabian Sea-G^ilf of Dnian. I t took many days 
t o r t he two a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s t o reacn in the Indian Ocean 
and t o replace t h e 'Mimitz' and the " : o r a l Sea* which meant 
t h a t f o r a s^^ort period t h e U.S, had of i t s 13 aircp^-^t c a r r i e r s 
m t h e Indian Ocean a r e a . 
The U.S. naval a c t i v i t i e s in 1980 cont inued t o be very 
a c t i v e and mot iva ted , Motably, t h e Pentoqon h;^ d designed a 
plan t o a t t a c k on Kharg I s l and , I r a n in Gulf, sometirries i r 
October 1980. I t was be l ieved t h a t t he Navy was equipped for 
t n i s ^urpose rieployirg a s p e c i a l l o g i s t i c s force a t Diego 
Garcia base, which could reach on the t a r g e t in about f ive 
104 
cays . 
mhe sa^e year , followji-a isl-'^m-'c r evo lu t ion in I r a n , 
few Americans were made hostages in Tehran. The Ame-i-icans 
passed a tuff t ime . But a f t e r an unsuccess-^ul a t t e m r t t o r e scue 
the hos tages , t h e U.S. a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had d i r e c t e d an a s s a u l t 
f o r ce of 1800 marines and f i v e amphibous warships i n t o t h e 
103. The Times of Ind ia , Apr i l 29, 1980. 
104. An prominent American Columinist Jack Anderson repor ted 
about t h i s U.S. Plan See . The Times of I n d i a , August 26, 
1980. 
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weanons ammunition and suu'^Jiec] were a l s o sen t t o '^ieqo 
105 
Ga - c i a . 
Thns, far-oughout 1<^B0, t n ^ r e were h e c t i c Tf,< ,^ naval 
ac t ive - t i e s in t h e Indian Ocean a r e a , in OctoDe- 1980, 'i^ he iT,s. 
respond f e I r an ian t h r e a t t o block snipnino in t h e s t r a i t s 
of Mormuz, assembling a naval task fo rce of 60 worships t rom 
106 
the U.S. ,France and A u s t r a l i a . 
i-'owever/ t he Soviet Union too , continued t o deploy more 
warships in t h e area throuch^ut 1980, A^t^r int'='rvention in 
Arg-^Qtii'^tan, a task f c c e o"* -^  i r e warships , i nc lud ina t h e most 
moc'ern Soviet auided m i s s i l e c r u i s e r "Pet ropar lovak" ot t he 
tifZOO ton K a r a - c l a s s , have jo ined o ther Sov ie t naval -Forces 
107 deployed in the indiati (_\:pan-'\rBbian Sea a r e a . Wnile, the 
Sov ie t Union norm^ "  ly P'Tir.tained a fo^^re o"^ 20 t o 22 naval 
v e s s e l s r r i o r t o tne Afghan c r i s i s , t h e Americans claimed 
thcit aoout 30 Soviet, warshirs were c n i i s i n c in the a^ea for 
severa l weeks fol lowing the Sov ie t i n t e - v e n t i o n in Atghanis tan . 
However, in e a r l y September 1980, when the Americans had 
32 warships steaming in the Indian Ocean, t he Sovie t s had 26 
10 5 . The Times of India , August ^t, 1980. 
106. The Times of Ind ia , September 13 & October 21, 1980, 
Also s e e . The Times o^ " Ind ia , November 1 / , 198b 
107. The Times of Ind ia , January 18, 1980. 
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s h i p s m tne ar-ea. 
In a-^dition, the NATO exper t s b e l i e v e t h a t the Sovie t 
merchant snips are i-ow in a pos i t i on t o a s s i s t the army 
t o i n t e rvene overseas as inassively as they did in neighbouring 
A ' g ' - a n i s t m . The Soviet merchant t l e e t i s prepared t o move s i x 
army d i v i s i o n s , aor-ut 7^,000 s '^ l^iers vntn a J l t h e i r equipm'^nt, ^ 
1C9 
a t any tame. " '^ost siQni^^ icant ly, in each of the 1,400 po r t s 
ot 1''3 ecu t r i e s where Soviet sh ips unload, t h e r e is a K,G«B, 
O'^ficer ass igned in p r i n c i p l e to give i n s t r u c t i o n s to t h e 
c rews . According t o a western r e o o r t , the Soviet sh ips use 
leqit-'m^ite carao a'-.sianments ^? P re t ex t s t o en te r s t r a t e o i c 
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po^t'^, t o r example, loadino phosphorus a t Jacaoowi lJe , F J o r i d e . 
To back t o t h e U.S . , i t s t^avy desioned the manoeuvres 
under i t s command in the Sea ot Om n^ nf^ar the HuJt, which beaan 
on October 20, 1980. I r an , Aus t r a l i a and B r i t a i n a l s o took 
p a r t i n the e x e r c i s e . The 25 s h i p s , inc lud ing the a i r c i - a f t 
c a r r i e r s the 'Midway' and t h e 'Eisenhower' took p a r t in t h i s 
111 
exerc i s e . 
On October 30, 19B0, the t h i r d a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r of the 
U . S . , t he B a t t l e Group, ac-ompanied by few o t h e r sh ips jo ined 
the } U.S. navy sh ips in the Indian Ocean. Thus, t h i s had 
been a c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n ot U.S. naval deploynient in tne 
108. The Times of Ind ia , Apr i l 9, 1<^/9, February 19 & September 
13, 1^80. 
109. K.S. Jawatkar , op. c i t . , p . l l b . 
110. The Times of India , Janizary 25, 1980. 
111. The Times of Ind ia , September 19,21,22 & October 26, 1980 
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Indian Ocean Arabian Sea-Pers ian Gulf area ever s ince the 
112 I r an i an m i l i t a n t s seized U.S. nostaqes in e^'rJy l°7'f. 
I t is beli-?ved t h a t the t h r ^ e TT,S. a i r c r i ' t ^ i r r i e r 
" <a t t le Groups", s t a t i o n e d in the Indian Oc^'^n havp '^rr-a^eds 
of t e c t i c a l nu-" lear weanon systern. Amonq t'-'em i r e B-t-.l j i a ' ^ t -
weight nuc l ee r bombs with y i e ld s ranging t r a n I'^ O t o bco 
k i l o t ^ n s (KT) , B-b7 l ightweight nucJear depth charges vjitn 
y i e l d s ranging up t o 20 F T . R - 4 3 mediiOT-weight nucJear bombs/ 
W-44 w<5rhe3cis ot about one KT yie ld "-or s'^ip-laun'^hed a n t i -
submarine m i s s i l e s , W-55 warheads of s e v e r a l KT y ie ld for 
submarine-Janu-:hed an t i submarine m-^ssiles, ?^r\d W-4b-l warheads 
of one KT y ie ld r or s u r f a c e - t o - a i r a n t i - a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s . 
I n a d d i t i o n , the U.S. sh ips and submarines p a t r o l l i n o the 
Ind ian Ocean mioht be^^n ca r ry ing the 1, bOU k i lomet re range 
113 
sea- launched c r u i s e " x s s i l e with W-80-20t) KT warheads. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , uo to 19B4-S5,tne ^entaaon nas s e t up 
30 mi l i t^ ' ry i-^sta I i a t i o n s i n t h e Indian Ocean, At p r e s e n t , i t 
has approximately, l,bOO warships , 80 s h i p s , t h r e e nuclear 
114 
submarines and 220,000 marines in the RDF c o n t i n g e n t . 
The presence of v a s t amount of nuc l ea r weapons aboard U,S, 
warships and warp lanes and a t m i l i t a r y bases such as Diego 
112. The Times of Ind ia , November 1, 1^80, 
113. The Times of Tndia^ December 4, 1984, 
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GP-rcia have en ' le-rtiveiy projected the ^jnit^d s ta tes i\avy's 
dominance in tne renio--. To r e c a l l , the U.S. has a l so included 
tne Indian Ocean in i t s 'Star Wars' proaramme which v;ould 
undouhtr^diy rn'^ re dis turb the nuclear balance in th i s a rea . 
The subsequent development in the region prove tha t the 
external and the U.S. mi l i ta ry involvement has t e r r i b l y increa-
sed in the Indian Ocean/ breat ing more regional i n s t a b i l i t i e s 
in the area and subsequently invi t ing addi t ional involvement 
by t^e U.S. l ike extra-regional powers. In rac t /both the 
super-poW'=rs possess con t l i c t ing commitments and di f fer ing 
perceptic'-'^ about the tas t -going tr^^nsformation in the Third 
World. In tn i s super-'-'Cwer comoef'tive searcn for i'^tluence 
and domination, t i e en t i re Indian Ocean area is rapidly cctning 
under the spe l l of t he i r new i nter-ventionist m s t u r e s . The 
Indian Ocean, therefore, has ne'^ ome a t pres-^^nt a focus of the 
new cole' 'va r con^'^-nptat ion. 
Tne ' nited sates and tne '='oviet Union havf^  not been 
subs tan t i a l ly capable in the past to respond millt-^fi-ily t o c r i s i s 
s i tua t ions in a swift and decisive manner. But, s ince the mid-
s i x t i e s and spec i f i ca l ly a f te r tt^e Vietnam war, both the super-
powers have i n t e l l i g i b l y demonstrated t he i r c apab i l i t i e s t o 
intervene effect ively in the Indian Ocean a rea . For instance. 
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t n e T^ b<=iz i r '^ ident in w^ich U.S. sh ips and a i r c r a t t s opera t ing 
*-roxr, 'Jieao Garcia and Egvnt in a combined opf ' ra t ion, attempted 
to y^srup tne Aneri'^an r^o^t^r^Qc^ jn ^ rrn in 1960, Tne a t tempt 
m s t i n ' ^ t J y eA'-os'='d tne vu lne rah i J i t i e s o-'- l i t t o r a l s t a t e s 
t o a coTiiined a s s a u l t or the U.S. t 'orces . 
Bof' t h e super-powers aim a t main ta in ing a balance 
0"p Power, implying t h a t 'no s i a n l e country should be allowed 
to dcminatf^ a-^y area and si m'-1 taneous ly, to become so s t r ong 
115 
as t o upset the e '-uil ibrium o+ t o r c ^ s . " Tn t a c t , t h e 
^on-^ept o^ a 'naval ba lance ' in the Indian Ocean region 
or to tv^eze Americ^^n and Sovie t naval deployments in t h e 
3T-ea i s ""est l i k e l y incon^'~ati ble with a-rowing U.S. s e c u r i t y 
concerns in the Indian Ocean r eg ion . 
However, the Sovie t naval presence in the Ind ian Ocean 
i s very smal l in tonnage. In 1980, t h e Sovie ts claimed t h a t 
t h e y amounted only t o 40% of one American a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r , and 
t h e r e were t h r e e such American a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s in t h e Indian 
ocean. The Sovie t naval presence in the Indian Ocean does 
not seem coi ipara t ive ly in excep t iona l c h a r a c t e r , "ov^ever, t h e 
Sov i e t i n t e r e s t a l s o r e s t in v a s t o i l r e se rves of t h e wealthy 
115, P.N, Khera, "V?ho Will Dominate the Indian Ocean," 
T a t t l e r , Vol. I , MO.^ . New Delhi , Septenber 1973. 
116. The Times of I n d i a , Vebr-uary 11,1'980. 
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dese r t Sheikhdoms and of the other Gulf States account for 
nearly two-tliirds of the worlds t o t a l supply. The wealth 
and the power that could flow from control of Persian Gulf o i l 
117 
and the oceanic trade routes have a lso tempted Russians. 
The western observers believe that the Soviets have 
opened a new front in the Near East/ through the intervention ' 
in Afghanistan. I t has placed Soviet forces now a t the two 
corners of the ^^ear East at the South west corner in the 
Sau^i Arabian peninsula and in the Horn of Africa on tn e one 
nand and a t tne nortri-east corner in South west Asia, on 
the othor. Factually, the lack of a s table power balance in 
th i s area, combined v/ith i t s c r i t i c a l economic and geopol i t ica l 
importance represents a chailenne and impediment t o the global 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n of re la t ions betv;een the suner-powers. Most 
s ign i f i can t , the I080s are l ike ly t o see more urgent Soviet 
economic problems, pa r t i cu la r ly in energy, and i t i s , therefore, 
presumed that the Kear '^ast is intended t o serve as a means 
for determining the terms upon which the Soviets wi l l become 
a net importer of o i l in the l9B0s. 
I t is a l so presumed tha t the growth of Soviet power 
projection caoab i l i t i e s wi l l coincide with growing western 
dependence on resources in the 'i'htrd World, pr ' r t icu lnr ly o i l 
in the i^ersian Gulf and rich mineral nodules ex i s t in the 
117. see, Robert D. ^e in l , J r . "^nassian r>rives East of Suez," 
Mev;swpek, Januar-y IB, 1*^71. 
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deep waters of the Trr^ian Oce-^n. Tn Middle ^^s t and th'^ 
i^ersian '-ii Jf r e q i ^ n s , t*ie Pnit'^d s t a t e s S'^ omed o'lli'""P^I 
t o a^t "'s an ou t s ide q'larantor- of s t " ^ b i l i t y . OovionsJy/ t*ie 
nroiolPm o*' dependino a a a i n s t Sovie t r j J i t a r y i'-'l erv'-^nt i-^ 
or l a r a e , s c a l e io^a l con^ ^ l i c t s t h a t could jpopardis '^ w^-t^rn 
o i l su r ' i e s a -^e enomous . -At I'^e-r^nt, the po 1 •'t''"•"'1 p r c / ^ a u i s -
•^  t e s [ot esta'^lis'n-'ng a s y ^ t ^ r ""or coJ]e-^tnvo s'^'^nr't^- i-^  t h e 
^egion i^"'^ a^rcnt w' ' j le the ^'"ericans be l i eve t h ^ t th'=' Soviet 
Union er>Jovs v---^^r- oeoor-^p-j^p i advant-aes in rrov in^ * or^f?s 
i n t o the a r ea , " e r t a i n l y / tne ~'ep''oymert of American naval 
forces in the Indian Ocean and the es tab l i shment n" ' r a p i d 
de-'loyment ' r r ce \ vjo" id prov i-"e t^e U.S. a dominant p o s i t i o n 
t o take a ' i l i t a r y ad^/.nture i n the region but C'-^uld de te r 
widescaio iqh t inq in the region and -heret 'ore, mioht t r i o o e r 
a l a rge s^a le m i l i t a r y d i s a s t e r . 
T'u=;, the Indian Oc^an region i s t ak ing on g r e a t e r 
imp-- -tance t o the T^nited S t a t e s . Tne I r an i an revoTution, 
^r i c a l c u r r e n t s in Arab p o l i t i c s , and oh cou r r e , the Sovie t 
presence in Atghanistan nave made naval ^orces t h e only 
r e l i a b l e way for t h e United S t a t e s t o p ro j ec t power i n t o t h e 
a r e a . The western observers a l s o presume t h a t t h e U.S. has 
become vulnera'^^le t o an A-at o i l Roycott Pvd i s sun jec t t c 
a s e i z u r e of host^r-Ps by a Sma' ] power, '^he >r-cent -^onf^lict 
with Libya is a l s o a i-ndication o^ f^e " , S . -fear, "^'-ey bf^lieve, 
t h e r e - o r e , t h a t t he U.S. i n t e r e s t s a re a t s t ake in ttie r e q i o n . 
12'\ 
Aftor Soviet i n tervent ion m ''^rghanist^p •^oliovin'^ t*^ -^  
''JUI^ WCJ"/ t'lp^ or'^val^nt ^nr^r-i^-n p^ rc^ r t j on wis *-or-^ c-qr~r^  on 
th'^ danT^r of Sovi'^t exnejns ionism and s'l-i t s in t n e olona] 
and r e c i o n a l oalance of pow^r. '^'^e A-^qVi^ni'^tan hronn^t t o 
the + c-e the ore'^ence ot a vcr-y t r a d i t i o n a l dan^^^r or tno 
U,S , t h a t o' Sovie t m i l i t a r y ex-^^nsion t h r e ^ t e n i n o the west , 
i t s m i l i t a r y pos-Jtion and i t s o i l ^-p^sources, A^o'^anist^n 
c r i s - i s , t^c'-r^^nre, mav tn -^n out to de a Coretastf^ o*^  a storm 
w'" ioh cortii-^ues t o g a t h e r . 
Tn a'-'d "'• •'"io'^/ the ^yrns t r a r s^ ' e r a l s o Provi-^p t"'=' 'nireo 
St^t '^s an indir-ect means o" ' ^ ro je r t i ig power i n t o Soutr 
'"''-^rt \ - i a and o f or reqions o+- the Tno ian Ocean, n'^s-'des, t n e 
U.S. attp-mpt t o develop ant ^ - s a t e l li t e int^^rce-t j on anr' 
the "nost advanced t e c h r - ^ l c j e s t o des t roy b a l l i s t i c mis '^i les 
-•T- SO^-^P^ T: ronah ias°r- beam?, is an arena ot c l e a r ^meri'^an 
1 "^ohno l o ' i c a 1 and nucleai- sut'^eri ori ry w'^ iich would o e r t a m i y 
anc t o t a l l y d i sba lance the v/hole r e a i o n . 
The U.S. naval v e s s e l s , equipped with l a t e s t nuc lear 
weapons, a r e t a s t l y ac- iu i rmg commandino j n t l u e n c e over 
the whole Indian Ocean rea ion . S t r a t e g i c a l l y locatf^d Oieao 
Ciarcia aas bf=en cons ide rab ly prepared to olay i t s d e c i s i v e 
and a t i^e- t ive roJe in U.S. s t r a t e g i c p e r c e p t i o n s . T'h-^  United 
St'^te-^ in t n i s p-ro'^e'^s, is now ri-eparino -^or a new per ' od of 
s t r a t e g i c modern isa t ion . Tt is i t s e l f t r y i n g to c r e a t e nuclear 
[2^) 
C i s b a l ? n c p i n t'^^ a r e a i m r o s i n a str-^ing nxi'^  lea r pov;nr-ed 
n'^val rleploympnts in t h e a r ea and l a s t l y , ni^r-joar ir>e t h e 
^ute-^ s c a c e f^rough e x t r e m e l y s o p h i s t ' - ^ a ted s c i e ^ + ' i t i c 
t echnc i o c J e s . 
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THE U . S . MILITARISATION OF THE INDIAN 0C5AN RSGION: 
THREAT TO INDIA'S SECURITY 
In r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y i nvo lvemen t 
of t he U n i t e d S t a t e s has r a p i d l y and t r e m e n d o u s l y i n c r e a s e d 
i n I n d i a n Ocean a r e a . Tne U . S . government p e r h a p s f e e l s t h a t 
t h e U .S . has a s p e c i a l r i g h t t o e x e r c i s e hegemony on the 
w o r l d ' s Ocean, i n c l u d i n g t h e I n d i a Ocean . The Ind i a n Ocean 
has become immensely s i g n i f i c a n t f o r Amer icans n o t on ly f o r 
what i t i s bu t what i t would be i . e . a base f o r p r o j e c t i n g 
U . S . i n f l u e n c e i n t o a l l t h e s t r a t e g i c a l l y l o c a t e d n a t i o n s 
2 
of t h e South , S o u t h - E a s t As i a , and E a s t A f r i c a . The American 
a m b i t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y , seem t o m a i n t a i n a w e s t e r n p r e s e n c e 
3 
on t h e I n d i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t . 
The U . S . i n t e r e s t i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean emerged as a 
p a r t of t h e "Global S t r a t e g y " i n t h e p o s t wor ld war s e c o n d 
p e r i o d t o s o - c a l l e d c o n t a i n t h e e x p a n s i o n of communism i n 
4 
t h e A f r o - A s i a n r e g i o n and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o expand American 
1. Ranjan Gupta, The I n d i a n Ocean; A P o l i t i c a l Geography, 
New D e l h i , 1979, p . 4 8 . 
2. See , J . L . 3 . G i r l i n g , S o u t h - E a s t As ia and t h e Grea t Powers , 
P a c i f i c community/ VoJ. 9, J a n u a r y l 9 7 8 ; a l s o s e e , A j i t 
B h a t t a c h a r j e e , " India- And S o u t h - E a s t A s i a , "The I n d i a n 
E x p r e s s , September 26, 1981. 
3 . The H i n d u s t a n Times, June 28, i 979 . 
4 . See, D i e t e r Braun, "The I n d i a n Ocean i n t h e A f r o - A s i a n 
P e r s p e c t i v e " World Today, June 1972. 
2^7 
influence in the region. The U.S^ thrus t assumed graduaJly 
5 
a po l i t i co -mi l i t a ry dimensions. I t became the f i r s t super-
power to es tabl ish a mi l i ta ry base a t Diego Garcia in the 
Indian Ocean region, further i t rapidly established naval 
comnunications centres , tracking and telemetry f a c i l i t i e s , 
radio and naval s t a t i ons , naval bases with capacity of advanced 
survi l lance system on the base. At present, the Indian Ocean 
area is going to u t i l i s e under the ambitions ' S t a r War" project 
of the Pentagon which dangerously aimed to place United States 
a s tep forv;ard from the Soviet Union and hence wi l l create 
nuclear disbalance in the region. In fact , to bols ter American 
prest ige in the region, the Diego Farcia base has been evaluated 
into a f u l l scale naval and a i r support f a c i l i t y with berthing 
f a c i l i t i e s for a l r ca r f t c a r r i e r s . 
With the end of colonialism in the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l , 
t^ere has been an in tens i f ica t ion of big power r iva l ry in the 
region, causing th rea t to the sovereign independence of the 
7 l i t t o r a l s . The mi l i t a r i s a t i on of the Indian Ocean, therefore, 
by the outside powers, especia l ly , the United S ta te? , is a 
mat t r r of serious concern to the l i t t o r a l countries of the region. 
5. see, G.J.F. MacDonald, "An American Strategy for the Oceans," 
Edmond A. Gullion(Ed.), Uses of the Seas, London, 19 68, pp. 
163-193. " 
6. The Times of India, March 2, 1979. 
7. "The Indian Ocean: UN Report", Link, June 16, 1974. 
8. See, Edmund Joseph, Gannon, "Military Consideration in the 
Indian Ocean," Current History, November, 1972. 
8 
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The United S ta tes , with tew other western countries like 
Bri ta in and France have increased t h e i r presece in the region/ 
9 thus, causing a grave concern to the world cominunity. The 
en t i r e environment of the Indian Ocean, pa r t i cu l a r ly the South 
Asian region today is heavily dominated by the new U.S. presence 
The unprecedental massing of American ba t t lesh ips in the Indian 
Ocean, ot which Diego Garcia i s only a staging post, provides 
a sombre background.With i t s foothold se t firm in Pakistan and 
i t s fearsome naval presence a l l along India 's vas t coas t l ine , 
India faces an encirclement which i t had never experienced 
before. The Cold War has come, therefore, to Ind ia ' s door 
11 
stepi 
H(;3,wever, the conf l i c t u a l re la t ionsh ip among t^e regional 
s t a t e s , botn l i t t o r a l and hinterland has enabled extra-regional 
powers to gain a foothold and has provided t h e i r presence 
with a ce r ta in legitimacy. This grov/ing linkage between the 
great powers and regional s t a tes has further des tabi l i sed 
the Indian Ocean region with the r e su l t t ha t , in the coming 
years, i t might well emerge as the most v o l a t i l e region of the 
12 
wor Id. 
9 . UN General Assembly Proceedings, 28th Session, November 23, 
1973. 
10. The Pioneer, March 13, 1986. 
11. see . Soc ia l i s t India, New Delhi, November 23, 1974,p.2. 
12. U.S. B a j ^ i , Ind ia ' s Security; The po l i t i co S t ra teg ic Envi-
ronment (ed) Lancer's Publication 1983, New Delh i ,p . 105. 
\:i'.) 
Today/ g loba l s e c u r i t y is in much g r e a t e r p e r i l than 
a t any time s ince the end of the second would war/ and t h i s can 
not be without i t s impact on the s e c u r i t y probleirs t h a t confront 
a count ry l ike I n d i a , The U.S. m i l i t a r y es tab l i shment in t h e 
Indian ocean/ e s c a l a t i n g super-power r i v a l r y under t h e second 
13 
cold war in the area which has c lose proximity t o t h e Indian 
s u b - c o n t i n e n t , generous U.S. m i l i t a r y a id to Pak i s t an e t c , tend 
t o view the problems of defending I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r s sometimes 
14 
e x c l u s i v e l y in r e l a t i o n t o P a k i s t a n . 
Pakis tan had been provided with weapons/ even nuc lea r 
capab le , much beyond i t s l i e g i t i m a t e defence needs in exchange 
fo r an unders tanding t h a t the U.S. force cdn use i t s po r t s and 
lb 
a i r f i e l d s when the need a r i s e s . Unfor tunate ly , such heavy 
arms d e l i v e r i e s impose heavy expendi ture which t h e developing 
16 
c o u n t r i e s i . e . Ind ia , can i l l - a f f o r d . Mil i tar 'Stn saps t h e 
17 p rospec t s of socio-economic advance. But Washington seems 
unwi l l i ng t o take i n t o account the i n t e r e s t of sovereign 
c o u n t r i e s IPads t o a s e r ious d e s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n 
18 
i n the Indian Ocean area and t o the aggreva t ion of t e n s i o n . 
1 3 . "The second Cold War: The ^^enace of Nuclear Brinkmanship, 
World Focus, Vol . 4, No. 8, August 1983. 
14. Inder Melhotra, "l^^^ia's Defence t^roblems:Ominous S e c u t i t y 
Environment," The Times of I n d i a , January 19, 1984, 
15 . 'Yhe Pioneer/ Apr i l 5, 19Bb. 
16. The I|:^dian Express , February 23, lo82 , 
17. B.D. Nagchaudhary, "Development of Marine Resources, Fights 
of L i t t o r a l s t a t e s And The Need For Maintaining A Zone of 
^eace In The Indian Ocean/" Peace and S o l i d a r i t y , V o l . 5 , 
No. 11/ November 19 74, p . 7 , 
18. "No Peace For Indian Ocean Area," Hindustan S tandard , 
February 11, 1972, 
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The U . S . p e n e t r a t i o n i n t h e a r e a , t h e r e f o r e , c r e a t e s a t h r e a t 
t o t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e l i t t o r a l s t a t e s and d i s t r a c t s t h e i r 
a t t e n t i o " . trorn t h e s o l i i t i o n of v i t a l p rob lems of economic 
and s o c - ' a l deve lopment I n d i a t e e l s t h a t t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
19 
s h o u l d n o t be used as a p l a c e of s u p e r power c o m p e t i t i o n * 
or t h e e x c e p t i o n deployments of n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d n a v a l b a t t l e s h i p s 
20 ^ 
i n t h e a r e a , f o r c r e a t i n g a t h r e a t f o r t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e 
21 
of t h e l i t t r o l s . 
The U . S . p o l i c y ot m i l i t a r y Dlackmai l has made New D e l h i n e r v 
ous and '"3'^ssd c o n c e r n t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n of m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s 
22 
i n I n d i a n Ocean. I n d i a b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e U . S . had gone 
2 3 
a g a i n s t t h e UN G e n e r a l Assembly r e s o l u t i o n of December 19 71 
which d e s i g n a t e d t h e I n d i a n Ucpan a zone of Peace f o r a l l 
t i m e s . However, t h e r e s o l u t i o n i n t a c t , i s o n l y h a l t measu re 
19. pahul Burrnan, "Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, "Vikrant , 
February, 1974. 
20. World Marxist Review, Vo' 25, No. 6, June 1982, P.10; 
§ l s o s e e , i'^eelam Tirachev Ian, "Ocean Community," Seminar, 
SeptEimber 1974. 
2 1 . K.P. Mishra, "Developments in the Indian Ocean: The L i t t o r a l 
Response," I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , January-March, 1977. 
22. The Indian Express , January 16, 1971; a l s o s e e . The Times 
of Ind ia , January 16, 1971, and May 1, 1975; The Hindustan 
Times, November 15, 19'/4; The Hindu, October 6, 1970; The 
Hindu, October 6, 1970; The Statesman, Apr i l 14, 1972. 
23 . The Times, October 4, 1974; a ] s o s e e , "Indian Ocean 
DeSateTEH.), Link, Ju ly 6, 1978; The P a t r i o t , June 16, 
19 75; The Times of Ind ia , June 21, l'^'/3; Robert J . Hanks, 
"Indian Ocean Nego t i a t ions : Rocks and S h o a l s , " S t r a t e g i c 
Diges t , September 1^78; A Alexeyer & A. F i a lko r sky , "Peace 
And s e c u r i t y For the Indian Ocean," S t r a t e g i c Diges t , 
November 1979. 
131 
f o r i t r e s t r i c t s the '-"i l i t a r y t h r e a t e s p e c i a l l y withoi^t e l i m i -
24 
na t ing the causes which endanger i t . For- i n s t ance / t h e 
U.S. ad iP in i s t r a t ion has c a t e g o r i s e d , the planning ot a conterence 
on the Indian Ocean which is t o work out an i n t e r n a t i o n a i ag ree -
25 
ment on t u rn ing the reg ion as a zone of Peace, as " u n r e a l i s t i c . " 
Thus, i t seems t h a t the United s t a t e s wants t o make 
the Indian Ocean the most used sea i n t h e world, a zone of 
American i n f l u e n c e . The Americans are d i s i n c l i n e d , t h e r e f o r e 
27 t o the idea ot a peace zone in the Indian '-'cean. While India 
urges the U.S. t o r e f r a i n from any s t eps t h a t could aagravate 
28 
the s i t u a t i o n in the region, not t o d i spa tch i t s major naval 
24. Kazlor SVyatos far , "Co l l ec t ive Secu r i t y After D e m i l i t a r i -
s a t i o n , " weekly Round Table , Ju^e 9, 1974 ,p .29 . 
2b. s e e , Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Ocean: The Problem," Seminar, 
September 1974; a l s o s e e . S u r v i v a l , January February, 1980. 
26. Maj Gen. E. Habibullah and Col . B.K. Narayan, Comnulsions 
of Indian Secu r i t y ; A Plea Vpy Geographic And Demographic 
Defence,~ABC Publ ish ing House, New Delh i , 1984, p . 1 0 5 . 
27. See, "Indian ocean: Zone of Peace or Future War," Mainstream, 
New Delhi , August 17, 1974, p . 24. 
28 . The Tribune, June 7, 1978. a l s o s e e . The Indian Express , 
May, 7, 19 75; January 2 7 , ' 1 9 7 6 . 
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s q u a d r o n s / no t t o ho ld m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s / and n o t t o modern i se 
29 
Diego Gartria b a s e a s w e l l . But/ t h e Uni ted S t a t e s hopes t o 
30 domina te t h e Ind ian Ocean by s e n d i n g huge f o r c e s t h e r e . 
However, i t i s presumed t h a t t o keep such s t r o n g f o r c e s i n t h e 
I n d i a n Ocean in t h e f a c e of s t e r n and p r o l o n g e d r e s i s t e n c e 
31 
would be t o i n v i t e a d i s a s t e r t h a t may be worse t h a n V ie tnam, 
Any how, t h e Uni ted s t a t e s was d e t e r m i n e d t o impose i t s w i l l 
on t h e r e s t of t h e world and i n t e n d e d t o commit c r i m e s as in 
V i e t n a m . The r e c e n t a t t a c k on Li'bya m e r e l y c o n f i r m s i t . Of 
c o u r s e , t h e U . S . r ema ins t h e w o r l d ' s most power fu l c o u n t r y and 
t h e h e a l t h of t h e world economy c^ontinued t o depend on t h e 
h e a l t h of i t s economy, i n vjew of t h e s i z e of i t s m a r k e t f o r 
32 
o t h e r n a t i o n s . Bu t , t h e Uni ted S t a t e s cou ld no t degtt^de t h e 
c o x , * 7 
Rajya sabha Deba t e s s V o l , LXXXVii, No.2 , F e b r u a r y 19, 1974, 
c o l s . 8 3 , 86 , v o l XC, No 3 , November 15 , 19 74 , C o l 2 4 0 . 
Also s e e . The New York Times , F e b r u a r y 6, 1975, March 24, 
l^'^^* The H-indu, March 13 , 1974 , 
3 0 . S .C , S a r k a r , " i n v a s i o n of t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , " Modem Review, 
A p r i l 1974; 
a l s o s e e , ^ a s i u r Sharma, "Power S t rx iqg le i n I n d i a n O c e a n , " 
K i k r a n t , June 1970; S .C , Chaudhary , I n d i a n Ocean: A Geo-
m i l l t a r y s t u d y , V l k r a n t , O c t o b e r 1974, 
3 1 . The P i o n e e r , A p r i l 5, 1986; a l s o s e e , S.W, Saxena , "iRr^ian 
Ocean Needs l a s t i n g S e c u r i t y , " S o c i a l i s t Review, June 1 9 , 1 9 7 5 . 
3 2 . G i r i Lai J a i n , "Problems With Uni ted S ' t a t e s i P r i o r i t y Fo r 
China and P a k , " The Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 26 , 1984, 
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s u p e r power s t a t u s of t h e S o v i e t Union . 
However/ t h e p r e s e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p be tween t h e Uni ted 
S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t y Union i s "more dangerous t h a n a t any 
33 t i m e i n t h e p a s t g e n e r a t i o n . P o l i t i c a l o b s e r v e r s b e l i e v e t h a t 
i f t h e s p e e d y deve lopmen t s i n t h e n u c l e a r arms r a c e and t h e 
s t r a i n e d U , S , - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s a r e a l l owed t o e x i s t more , 
34 
we cou ld f a c e n o t t h e r i s k b u t t h e r e a l i t y of n u c l e a r wa r . 
I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e I n d i a n ^cean a r e a i s in d a n g e r of becoming 
35 
a s a t e l l i t e of t h e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m of major powers* both a s 
a l a u n c h i n g a r e a a s w e l l a s a t a r g e t ^ The U . S . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
had s o u g h t " t o c o n t r o l p o l i t i c a l deve lopment s i n t h e Ij^dian 
Ocean a r e a and t o u s e them t o i t s own a d v a n t a g e i n t h e c o n f r o n -
t a t i o n w i t h USSR, " Th i s s u p e r - p o w e r r i v a l r y has c r e a t e d 
t h e d a n g e r of t h e immedia te c o n v e n t i o n a l n a v a l arms r a c e and 
38 
t h e p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s i n t h e r e g i o n . I t i s a l s o t o .remfember 
t h a t t h e Oceans i n c l u d i n g t h e I n d i a n Ocean, c^re l i k e l y t o be 
3 3 . I n d e r M a l h o t r a , " I n d i a ' s Defence Problems,* Ominous S e c u r i t y 
E n v i r o n m e n t , " The Times of I n d i a , J a n u a r y , 19 , 1984 . 
3 4 . I b i d , a l s o s e e , Rober t l e g v o l d , "The S u p e r R i v a l s : C o n f l i c t 
In t h e T h i r d World, " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , Vol 57, S p r i n g 1979 . 
3 5 . Tad S z u l e , " C o n f r o n t a t i o n P o l i t i c s i n t h e I n d i a n O c e a n , " 
New R e p u b l i c , March 13 , 1976 , 
3 6 . The P a t r i o t , March 6, 1974 . 
3 7 . S e e , A.G. N o o r a n l , " I n d i a n Ocean: A Zone ot C o n t e s t s , " 
The I n d i a n E x p r e s s , J u l y 12, 1 9 7 5 . 
3 8 . "wes t Asia and t h e I n d i a n Ocean", I n d i a i n t h e World S t r a t e g i c 
Envi ronment , Annual Review, V o l . I I # New D e l h i , 1973, p . 7 1 6 . 
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ot even more m i l i t a r y i n t e r e s t in the coming f u t u r e than a t 
p r e s e n t under the impact of fu tu re advancement in tfx:hnology 
39 
and chances in s t r a t e g y . The U.S. new r e sea r ch on "Star W;,rs 
progratrme is the s ign of the beginning and not an end. 
In t a c t , t h i s super power x r i v a l r y th rea tened to use 
fo rce in case of an emergency t o achieve t h S i r i m p e r i a l i s t i c 
40 
i n t e r e s t s . Bes ides , t h e U.S . , p a r t i c - i l a r l y , i s e x p l o i t i n g 
41 
t h e i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n s of the region and e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s 
as w e l l . The Indian Ocean, t h e r e f o r e , has become m i l i t a r i l y , 
more or l e s s , "a d e s e r t t o r the r e g i o n a l c o u n t r i e s , wi^ere 
42 
the main concern is t o claim and acqui re key p o s i t i o n s . 
39, "Prospects of Arms Control In tne I^riian Ocean," SIPRI 
Research Report , No, 7, Stockholm, September, 19777 
a ] s o s e e , J . s , Rama Rao, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re la t ions : Power 
Has A Role, "World Focus, Vol ,4 , No. l , June 1983,pp .11-13 . 
40 , s e e , K.S. Sjdhu, "The U.S. Imperial ism In The Indian 
Oce^n," Vikran t Apr i l , 1978. K.S. Sidhu, "Stakes of Big 
Powers in the Indian Ocean, "Vikrant , June, 1977; Alexander 
O.Ghebhardt, "Sovie t and U.S. I n t e r e s t in t h e Ind ian Ocean," 
Asian Survey, August 1^15; Anirudha Gupta, " i m p e r i a l i s t 
S t r a t e g y in t h e Indian Ocean Region, "Mainstream, March 22, 
1975; V. Kudtyar tsev, "i^^^ian Ocean in the Plans of Imper i -
a l i sm, " i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , November 1974; W.T.Roy," 
Indian Ocean as an Atea of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conf l i e t , "World 
Review, 1979; A, Chernyslov, "peace and s e c u r i t y f o r The 
Indian Ocean, " i n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Vol . 12, December 
1976, p . 4 3 . 
4 1 , The Statesman, May 2b, 1977. 
42 , Glaus Terf l o t h , "The fu tu re of Indian Ocean," Aussen P o l i t i k , 
Vol .26 , 1975, p . 4 6 3 . 
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T h a t ' s why t h e -region f e e l f r i g h t e n e d about t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l 
arms r a c e and eve r growing and i n t i m i d a t i n g p r e s e n c e of t h e 
43 
n u c l e a r weapons sys tem in t h e I n d i a n Ocean. 
The s i t u a t i o n i s w o r s e n i n g as t h e U n i t e d s t a t e s i s 
i n c r e a s i n g i t s n a v a l f o r c e s , e s t a b l i s h i n g and e x t e n d i n g i t s 
h i g h l y advanced n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d n a v a l bases in t h e I n d i a n Ocean 
on t h e p l e a of m a i n t a i n i n g b a l a n c e of power, w h i l e , f a c t u a l l y , 
t h e U .S . t h r u s t would c r e a t e a n u c l e a r d i s b a l a n c e i n t h e r e g i o n , 
e s p e c i a l l y t h r o u g h t h e m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of s p a c e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
t h e p l e a of m a i n t a i n i n g b a l a n c e of power i s in i t s e l f an u n e n d i n g 
p r o c e s s . I t has he&i seen i n o t h e r a r e a s of t h e g l o b e t h a t t h e r e 
has been a c o n t i n u o u s a c c e l e r a t i o n of momentum i n t h e r a c e fer 
armaments u n d e r t h e p r e t e x t of m a i n t a i n i n g b a l a n c e of power 
44 
s t r u c t u r e . However, t h e c o n c ^ t of b a l a n c e of power has been 
45 
r e g a r d e d as a g u a r a n t e e of p e a c e bu t such t h r u s t , in t r u t h , 
a c c e l e r a t e s s u p e r - p o w e r r i v a l r y and may i n v i t e a d v e r s e p o l i t i c a l 
and economic consequences which would not e a s e b u t o n l y add 
t o t h e t e n s i o n s i n t h e v i t a l r e g i o n l i k e t h e I n d i a n ^cean 
4 3 . T.T. P o u l o s e , " I n d i a n Ocean: P r o s p e c t s of a N c l e a r F r e e 
Peace Zone, " P a c i f i c Community, J a n u a r y , 1 9 7 4 , p . 3 2 1 . 
4 4 , See, P . K . S , Namboodr i , " New U.S.Moves i n I n d i a n Ocean 
P o l i t i c s , "Fo re ign News and F e a t u r e s . Vol .X, March 17, 1979; 
The Times of I n d i a , March 3 , 1978; "The Sydney Outcome," 
( E d i t o r i a l ) , The I n d i a n Express ( C h a n d i g a r h ) , F e b r u a r y 18, 
1978. 
4 5. A . J . C o t t r e l l and R.M. Burr e l l , " S o v i e t - U , S . Naval C o m p e t i t i o n 
i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean ," O r b i s , Winter 1975, p . 1128. 
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46 today. But* in view of the development of nuclear miss i le 
deterrent which has overcome distarjce, the doctr ine of balance 
of power appears to be superfluous as i t is no longer expected 
to be an effect ive instrument for the exhibi t ion of i n t e m a t i -
47 
onal peace and secur i ty . India, therefore, has expressed i t s 
d e ^ concern to the growing i n t e r e s t and involvement of the 
super powers, pa r t i cu l a r ly the United s ta tes in the IhclLan 
'-'cean region. 
For both the super-powers, India i s the pre-eminent nedium 
level power in a region v i t a l to the i r s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . 
South Asia, to which India belongs, was not always perceived 
to be so crucial to super power's concerns before developments, 
climaxing in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in Eecember 
19 79, following the fal l of pro Washington regime in Iran through 
a coup, changed considerably the p o l i t i c a l environment of the 
region. 
South Asia, therefore, ranked low in U.S. s t r a t eg i c 
p r i o r i t i e s but the U.S. resumed i t s mi l i tary ass i tance to 
49 Pakistan in 1980, af ter the ev&xts happened in i t s neighbour 
46. K. S. Sidhu, The Indian Ocean: A Zone of Peace, Hamam 
PublIcations, Ne^ Delhi, 1983, p . 123-124. 
4 7. See, "Indian Ocean: A Zone of Peace," World Focus, Vol.2, 
No. 1, Janaury, 1981. 
48, A.S, Abraham, "Super Powers And South Asia; Change In 
Strategic P e r c ^ t i o n s , " The Times of India, May 31, 1985. 
49. United States withheld arms supplies both for India and 
Pakistan af ter the commencement of 19 71 Indo-Pak war. 
Afghanis tan. Afghanistan had compelled t h e U.S. to ass ign 
50 South Asia high s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t y . The p r e sence of t h e 
Soviet t roops in P a k i s t a n ' s neighbour, t he overthrow of Shah 
reginie in I r a n , t h e outbreak of I r a n - I r a q war, a l l these p o l i -
t i c a l upheavals in South Asia and t h e Qilf persuaded t h e U.S. 
po l icy-makers t h a t t he region was now a r i t a l area of s t r a t e g i c , 
i npo r t ance . While, the Soviet Union as a l o c a l super power was 
cons idered in Washington a se r ious t h r e a t to P a k i s t a n . Resultan-
t l y , Pak is tan f e l l within t h e eas tern pe r iphe ry of America's 
c r u c i a l i n t e r e s t s in the Gulf r eg ion . The United S t a t e s , in 
a d d i t i o n , took very soon China ' s p lace as P a k i s t a n ' s p r i n c i p a l 
52 
arms s u p p l i e r . However, t he then c a r t e r admin i s t r a t i on cild 
o f f e r t h e Zia regime, for whom the Afghanistan events and t h e 
U.S. reassessment of P a k i s t a n ' s s t r a t e g i c va lue came as a 
godsend, approximately 400 mi l l ion <f do l l a r s in economic and 
arms a id spread over two years and which Ggneral Zda conterrpt-
,53 
uous'ly dismissed as "peanu t s . " ' 
50. See, E l i o t Theodore, "Afghanistan After The Revolut ion," 
S t r a t e g i c Review, Spr ing 19 79, pp . 57-62; a l so see , Fred 
Ho l l i day , " Revolutions in Afghanistan, "New Left RAview. No. 
112, November-Dec ember 19 78; Hannan Negaran, "The Afghani-
s t a n Coup of / p r i l 1978; Revolution And I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
^ c u r i t v , "Orbis , Vol. 23, Spring, 19 79. 
5 1 . R.K. Ramzani, "Secur i ty in the ^e rs ian Gulf, "Foreign A f f a i r s , 
^fel, 57, Spring, 1979. 
52. In 1980, Chinese arms aid to Pakis tan was worth 600 mi l l i on 
d o l l a r s , with Chinese made weapons, compris ing 75 pe rcen t 
of P a k i s t a n ' s tank force and 65 percent of i t s a i r force . 
53 . A. S. Abraham, "Super Powers And South A s i a . . . " op. c i t . 
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But/ i t was only in June 19 81, s i x months i n to t h e new 
Reagan ad min i s t r a t i on , which had been s w ^ t i n t o o f f i ce by a 
r e su rgen t conserva t ion t h a t Pakis tan became t h e r e c i p i e n t of 
l a v i s h l a r g e s s . In f i s ca l year 1985, t h e fourth Insta lment of 
t h e s i x year , 3 ,2 b i l l i o n d o l l a r arms and economic aid package, 
h a l f of which was for defence purchases a t an i n t e r e s t of 
A% p e r annum, P r e s i d a i t Reagan provided Pakis tan came to 526 
54 
m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , making i t the fourth l a r g e s t out of about 
55 100 b e n e f i c i a r i e s of U.S. s e c u r i t y a s s i s t a n c e . Notably, t h e 
p r e s e n t ^ 3 . 2 b i l l i o n deal w i l l be conpleted in 1987, t h e r e f o r e 
Pak i s tan is now going to oi joy t h e new package of ^ 4 b i l l i o n 
56 by t h e United •States. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Reagan admin i s t r a t i on 
has a l so decided t o s e l l ^ 103 mi l l ion worth of arms to Pak i s t an , 
which is a l so in addi t ion to t h e fl 3.2 b i l l i o n worth a U.S. 
57 
m i l i t a r y and economic a id package to Pak i s t an , 
Thus, i t i s obvious t h a t t h e Soviet i n t e r v e n t i o n , brought 
about a dramatic changs in t h e reg iona l p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and 
54, I b i d , 
55. Chly I s r a e l , Egypt and Turkey got more. 
56, Inder Malhotra, "Befr iending t h e Neighbours: H i l t i p l e 
Moves, Conplex S e t t i n g , " The Times of I n d i a , August 8, 
1985. 
57. The Times of India, September 18, 1985. 
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led the U.S. policy^makers to rediscover the s t r a t eg i c 
inportance of Pakistan as a front l ine s t a t e . Pakistan, v.-hich 
share 92,400 Km, long front ier with Afghanistan, became 
an essent ia l l i n e of deforce, Pakistan, however, fe l t d i rec t ly 
ej5>osed to Soviet mil i tary pressures because Afghanistan ceased 
to be a bjffer between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Inslamabad 
also fe l t the th rea t of poss ib le Afghanistan and Soviet support 
for separa t i s t elements among the Baluchi and Pathans populations 
of Pakistan. The pos s i b i l i t y of Soviet sponsored attack by India 
against Pakistan and a Co-ordinated India-Soviet aimed att<^ck 
designed to fragment Pakistan along ethanic l i ne , was also a n t i -
cipated in Islamabad. Pakistan fears considerably increased 
in January 1980 by the coming into power of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. 
In i t s el for t s , in response of above considerations/ to 
rees tab l i sh close mil i tary and securi ty t i es with the threatened 
Pakistani government and to meet i t s " legi t imate defensive 
mi l i t a ry needs," the Carter administration in 1980s even 
Overside Pakis tan 's nuclear concern. 
South Asia, therefore, i s an areas of d i r ec t ly and 
massively competitive arms supplies by the United States to 
Pakistan, and in response, Soviet Union to India, a with smaller 
roles in the munitions game sought by European suppliers l i k e 
58. Rashmi Jain, 
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Prance, ";-JCc--.in, .'est lermany and Italy. " In the 1970s, the 
Soviet Union accounted for 59 percent of the total value of 
arms " ounht y^ In^Ua ntif" "aVvistan as against the U.S. share 
of mere seven percent. Hut, in the early eighties, the U.'J. 
caane to overtake fast, chiefly through the resumption of 
60 
cenerous flow of r'^i it^r/ equipments to Pakistan. 
Obviously, the U.-. interests in South .VUa had been 
warning and its capacity to treat it as the area has increased. 
The importance which south Asia has assumed for both super-powers, 
particularly the U.3., as an aroa of intense competitiveness in 
arps GW^^lios is '^ nly one si'-^ n of the major chan'-^ e over the last 
several years in their strategic perceptions of the region. This 
change ca.me to emerge to-.'ards the end of the seventies with the 
fall of the Shah of Iran, America's steadfast ally and proxy 
oendarme of the Gulf. The '-Jest's oil supplies and vi*-al maritime 
comrunications routes were seen as vulnerable to Soviet 
manipulation and the Soviet were considered 
59. See, Norman D. Palmer, "The Changing Scene in South Asia: 
internal And External Dimensions", orbis. Vol. 19, Fall, 1975. 
60. A.S, Abraham, "Super Pov.'ers And South Asia " 
op. cit. 
61. Geoffrey ^Ullians, Global Defence; Motivation And Policy In 
A Nuclear Age, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., x^ ew Delhi, 
19S4, p. 141. 
62. David D. Newsom, "Sourh Asia: Super Posers and Regional 
Alliances, Department of State Rullentin, December. 1978, 
63. See, M.S. Agwani, Politics in the Gulf, Vikas Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1978, pp. 15-22; also see, Hd. Reza Djolili, 
"Indian Ocean: Seen From Iran," IPSA Journal October-December 
1976; Alexander Hacleod, "Shah of the Indian Ocean" Pacific 
Community, April 1976. 
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i n Washington as b e i n g so much n e a r e r to a c h i e v i n g s t r o n g d e s i r e d 
64 
o b j e c t s , of s e c u r i n g s o u t h e r n warm-water p o r t s . To r e c a l l , 
t h e U.S . s t r a t e g y i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean was a l s o d e s i g n e d t o 
d e m o n s t r a t t e U .S . r e s o l v e t o p r o t e c t o i l r o u t e s and s t a n d i y 
65 i t s a l l i e s i n West A s i a . In a d d i t i o n , t h e U . S . n e r v o u s n e s s 
h e i g h t e n e d when i n December 1979, t h e S o v i e t s went i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n 
t o p r e s e r v e t h e i r g a i n s . The S o v i e t p r e s e n c e was i n t e r p r e t e d 
i n Washington, as S o v i e t expans ion i sm r e d in t o o t h and c law. 
T h i s was t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t S o v i e t t r o o p s have moved o u t of 
t h e Sov ie t b l o c for combat d u t i e s . Once more, the Qj l f r e g i o n 
was p e r c e i v e d as t h r e a t e n e d by t h e S o v i e t push for access t o 
warm-water p o r t s . 
A f t e r t h e f a l l of Shah of I r a n and i n t r u s i o n of USSR 
t r o o p s i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n t h e Americ^^s appea red t o have found 
a t a n g i b l e p r o t e x t for c o n s o l i d a t i n g r h e i r m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e 
58 in t h e I n d i a n O^ean. The U .S . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n began t o view 
69 
t h e I n d i a n Ocean a r e a as a " f u t u r e t r o u b l e s p o t . The focus 
o f t h e c o l d war a t p r e s e n t , has s h i f t e d from d i s t a n t 3a rope 
t o the I n d i a n ocean and t h e Qalf r e g i o n , t oo c l o s e t o t h e 
70 I n d i a n S h o r e s . 
64 . A. S. Abraham, "Super Powers And South A s i a , " . . . . op . c i t . 
6 5 . The Hindu, March 10, 19 79; a l s o see The N a t i o n a l He ra ld , 
March 10, 19 79. 
6 6 . A. S. Abraham, " S u p e r p o w e r s and South A s i a , " . , , c p . c i t . 
67 . See, Shahram Chubin, " R e p l e r c u s s i o n s of t h e c r i s i s i n 
I r a n , " S u r v i v a l , Vol. 2 i , May-June l979o 
6 8 . Sban, May 1981, p p . 3 6 - 3 9 . 
6 9 . S.P. Sharma, I n d i a n Fo re ign P o l i c y (Annual Survey 1971) , 
New i^e lh i , 1973. 
7 0 . I n d e r M a i h o t r a , " I n d i a ' s Defence Problems:Ominous S e c u r i t y 
Env i ronma i t , "The Times of I n d i a , J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 8 4 , 
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S i g n i f i c a n t l y / the foundation of t h e U.S. s t r a t e g i c 
p l a n , based on the fever i sh arms t u i l d vip in the Qalf region 
was co l lopsed when Shah's o b s o l e t e monarchy, t h e bas t ion of 
71 U.S. s t r a t e g y , was overthrown in 1978. I n c r e a s i n g the cpe ra -
72 t i o n a l area of Seventh f l e e t , t h e Americans, t he r e fo re , 
began to review t h e i r s t r a t e g y in the Indian Ocean a rea . The 
73 
c r e a t i o n of t h e RDF and t h e p lann ing of es tabl i shment of an 
74 independent nuclear-powered F i f t h F l ee t based on Pi ego 
Garcia in the Indian ^cean a r e t h e obvious r e f l e c t i o n s of the 
75 U.S. new s t r a t e g i c designs in the a rea . La t e r , t h e American 
hostages c r i s i s led to a massive naval bu i ld up by t h e United 
s t a t e s . The Americans fu r the r became extremely exc i ted a f t e r 
the l i q u i d a t i o n of «min and t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of Kam«l regime 
in Kabul, t h e massive i n t e r v e n t i o n , of Soviet t roops there took 
p l a c e . The Soviet i n t e r v e n t i o n provided a p r e t e x t for t he 
Americans to s tep up t h e i r m i l i t a r y and naval bu i ld up in the 
Gulf and Ind ian '^cean a rea . However, to r e c a l l , the U.S. designed 
t h e concept of R.D.F. even before the f a l l of t he Shah of I r an 
7 1 . See, Ifavid Balders ton ," I ran Leaves Gulf of S t ra ined 
Rela t ions^ "The Age, '^ctober 10, 1979, 
72. The New York Tiroes, ^^arch 22, 1972, a l so see , "Naval P r e s o i c e 
in t h e Indian Ocean, " ( E d i t o r i a l ) , The Nat iona l Herald, 
December 31,19 71 . 
73. See, "U.S. Bases And R.D.F. Head Quar te r Base," B l i t z , 
January 23, 19 82. 
74. See, "How Grave i s Our Grave Concern, " E d i t o r i a l , Amrll; Bazar 
P a t r i k a , May 16, l979; The Indian Express, June 8, 1979/ 
The Hindu, March 10, 19 79. 
75 . K.P. Mishra, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s in t h e Indian Ocean," 
Orbis, Winter 1975. 
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and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.The two mere provided 
76 iirpetus and j u s t i t i c a t i o n an re»trospect . And in i t s innfsli-
cations ^^akistan began to receive massive mi l i t a ry and economic 
aid from the United States, without modification in i t s nuclear 
weapon programme. These p o l i t i c a l happenings have, thus, adverse-
ly affected the secur i ty environment of India because the U.S. 
f e l t the need of Pakis tan 's ef f ic ient and war-tested mil i tary 
macnine to check the alleged Soviet ^-.^ansionism towards the 
West's o i l l i f e l i n e in the ^ I f . ' Resultantly, i^akistan is 
placed irs the U.S. perception as a " f ront - l ine Sta te and i t 
acquired a s t r a t e g i c importance in the U.S. global s t ra tegy. 
The Americans, therefore, proceeded to aim Pakistan with p l an t i fu l 
5C bestowal, regardless of Ind ia ' s apprehensions tha t such assig 
tance would threaten India ' s security* 
The U.S. Pakistan securi ty relat ionship i s a case of 
mutual i n t e r e s t s and requirements. The American could not and 
should not be expected to have agreed to a major programme, 
the ^ 3 . 2 b i l l ion economic and mil i tary aid on concessional 
78 
terms without gett ing anything whatsoever in re turn . The 
United States regards Pakistan as a base to check the alleged 
76. R.G. Sawhney, "U. S.-Pak Security Relations^ I-Possible 
Problems For India," The ^imes of India-April 16, 1984. 
77. K.P.S. i'-ienon, "Oil And The Ocean," Contemporary Review, 
January 19 76. 
78. Rashmi Jain, U.S. Pak Relations l974-l982 Radiant Publishers 
New Delhi, p . 13 4. 
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S o v i e t expans ion i sm. While , P a k i s t a n needs U . S . back up t o r i t s 
s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t I n d i a , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view o f t h e changed 
g e o - p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n in t h e r eg iono In o t h e r words , i t n e e d s 
U.S. a s s i s t a n c e t o meet i t s rec^uirements fo r m o d e r n i s a t i o n 
of i t s ar-med f o r c e s . The m i l i t a r y r eg ime of P a k i s t a n a l s o d e s i r e d 
U . S . supt^ort t o ensu re i t s s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t t h r e a t s from 
w i t h i n ttie c o u n t r y * S i g n i f i c a n t l y , in r e t u r n of t he r i c h U .S . 
a s s i s t a n c e P a k i s t a n became t h e c o n d u i t of arms s u p p l y t o t h e 
"^ iu jah idd in" i n s u r g e n t s f i g h t i n g t h e Afghan r e g i m e . The P a k i s t a n i ' s 
w^ l l a n t i c i p a t e d and judged in t h e American r e a c t i o n t o t h e 
S o v i e t p r e s e n c e i n A f g h a n i s t a n an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
c h a l l e n g e I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t a l d i p l o m a t i c and m i l i t a r y p r e -
79 
e m i n e n c e . 
I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o remember h e r e t h a t I n d i a r e g a r d e d 
t h e Sov ie t a c t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n as d e f a i s i v e r a t h e r than e x p a n s i o -
n i s t . I n d i a , t h e r e f o r e , viewed t h e r e s u n p t i o n of mass ive American 
amns a s s i s t a n c e to P a k i s t a n as a d e l i b e r a t e and dangerous move t o 
t i l t the r e g i o n a l b a l a n c e i n P a k i s t a n ' s f a v o u r . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e 
govemrrient of I n d i a a rgued t h a t i t was U .S . h e l p t o t h e Mujahiddin 
t h a t w.s k e e p i n g t h e S o v i e t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n l o n g e r t h a n t h e y would 
80 
O t h e r w i s e p r e f e r t o be . 
The c o n f l u e n c e of i n t e r e s t s between I s l a m a b a d and 
Washington, t h e r e f o r e , can be wel l i n t e r p r e t e d e s p e c i a l l y w i t h 
7 9 . A. S. Abraham, "Super Powers And South A s i a . . . " . . . o p . c i t . 
80. Ibid. 
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Islamabad's obsessive h o s t i l i t y tov^ards New Delhi, According 
to Francis Fakuyana, a fiDrmer member of the Sta te Departmgit's 
Policy planning Council/ the basic object of U.S. mi l i tary aid 
pol icy towards Pakistan i s to res to re a re la t ionship of t r u s t 
with Pakistan so that various forms of s t r a t eg ic co-operation 
will prove possible in the Persian Qjlf area, including r ight OT 
81 
means of approach for the R.D.F., now the U.S. centCom> 
to the Pakistani ports and a i r f i e lds and l a t e r ass is tance to 
82 U.S. forces i f the need should a r i s e . " Fakuyana haa further 
s t a t ed that Pakistan could serve as an extremely important 
e n t r ^ o t for the R.D.F. moving into the Persian G^lf from the 
east i . e . from Diego Garcia or the Phi l ippines . 
Pakistan, therefore has givei assurances to Washington 
to allow U.S. playves to u t i l i s e Pakistan a i r f i e l d s . Both the 
countries have also reached to an agreement tha t the U.S. wil l 
share in t e l l i cence information with Pakistan. The co-operation 
o^f 
in the f ie lds / in t e l l igaice gathering and sharing would form 
cer tainly/ an essential ingr iede i t to serve U.S. Pakistan, secur i ty 
relat ionsf To reca l l / Zia regime has also agree to allow U.S. 
weapons to be sent to the Afghan rebels through i t s "special 
forces ." In re turn, the U.S. has agreed to t r a in the Pakis tan 's 
83 
p res iden t i a l bodyguards. 
81 . The U.S. Central Command(CentCom) has created for mi l i t a ry 
operation from Kenya to Pakistan, in the Indian Ocean area . 
82. See Rashmi J a in , . op. c i t , p . 13 S. 
83 . Jack Anderson, ^ prominent American Correspondait, has 
revealed these facts, ouoting inside sources and several 
secre t and top secret documents. See, R. G? Sowhney," 
U.S. Pak Security Relations: I-Possible Problems For India " 
The Times of India, April 16, 1984 
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I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e U.S . a d m i n i s t r a t i o n wanted t o 
make su re t h a t ^ i a regime does n o t become a n o t h e r shah of I r a n . 
To t r a i n P a k i s t a n i p r e s i d e n t i a l bodyguards i s a f u r t h e r s t e p 
t o w a r d s e n s u r i n g t h e s u r v i v a l o f t h e m i l i t a r y r e g i m e . I t i s a l s o 
presumed/ a s i g n i f i c a n t l y / t h a t t r a i n i n g of t h e bodyguards 
c o u l d a l s o p r o v e u s e f u l t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i f t h e need a r i s e s 
f o r Z i a ' s r ^ l a c e m e n t by a n o t h e r General f a v o u r a b l y i n c l i n e d 
84 
t o w a r d s U.S . i n t e r e s t s ^ 
The U .S . s e c r e t a r y of Det^ /e, ^ r . C a s p e r Weinberger/ 
p r e s e n t i n g h i s annual r e p o r t t o Congress for f i s c a l yea r 1985/ 
made s e v e r a l s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t s r e l a t i n g t o South West A s i a . He 
u r g e d t h a t t h e U .S . must be a b l e t o p r o j e c t a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s 
v e r y r a p i d l y t o t h i s r e g i o n of t h e I n d i a n Ocean and sust^ain thern 
a d e q u a t e l y in combat because a t p r e s e n t t h e U» £. m a i n t a i n s 
o n l y a l i m i t e d s e a - b a s e d p r e s e n c e t h e r e . He emphas ized t h a t p o l i -
t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s and ag reement s w i th f r i e n d s and a l l i e s n e a r 
t h e r e g i o n / i n Europe and e l s e w h e r e a l o n g v i t a l l i n e s of commun-
i c a t i o n i n f l e u n c e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f t r a n s i t f a c i l i t i e s needed t o 
s u p p o r t t h e r a p i d d ^ l o y m e n t s t r a t e g y . )-le ijiade i t c l e a r t h a t 
forrnal agreements have a l r e a d y he&x r e a c t e d w i t h s e v e r a l r e g i o m a l 
n a t i o n s and n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e b e i n g p u r s u e d w i t h o t h e r s * f o r 
p e r m i s s i o n t o p r ^ o s i t i o n m a t e r i a l , t o u s e r e g i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s 
d u r i n g c r i s i s and t o conduc t t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s d u r i n g p e a c e 
8 4 . R.G. Swahney, "U.S . M i l i t a r y Men On Pak S o i l / " The Times 
of I n d i a , A p r i l 18, 1984. 
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t i m e . He informed t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g f a c i l i t i e s and o t h e r i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r e have been i n p r o v e d and a r r angemen t s were b e i n g made 
8 S f o r prompt a c c e s s when n e e d e d . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , Mr. Weinberge r s annual r ^ o r t t o Congress 
f o r f i s c a l y e a r 1984 showed an a l l o c a t i o n of $ 43 5 m i l l i o n 
f o r Diego G a r c i a fo r m i l i t a r y c o n s t r u c t i o n s t o p r o v i d e n e c e s s a r y , 
f a c i l i t i e s f o r RDF. Put , t h e r ^ o r t f o r f i s c a l y e a r 1985 showed 
an a l l o c a t i o n of $ 451 m i l l i o n fo r f i s c a l y e a r s 1980-84 and ^ . 5 4 
m i l l i o n fo r f i s c a l y e a r s 1985-89 f^r t h e same p u r p o s e t o ' o t h e r ' 
l o c a t i o n s , which weire n o t a b l y , n o t s p e c i f i e d . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , a 
t o t a l amount of $ 400 m i l l i o n has been a l l o c a t e d , for t h e same 
p u r p o s e , to Egypt , i ^ n y a , Oman and Somal ia . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s 
a l o s b e l i e v e d t h a t a p a r t of t h e above sum c o u l d be sha re w i t h 
P a k i s t a n , t h e o n l y o t h e r n a t i o n i n t h e r e g i o n fo r which p r o v i s i o n 
has beoi made fo r major funded s e c u r i t y a s s i t a n c e programmes 
86 
by t h e U. S. 
In t h i s r e s p e c t / t h e s t a t e m e n t i s s u e d by t h e Movement 
f o r ftestoration of Etemocracy (MRD) i n Karach i on March 4, 1983, 
a l l e g e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e v i s i t of Admiral Holcomb, commander 
o f t h e Seventh F l e e t , t o K a r a c h i on F e b r u a r y 24, 1983, Genera l 
Z i a had o f f e r e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t t o p l a n s fo r u p g r a d i n g 
n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s fo r RDF i n B d i u c h i s t a n i p o r t s and t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
85. R.G. Sawnney, "U.S. Pak Security R e l a t i o n s . . . . , " op. c i t . 
86. Ibid. 
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of a i r bases in s o u t h e r n B a l u c h i s t a n as p o r t of U . S . " fo rward 
S t r a t e g y " / i n t h e resjLon. To r e c a l l , t h e a r e c e n t v i s i t of 
"USS E n t e r f j r i s e " a t Karach i p o r t , can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s 
p e r s p e c t i v e . At p r e s e n t / Pen tagon i s working on t h e p l a n n i n g 
of p e r i o d i c f l i g h t s of t h e U .S . warp lanes and r e g u l a r v i s i t 
o f U .S . t a s k f o r c e s in t h e a r e a , t o d e m o n s t r a t e U .S . s u p p r o t 
88 
t o i t s a l l i e s and f r i a i d s . 
Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y * P a k i s t a n i a i r f i e l d s c o u l d a l s o 
be used by AWACS, s a - 7 1 , and ftC-lSS for i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g 
o v e r I n d i a , There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h e U .S . I s in a p o s i t i o n 
t o p r o v i d e i n t e l l i g a i c e abou t I n d i a t o P a k i s t a n based l a r g e l y 
on s a t e l l i t e s , h i g h - l e v e l a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e {SR-7 l ) , AwACS and 
e l e c t r o n i c m o n i t o r i n g , i n c l u d i n g o p e r a t i o n w i t h RC-13 5. The 
s o r t of i n t e l l i g e n c e which P a k i s t a n would r ^ u i r e from t h e U . S . 
b o t h s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l , wouiid b r o a d l y r e l a t e t o f o r c e 
l e v e l s , o p e r a t i o n a l r e a d i n e s s s t a t u s * d ^ l o y m a i t and m o b i l i s a -
t i o n s t a t u s , e l e c t r o n i c i n t e l l i g e n c e fo r e l e c t r o n i c war fa re* 
m a r i t i m e s u r v e i l l a n c e * i n c l u d i n g l o c a t i o n of f l e e t s and s h i p s , 
t a c t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e p e r t a i n i n g ma in ly t o t h e l o c a t i o n * 
d ^ l o y t n e n t and movement of a. u r e d forttiations and major p o l i -
89 
t i c a l and economic t r e n d s r e l a t • t o defence p r ^ a r a i d n e s s . 
87 . I b id* 
8 8 . The Hindus tan Times, March 3 , i 9 7 9 . 
8 9 . RMG, Sawhney* "V,S» Pak S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s * , , , , , * " o p . c i t . 
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S i g n i f i c a n t l y / t he U . S . i s a l r e a d y i n a p o s i t i o n to 
m o n i t o r developrriQits which may t a k e p l a c e i n t h e r e g i o n t o 
P a k i s t a n t h r o u g h i t s I n d i a n Ocean s a t e l l i t e . N o t a b l y , t h e r e -
p o r t t h a t t h e o b s t r u c t i o n i n t h e s u p p l y of s p a r e s fo r 
T a r ^ u r was t h e r e s u l t of U .S . s a t e l l i t e i n f o r m a t i o n abou t some 
90 
a c t i v i t i e s a t Pokhran o n l y con f i rms t h i s v iew. 
In t h i s c o n t e x t / P a k i s t a n ' s p l a n t o l a u n c h commnnica t ions 
s a t e l l i t e s in t h e n e x t few y e r s for QUICK: t r a n s m i s s i o n of 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s r e l e v a n t . But/ i t would be most d i s c o n c e t t i n g i f 
t h e U .S . d e c i d e d t o s u p p l y d e g i t a l maps to be fed i n t o -he 
9 l 
n a v i g a t i o n computer of F _ i 6 , t h e most advanced fight«=>r a i r c r a f t 
s u p p l i e d t o P a k i s t a n , fo r a i r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t I n d i a n t a r g e t s . 
The p o s i t i o n would be eva i more s e r i o u s i f P a k i s t a n becomes a 
b e n e f i c i a r y of t h e lANTIRN sys tem, which w i l l bes tow an a l l 
92 
w e a t h e r , i n c l u d i n g n i g h t , low, l e v e l n a v i g a t i o n c a p a b i l i t y . 
Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i n t h e u l t i m a t e a n a l y s i s , s o p h i s -
t i c a t e d wecjpons a r e of l i t t l e a v a i l u n l e s s a d e q u a t e i n t e l l i g o n c e 
i s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e i r cptitnum u t i l i s a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e / t h e 
s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d v e r s i o n of t h e Harpoon m i s s i l e / which P a k i s t a n 
has o b t a i n e d / has an ex tended range of 110 km and can be l a u n c h e d 
9 0 . I b i d . 
9 1 . The U .S . i s p r o v i d i n g 40 F_ i6 p l a n e s t o P a k i s t a n . 
9 2 . R.G. Sawhney, "U.S. Pak S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s . . . / " . . o p . c i t . 
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from t h e normal t o r p e d o t ubes of t h e e x i s t i n g P a k i s t a n i 
s u b m a r i n e s . P a k i s t a n ' s mar i t ime r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t c o u l d 
pOoS ib ly s u p p l y t a r g e t d a t a u p t o about 1,500 km from i t s c o a s t -
l i n e * ^ o r e f f e c t i v e employment beyond t h a t r a n g e , however. 
Harpoon - s u b m a r i n e ' s f u l l p o t e n t i a l can n o t be r e a l i s e d u n l e s s 
t a r g e t d a t a ba sed on s a t e l l i t e sensons o r h igh a l t i t u d e 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i s made a v a i l a b l e . The submar ine-Harpoon c o u l d 
b e , t h e r e f o r e , a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to I p d i a n Naval f o r c e s evm 
i n South Arab ian Sea and t h e I n d i a n Ocean, i f such t a r g e t i n t e -
93 l l i g a : i c e i s s u p p l i e d t o P a k i s t a n . 
The Harpoon, a dead ly and v e r s a t i l e m i s s i l e wi th a 
r a n g e of 95 km., i s an " i n t e l l i g m i t " m i s s i l e which can s w i t c h 
o v e r a u t o m a t i c a l l y t o a n o t h e r homing system i f one i s jammed. 
94 I n d i a has no weapon i n i t s a r s e n a l t o match t h e Harpoon. 
I n a d d i t i o n , P a k i s t a n i s a l s o go ing t o d3ulp i t s c h a r i n g class 
d e s t r o y e r s w i t h U .S . b u i l t vulcam p h a l a n y a n t i - m i s s i l e m i s s i l e s . 
N o t a b l y , P a k i s t a n has a l r e a d y managed t o ^ u i p i t s fo rces w i t h 
two o t h e r d e a d l y m i s s i l e s , t h e a i r t o s u r f a c e v e r s i o n of Sea-
skimming, French b u i l t Exoce t and t h e a i r - t o - a i r v e r s i o n of t h e 
American S i d e w i n t e r . P a k i s t a n i s a l s o g e t t i n g advanced medium 
r a n g e a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s , AMRAAM, d e s i g n a t e d ' f a r r o w ' . I t i s 
a s t a n d o f f weapon which c o u l d be f i r e d from beyond t h e v i s u a l 
9 3 . R.G. Sawhney, "U .S . Pak S e c u r i t y R e l a t i o n s - ' I I - U . S . E l e c t r o n i c 
BSayp^naafay Eyes For Pak, "The Times of I n d i a , A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 8 4 . 
9 4 . K.C. Khanna, " I n d i a n Navy In Rough S e a s : Many C h i n k s . I n 
The Armour, "The Times of I n d i a , November 8, 1983 . 
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range of 30 km with t o t a l p r e c i s i o n . I t has an e f f e c t i v e 
range of 70 km. The m i s s i l e i s very good a t evading oiemy-
d e t e c t i o n , through a c l eve r improvement to i t s r^d^r system. 
I t g r ea t ly reduced inaccurac ie s caused when t h e m i s s i l e jumps 
from one r ada r f requent ly to another enroute t o i t s t a r g e t . 
I t has an e l e c t r o n i c t a r g e t t r a c k i n g f a c i l i t y which i s cornple-
t e l y au tomat ic . S ign i f i can t ly / t h i s m i s s i l e i s ab l e to be 
f i t t e d in t h e -'^'-le. This would, t he r e fo re , g ive t h e PAF trem-
95 
endous a i r s u p e r i o r i t y . The supply of these m i s s j l e , to 
Pak i s t an would have very s e r i o u s impl ica t ions for the lAF which 
does not have the r e q u i s i t e e l e c t r o n i c counter measures 
96 
equipma:it to n e u t r a l i s e the t h r e a t from i^arrow. 
In add i t i on , t he Pakis tan Air Force i s acqu i r ing four 
Grumman OV-ID >t)hawk b a t t l e f i e l d s u r v e i l l a n c e a i r c r a f t which 
are equipped with AN/APS-94 s i d e looking a i r b o r n e radar(SLAR) 
system with AKT-16 VHF data l i n k for r e a l t i m e data t r ansmiss ion . 
Radar photographs can be developed within a few seconds. The 
r a d a r coverage range i s 100 Km abeam f l i g h t p a t h . The Mohawk 
can a l so ca r ry two KA 6oC panoramic cameras (l80 degree a n g l e ) . 
One KA-76 a e r i a l frame Camera system, e l ec t ron ic i n t e l l i g e n c e 
95 . "U.S. To Se l l Advanced Miss i les to Pak i s t an , "The Times 
of India , February, 27, 1984. 
96. I t was t h e s e Sparrow m i s s i l e s which the I s r a e l i s used frotb 
t h e i r F - i s and ^'-16 a i r c r a f t in the Bakaa Velley in June 
1982 to shoot down 89 syr ian a i r force j e t f i g h t e r s . 
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l o c a t i n g system, LS 59A Photof lash u n i t on underwing s t a t i o n s 
with f l a r e s for n igh t photography and E l e c t r o n i c counter 
Measures (ECM) pods . This system would permit Pak i s t an to look 
i n t o Indian t e r r i t o r y upto lOOkm. without even i n t r u d i n g i n t o 
Indian a i r space , and thus ob ta in accura te information on t roop 
d ^ l o y m e n t s , veh icu la r movements/ i nc lud ing those of tanks 
97 
and armour, both by day and n i g h t . 
S ign i f i can t ly* Pakis tan has also setup an i n t e g r a t e d 
command cont ro l and communication, network, known as C-3 in 
m i l i t a r y p a r l a n c e , l i n k i n g t h e country, a i r defence system 
t o apex command's a u t h o r i t y . The mu l t i -mi l l i on d o l l a r p r o j e c t 
under t h e c o n t r a c t to the Hughes A i r c r a f t Corpora t ions of the 
U . S . , which began in 1980 and cornpleted in l985, w i l l make 
Pakis tan a i r space extremely d i f f i c u l t to p e n e t r a t e by h o s t i l e 
a i r c a r f t . Under t h e "^-3 p r o j e c t , a l l a i r defo ice elemants of 
Pakis tan i n c l u d i n g t h e Pak i s t an i Air Force has bean i n t e g r a t e d 
i n t o one s i n g l e system by us ing highly s o p h i s t i c a t e d computer 
and e l e c t r o n i c gadgetso Real t ime information wi l l be d ^ l o y e d 
on screen a t the apex command c ^ t r e in Islamabad and opera-
t i o n a l o r d e r s w i l l be t r a n s m i t t e d i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y to func t iona l 
u n i t s in the f a r - f l u i n g s e c t o r s of Pak i s t an . These have been 
specu la t ions in I nd i a t h a t t h e C-.3 would be made in to a C-31 
i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e fourth f ac to r , i n t e l l i g e n c e , a l so i n t o t h e 
97 . R*G, Sawhney/"U.S. Pak Secur i ty R e l a t i o n s : I I . U.S. 
E lec t ron ic Eyes For Pak," op. c i t» 
netv.'Orkc I t i£ b e l i e v e d t h a t h i s would e n a b l e i t t o be 
hooked on to t h e Pentagon c i r c u i t s for s h a r i n g of i n t e l l i g e n c e 
and for c l o s e c o - c r - i i n a t i o r . between U.S . and -Pakis tan for 
f u t u r e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P e r s i a n Oal f a r e a by t h e U.S. 
9 8 
r a p i d deployment f o r c e . 
Thus, one can e a s i l y c o n c l u d e t h a t I n d i a has s e r i o u s 
t h r e a t t o i t s s e c u r i t y from P a k i s t a n . The I n d i a n p o l i c y - m a k e r s 
a r e conv inced t h a t much of American arms s u p p l i e d t o P a k i s t a n 
w i l l be p o s i t i o n e d a g a i n s t I n d i a . I n d i a n b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s 
99 
u p s e t t i n g t h e b a l a n c e i n t h e r e g i o n . 
i"^iainly, P a k i s t a n and China a r e i d e n t i f i e d two p o t e n t i a l 
enemies of I n d i a . In I n d i a ' s p e r c e p t i o n s , China i s r e g a r d e d as 
t h e b i g g e r b u t l o n g - t e r m t h r e a t / w h i l e P a k i s t a n i s s t i l l 
IG 0 
r e g a r d e d as t h e more a c t i v e and inimediate o n e . The t h r e a t s 
from them t o I n d i a n bo rde r s have been p r e s e n t a lmos t s i n c e 
t h e b i r t h of i n d e p e n d e n t I n d i a . I t r e q u i r e s , t h e r e f o r e / t h e 
m a i n t e n a n c e of a l a r g e and growing m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y . But/ 
Washington s m i l e on P a k i s t a n has h e i g h t e n e d t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s 
s e c u r i t y . Obvious ly , t h e U .S . Pak s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s have 
t e r r i b l y c r e a t e d s u s p i c i o n and t e n s i o n between I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n . Eut/ t h e high t e c h n o l o g y weaponary b e i n g made 
9 9 . News week^May, 25, 1985. 
100. Geoffrey op. c i t . , p . l 4 2 . 
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avai lable to Pakistan by the United Sta tes . Notably, Gen. 
Zia-ul-Haq believes that Pakis tan 's securi ty i s "the respon-
s i b i l i t y of the U.S. and that matters l i t t l e whether America 
1 ni 
gives Pakistan "five F-16s or 500." 
I t i s s ignif icant to note that of the t o t a l fl 3,2 
b i l l ion aid to Pakistan, half is for defer^ce purchases. The 
' a i d ' cont(3:it of the ^^eal is the difference between the 
pre/ci i l ing 20% prime r a t e of in te rp^ t in the U.S. market and 
the lower irate being cnanged in two thirds would be in the 
form of grants and one-third to recal l was expected to be a 
loan carrying an in teres t of A% per annum. A IQ year grace 
period is allowed for repayments which are to s t a r t from 
October 1992 and continue upto 2012. This, obviously, makes 
Pakistan t ied up to the U.S. for the next three decades in 
102 i t s economic and mil i tary r e l a t i ons . Notably, once Pakis tan 's 
Foreign Minister Agha Q^ahi pointed out that under the new 
re la t ionship betv^een U.S. and Pakistan, i t was not a mi l i ta ry 
' a i d ' but a mi l i ta ry ' s a l e s ' re la t ionship . 
But# th i s Security re la t ionship poses serious th rea t 
to India ' s secur i ty . In 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz 
101. Inder Malhotra, "The Real securi ty Issue: How National 
Is National Defence, The Times of India, February 9, 1984. 
102. For more de ta i l s , see, B.M. Bhatia, "Pakistan: U.S. Aid 
Implications. "The Times of India. November 6,1981, also see, 
Ravi Rekhye/" The Truth About U.S. Arms," The Indian 
Express, March 23, 1982. 
103. Rashmi J a i n . . . op, c i t . p . 13 2. 
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v i s i t e d Pakis tan and viewed t h a t t he r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
Pakis tan cand United Sta tes i s exce l l en t and based or s o l i d 
foundations of common i n t e r e s t . Ptoth the c o u n t r i e s , Vf' added, 
had a s e c u r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p and shared concern about •soviet 
behaviour s p e c i a l l y in regard to Soviet aggress ion in Afghanistan9 
B u t / i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to n o t e t h a t the U.S. dec is ion to supply 
t o Pakis tan o s t e n s i b l y to counter the Soviet t h r e a t from 
Afghanistan, h ighly s o p h i s t i c a t e d warplanes and tanks which, 
in the very na tu re of t h ings , are incapable of being used across 
t h e kheyber. 
In t r u t h , Pakistan d i d ' n t sha re the United S ta tes s t r a t e g i c 
p e r c ^ t i o n s and merely e>{ploited America's a n t i - S o v i e t p r o p e n s i t i e s 
to i n c r e a s e i t s m i l i t a r y might with a view to b u l l y i n g Ind ia 
101) 
and s e t t l i n g i t s problems with India by force . Twice, the 
m i l i t a r y regimes in Pakistan us ing American arms have a t t acked 
Ind ia , and t r i e d to wrest Kashmir by force. How t h e Punjab, 
perhaps , has added in t h e i r t h r u s t . These U.S. weapons have 
never been used to f ight t he "ex te rna l communist t h r e a t . " 
P a k i s t a n i l eade r s have a lso s t a t e d t h a t they did not wish to 
107 get involved i n t o a c o n f l i c t with the Soviet Union. 
104. Rashmi J a in , op. c i t , p . 13 2. 
105. I n t e r Malhotra, " I n d i a ' s Defence Problems, " op. c i t . 
106. Madhu Limaye, Problems of I n d i a ' s Foreign Po l i cy , Atma Ram 
& Sons, Delhi , 1984, p . 185. 
10 7. See, I b id , p . 189. 
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I n d i a has i t s p e c u l i a r approach towards con ip l i ca t ed 
A f g h a n i s t a n i s s u e . I n d i a has no i n t e r e s t in t h e e^o^ansion of 
S o v i e t power beyond t h e kheybe r b e c a u s e t h a t w i l l weaken one 
o f t h e e s s e n t i a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r I n d o - S o v i e t f r i e n d s h i p i . e . 
t h e e x i s t e n c e of a v i a b l e b u f f e r be twes i t h e two c o u n t r i e s . 
IDS I n d i a , t h e r e f o r e , has a s t a k e i n t h e i n t e g r i t y of P a k i s t a n . 
But, P a k i s t a n c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t t o I nd i a n s e c u r i t y w i t h t h e 
h e l p of U.S . equipment and n o t a b l y , wi th C h i n e s e oncouragement 
and a s s i s t a n c e . I n d i a has made known t o ^bscow i t s d i s p l e a s u r e 
r e g a r d i n g S o v i e t p r e s e n c e in A f g h a n i s t a n and r e i t e r a t e d I n d i a ' s 
? n 9 
s t a n d t h a t S o v i e t t r o o p s s h o u l d wi thdraw from A f g h a n i s t a n . 
But, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , I n d i a viewed t h a t such wi thd rawl c o u l d come 
a b o u t o n l y i f t h e i n s u r g e n t s s t o p p e d t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , and 
110 
o u t s i d e he lp and encouragement t o them was ended. Thus, I n d i a 
has p o s i t i v e l y and c a t e g o r i c a l l y t aken up a p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t 
t h e p r e s e n c e of S o v i e t t r o o p s i n A f g h a n i s t a n , of c o u r s e , w i t h 
few r e s e r v a t i o n s , 
P a k i s t a n ' s p o s t u r i n g on A f g h a n i s t a n a r e p r i m a r i l y d e s i g n e d 
t o i n f l u e n c e t h e U .S . Congress w i t h a view t o e x t r a c t i n g from 
108. G i r i l a l J a i n , "P rob lens With U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . " c p . c i t . 
109 . Pran Chopra , " P a k - A f g h a n i s t a n C r i s i s , " The Times of I n d i a , 
December 12, 1981. 
110 . The Times of I n d i a , September 23, 1982. 
1 1 1 . Ra jendra S a r e e n , " I n d i a , A f g n a n i s t a n , And P a k i s t a n , " 
The I n d i a n Expres s , J a n u a r y 6, 19 8 1 . 
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t h e United S t a t e s the most modem s we^ons system l i k e F-.16, 
Harpoon mi s s i l e s e t c . , which Pakis tan would even tua l ly use 
a g a i n s t Ind ia . I n e v i t a b l y , t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y a id t o Pakis tan 
113 iooms l a r g e on Indian hor izon. 
India i s a much longer country thaTi Pakis tan with a 
l a r g e r d i spe r s ion of i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n s than Pak is tan t h a t might 
l l 4 be e a s i l y h i t by ^-16 l i k e p l a n e s . India has more danger 
of damages r a t h e r than defeat , from Pakis tan which would c e r t a i n l y 
h a u l t I n d i a ' s p r o g r e s s . India dees r.ot have any capable a i r -c ra f t t o 
F-16 to n e u t r a l i s e any t h r e a t to i t s major i n s t a l l a t i o n s , most 
of which came within the range of PAF bases for the f i r s t 
1 1 fi 
t ime. However, Ind ia has acquired Mig~23 and Mig-25 p lanes 
from the Soviet Union o the r than Mirage 2000 from France and 
Jaguars from B r i t a i n . Soviet Union also of fe red Mig-29, claimed 
l l 7 t o be equal ly capable to F^i6 to Ind ia . 
In fact* d i s p a r i t i e s in t h e s izes of India and i t s immediate 
neighbours l i k e Pakis tan , and h i s t o r y do c o n t r i b u t e to the 
p rox imi ty of these neighbour to seek and s e c u r e ex terna l i n t e r v e n t - ' 1 
ion in the s u b c o n t i n e n t ' s a f f a i r s . However, India does no t 
118 d e s i r e to p l a y a dominent r o l e in t h e Indian Ocean a r ea . 
But I n d i a ' s neighbours which are m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p s see 
in I n d i a ' s funct ioning democracy and federal p o l i c y a t h r e a t 
113. G i r i l a l J a in , A New Approach Tow-^rds U.S.:why A change Is 
Necessary , " The Times of Ind ia , Apri l 24, 1985. 
114. "Indian Wars On Arming Pakis tan , "The A u s t r a l i a , -^^ril 3 ,1981 . 
115. See, Ravi Rekye, "The F-I6 Again, "The Indian Express, Jan . 10,1983. 
116. Francine R* Frankel , "Indo-American R e l a t i o n s : I As A U. s. 
Scholar sees Then," The Times of Ind ia , May 16, 1985. 
117. See/"Mig-29 I s the Most Advance Fjgheer, "The Times of I n d i a , 
>iarch 19, 1984. 
118. T.N. Kaul, " I n d i a ' s C r i t i c a l Role in t h e Indian Ocean," 
P a t r i o t , August 8, 1973. 
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119 to themselves. While, the mil i tary d ic ta torships of Pakistan 
h'lve already bred two wars in South / ^ i a . An unstable Pakistan, 
therefore, arming i t s e l f to the teeth cons t i tu tes a grave 
120 threa t to Indi ' s securi ty. Obviously, the s t r a t e g i c perce^?-
t ions of the U.S. and the real intent ions of the 7ia regime pose 
a new threa t for 46500 sq. miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y . The 
secur i ty threats from Pakistan is acquiring, at present , new 
dimensions as Pakistan is believed to be developing nuclear 
weapons in secre t . 
Two nuclear weapon powers, China and the Soviet Union, 
are India 's neighbours. The U.S. seaborne nuclear weapons are 
deployed along the Indian coast . Pakistan is embarked on a 
clandestine guest for nuclear capabi l i ty . Ind ia ' s secur i ty 
problems, therefore, came to grips with the nuclear dimensions 
of national defence. India is c lear ly experiencing the th rea t 
of nuclear blackmail. 
India has claimed to have intel l igent 'e reports which 
highlighted that Pakistan has achieved a nuclear capabi l i ty 
121 
and receiving Arab monetary aid in her nuclear quest . 
119, Inder ^^alhotra, " India ' s Defence Problems," . . . op. c i t . 
120. Madhu Limaye, o p . c i t , p . 182. 
1 2 1 . Maj. Gen. E. flabibullah and C o l . B.K. Narayan, 
c p . c i t . , p . 57. 
P a k i s t a n has c o n s t r u c t e d a n u c l e a r i n s t a l l a t i o n a t 
Kahuta a n u c l e a r enr ichment p l a n t , 2b rriilps from IslarTidbad 
u n d e r t h e t i g h t s e c u r i t y which, o b v i o u s l y , i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
P a k i s t a n aims t o p r o c u r e n u c l e a r weapon t e c h n o l o g y . J l gni f i c a n t l y , 
t h e Kahuta i s c a p a b l e t o p r o d u c e weapon-grade fuel which has 
122 
no c i v i l i a n u s e . Tne Ch inese n u c l e a r ej<perts o c c a s i o n a l l y 
v i s i t the c l a n d e s t i v e l y b u i l t uranium a i r i c h m e n t p l a n t a t 
K a h u t a . China c o n t i n u e s t o he lp P a k i s t a n i n d e v e l o p i n g t h e N u c l e a r 
bomb. The Cliinese s c i e n t i s t s a r e t r a d i n g t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e as 
a n u c l e a r weapon and in r e t u r n o b t a i n i n g advanced t e c h n i c a l 
123 know-how a c h i e v e d by P a k i s t a n i s c i e n t i s t s . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
t h e C h i n e s e a r e a l s o b e l i e v e d h e l p i n g t h e P a k i s t a n i s to deve lop 
t h e t r i g g e r mechanism t h a t would e n a b l e them t o b u i l d a r e l i a b l e 
124 
and u s u a b l e bomb w i t h o u t n e c e s s a r i l y h a v i n g t o t e s t i t » 
The re a r e a l s o r ^ o r t s of '^hina h a v i n g given t h e weapon d e s i g n 
o f t h e i r f o u r t h weapon t e s t , t o P a k i s t a n . The f o u r t h t e s t was 
c a r r i e d o u t by China i n Oc tobe r 27, 1966 and an i n t e r m e d i a t e 
r a n g e m i s s i l e d e l i v e r e d a 20 KT warhead o v e r a d i s t a n c e of a round 
600 m i l e s . The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the des ign was t h a t t h e warhead 
weighed l e s s t han a ton and c o u l d be c a r r i e d by an a i r r c r a f t 
l i k e HLrage I I I / I V o r ^ - 1 6 . I t may be conc luded , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t 
122. "Pak And The iJomb, " ( E d i t o r i a l ) The ^imes of I n d i a , 
F e b r u a r y 20, 19 84. 
123 . The F i n a n c i a l Times, J u l y 17, 1984. 
124 . I n d e r M a l h o t r a , "Bomb Tha t Won't Go Away: More On Pak 
N - c a p a b i l i t y , "The Times of I n d i a , August 9, 1981. 
To remind, t h e f i r s t bomb made o u t of e n r i c h e d u ran ium 
dropped on H i r o s h i n a had n o t been t e s t e d e a r l i e r . 
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Pakis tan i s nea r ing or has acquired the c a p a b i l i t y to produce 
a 20 KT weapon and t h e r e has been some kind of Chinese support 
125 
and help to Pak i s t an . 
At Kahuta^ near ly 1000 u n i t s are a l ready at work and 
t h e s e are enough to produ,ce 15 kg of weapon-grade' h ighly 
en r i ched uranium. The c u r r a i t capac i ty of Kahuta i s est iniated 
t o be between 2,000 to 3,000 separa t ion work u n i t s or enough t o 
1 9 fi 
produce t h r e e nuc lea r warhead a year . Pak is tan has a l so 
b u i l t a p l a n t a t a underground s i t e near Multan where e x i s t s 
a la r<^ source of e l e c t r o n i c power necessary for e x t e n s i v e 
127 
uranium enrichment . 
S i g n i f i c a t n l y , in sharp c o n t r a s t to I n d i a , Pak is tan has 
no use for a uranium enrichment p l a n t for peaceful purposes . 
I t ' s s o l i t a r y power r eac to r t h e 13 7-Mw kanupp a t ka rach i , i s 
fue l l ed by n a t u r a l uranium and is under p e r p e t u a l sa feguards . 
Pakis tan has no programme to bu i ld power r e a c t o r s on i t s own. 
I t ' s small r e sea rch r eac to r , though fuel led by enr iched uranium, 
i s again under safeguards . Besides, Pakis tan does not have 
e}<portable r e se rves of n a t u r a l uranium to be ab le to claim to 
125. K. Subrahmanyam, "Pak Ploy to Hind Nuclear Reality^ "The 
Times of Ind ia , July 28, 1984. 
126. See, "I Cranston Expose of Pak Bomb," The Times of Ind i a , 
Ju ly 4 , 1984. 
127. The Times of Ind ia , Febiruary 22, 1984. 
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t h a t i t needs an en r i chment p l a n t o add " v a l u e " t o t h e m e t a l . 
Obv ious ly , t h e aim of i t s a t t e m p t s t o a c q u i r e a uran ium 
•1 Q Q 
e n r i c h m e n t p l a n t has a l l a l o n g been m i l i t a r y . S e n a t o r Aie-n 
Canston a l s o m a r s h a l l e d m a s s i v e e v i d e n c e o f r e g u l a r P a k i s t a n 
129 p r o g r e s s towards i t s goal of b u i l d i n g up a n u c l e a r a r s e n a l . 
Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y / r e c e n t l y / a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e t o 
I n d i a n s o u r c e s p o i n t e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t P a k i s t a n has 
n o t o n l y succeeded in en r i chmen t uranium t o weapon-g rade l e v e l , 
b u t a l s o has p r o b a b l y d e s i g n e d and t e s t e d s u b - s y s t e m s of n u c l e a r 
weapons/ i n c l u d i n g p h y s i c s - o r i e n t e d s t u d i e s in t h e weapon g r a d e 
u r an ium j u s t a s Sweden has done , ^ t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t 
P a k i s t a n may have a c t u a l l y c o n d u c t e d a n u c l e a r t e s t i n t h i r d 
c o u n t r y , most p r o b a b l y in C h i n a . 
The Ind i an l e a d e r s c l a i m t h a t a t t h e moment I n d i a ' s 
ma jo r p rob lem wi th t h e U .S . i s P a k i s t a n ' s n u c l e a r programme. 
I n d i a b e l i e v e s t h a t P a k i s t a n i s c l o s e t o making a n u c l e a r v/eapon 
l 3 l 
and t h e U.S . i s n o t do ing a i l i t c o u l d do t c s t o p them. 
While , most p r o b a b l y , i t has he(^ made known t o America by I s l a m a b a d 
13 2 t h a t any c o n d i t i o n would be u n a c c e p t a b l e t o i t . Even t h e n , t h e 
U . S . p o l i c y - m a k e r s a r e c o n v i n c e d t h a t m e e t i n g P a k i s t a n ' s s o i s e 
128 , K.C. Khanna, "Coping With t h e Pak Bomb: Why n o t An Cpen 
Commitment," The Times of I n d i a , March 28, 1984. 
129, " " I - C r a n s t o n Ej^ose of Pak Bomb, "The Times of I n d i a , J u l y 4, 
1984; a l s o s e e , I n d e r ^^a lho t ra , " S t a r k r e a l i t y of Pak Bomb: 
S e n a t o r Crans ton T e l l A l l , "The Times of I n d i a , June 28, 1984; 
"Pak Bomb, China and U . S . , " ( E d i t o r i a l ) , The Times of 
of I n d i a , J u n e 22, 1984. 
1 3 0 . "Pak i s t an 'SNuc lea r C a p a b i l i t y : Some R e v e a l i n g Ev idence" 
The Times of I n d i a , May i l , 1985. 
1 3 1 . "PM t o Discuss U.S. Arms t o P a k i s t a n , " The Times of I n d i a , 
May 26, 1985. 
13 2 . I n d e r Mai ho r t a, "More About P a k i s t a n i s Bomb: 3Dme Reveal I n a 
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of secur i ty and incre^.sing Pakistan 's confidence arc the 
best way to influencing Pakis tan 's nuclear prograrrme away 
133 from the acguisi t lon of nuclear weapons. But/ i t is as 
foolish to think as "give junior a water p i s t o l and perhaps 
he wiU not s t ea l an air-gun and knock off the neighbour's 
134 
window pans ." 
Thus, the United s t a t e s i s tur ing a blind eye to Pakistan 
deveJop^'ng nuclear weanon te'^hnology. r-^ost slon 1 " j "ant ly , there 
are -sports in Washington t!Tt3t Pakistan 's nuclear effor ts 
are a l so funded by Libya which has ^or years sought an 
Islamic Bomb. The soft postu^-o of the U.S. is more d i f f i c u l t 
to f igure out in th i s respect Cor Libya is considered by tlie 
r'eagan administration^ as the " ou n ta i nh ead of almost a l l instances 
135 
of in terna t ional terrcr ism, whi-h led theUnited Sta tes to 
at tach Ljbya recent ly . 
Pakis tan 's par t ic ipa t ion in the U.S. an t i -Sovie t 
"s t ra teg ic consensus" that the Zia regime is making America 
pay i±s ext raordinar i ly high, and the U,S, has so far not 
hes i ta ted to pay i t . India and Pakistan both are capable to 
develop nuclear weapon/ however both deny to do so . The stakes 
133. The Times of India/ December 9, 1982. 
134. N.C, Menon/"Pakistan's Pilfered Brmb/" The 'Hndus tan 
Times/ July 17, 1985. 
135. Ib id . 
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f o r I n d i a and P a k i s t a n and t h e s u p e r pov;ers a r e much h i a h e r 
t h a n even be-Fore, I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t , of renewed and 
h e i g h t e n e d r e g i o n a l r i v a l r y i n which t h e s u o e r powers have 
come t o be d i r e c t l y invo lved and in whose outcome t h e y have 
a d i r e c t s t a k e must be v iewed a s a c h a l l e n a e t o I n d i a n 
136 
s e c u r i t y , 
I nd i an s e c u r i t y , t h e r e f o r e , : s c e r t a i n l y t h r e a t e n e d 
as n u c l e a r i s a t i o n of t he r ea io r , i s appea r inQ i n e v i t a b l e . 
A l t h o u g h , f o l l o w i n g i t s exper i r r i en ta l n u c l e i r b l a s t a t Pokhran 
i n 1974, I n d i a h a s r e f r a i n e d from g o i n g n u c l e a r b u t t h e 
Inc3ian Pr ime ^ ' ' i n i s t e r , ^''^. ^ a j i v Gandhi has ma(]e i t c ] e a r 
t h a t I n d i a would have t o r e c o n s i d e r i t s o p t i o n s i n t h e e v e n t 
of P a k i s t a n do ing s o . I n d i a , i n f a c t , cou ld n o t w a i t e v e n t s 
as i d l e s p e c t a t o r s . I n d i a has made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e s e c u r i t y 
r t ians of t h e c o u n t r y have t o p roceed ^n t h e a s s u m n t i o n t h a t 
P a k i s t a n has e i t h e r a c h i e v e d a n u c l e a r weapon c a p a M l i t y o r 
137 
i s i n tJie p r o c e s s of a c h i e v i n g i t . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , r e g i o n a l n u c l e a r r i v a l r y h a s a s u p e r -
power d imens io '^ , f o r w i t h o u t t h e U . S . C o n a r e s s i o n a l exempt ion 
of P a k i s t a n from the a p o l i c a t i o n of t h e a n t i - p r o ] n - f p r a t i o n 
136 . A . S . Abraham, "Super Powers ^nd Snuth A s i a , . . . , " O D . c i t . , 
a l s o s e e , R.f". Sharma, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l and R e g i o n a l 
Focus on tl-ie I n d i a n C c ^ a r , " P a c i f i c community, A p r i l 
1976 . 
1 3 7 . P . K . S . Namboodri , "Pak "^^ 1,0 Tear c a p a b i l i t y : Some t^evealir^g 
E v i d e n c e , " The Times of I n d i a , May 1 1 , I'^SS, 
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Symington Amendment, Pakistan wo'ild perhaps lonci ago have 
been stopped in i ts nuclear tracks, ^''otabjy, a Pal: i-tan 
national was also caught by r .S. custom tryi no to smuag Le out 
some triggering devices for nuclear v/eapons. T*'? waiver of 
the Symington Amend"ent in Lavour of Pakistan by the "leagan 
administration in 19S1 has a clear signa]/ in truth, to 
Pakistan that the U.S. need to supply arms to A-^ghanistan 
insurgent though Pakistani territory outivelghfed its non-
139 
proliferation objective. 
One can eas-! ly visualise that V/ashington will continue 
to •provide sophisticated military hardware to Pakistan, 
ignoring i ts nuclear programme which is designed, especially 
tohelp It produce weanons in the course of the next few ^ ears 
and in the process complic=ite Indian security oroblems, 
Cbviously, the A ericans have mesmerised themselves into 
be'-'evinn th i t a militarily strong Pakistan is v i ta l to 
their security interests in the region, especially in view 
of the Soviet milita^-y presence in Afghanistan. Similarly, 
Washington has come to eguate Pakistan stabil i ty and dependability 
on the survival of President Zia in office. Gen, ?ia, therefore, 
enjoys considerable room for manoeurre in his dealings with 
138, Pakistan was the only country which has been exempted. 
139 . K. Subrahmanyam, "Pakistan's Nuclear Capability: 
l-Jhat Do latest Statesment J^an, " The Times ot India, 
February 29, 1984, 
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t he Americans and t h a t t h i s i nc reases t h e danger to Indian 
140 
s e c u r i t y , 
Ind ia be l i eves* t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e P a k i s t a n ' s nuc lea r 
programme has introduced a ' d e s t a b i l i s i n g f a c t o r in the region 
141 
and made i t i n e v i t a b l e a new nuclear arms race in the a r e a . 
I t should a l s o be remember t h a t the s h i f t from land-based 
s t r a t e a y in the modern warfare occompanied by the n u c l e a r i -
s a t i o n ot the Indian Ocean makes the region a l l the more prove 
t o danger/ leaving a lmost no scope fo r the S t a t e s of the 
142 _ . . 
Indian Ocean to e f f e c t i v p l y check the war. i t i s presumed, 
t h e r e f o r e , if any c o n f l i c t took place in such dec reas ing 
s e c u r i t y environment, i t may be i n s o l u a b l e d o m e s t i c a l l y dind 
143 
c o s t unhearab ly . P o l i t i c a l observers a l s o presume t h a t 
nuc lea r armed submarines of the b i g powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y of 
the U.S. having worldwide d i s p o s i t i o n would make t h e l i t t o r a l 
s t a t e s of the Indian Ocean h e l p l e s s v i c t i m s in case of any 
144 
nuc lear c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Tn the background of r ecen t p a s t 
p o l i t i c a l developments, e s p e c i a l l y i n I r a n , I rag and Afghanistan 
140, G i r i l a l J a i n , "Problems With United S t a t e s " o p . c l t . 
141, T.T.Poulose,"Dancers of Huclear Race in the Indian Ocean," 
Weekly Round T a b l e . , New Delh i , June 9, 1974. 
142, P .K.S. Namboodri, "The Indian Ocean: The Real S t a k e s , " 
S t r a t e g i c Analys i s , Vol .TI , No.8, 1978 p . 3 l2 ;Also see 
K, Subrahmanyam and J . P . Anand, "l^^iian Ocean as an Area 
of Peace , " India Quar te r ly Vol.XXVii, No. 1, October-
December 1971. 
143, Sheldon V. Simon, "A Systems Approach To s e c u r i t y in the 
3'ipdian Ocean Area," Orbis , Vol . XiV, np ,2 , summer, 1970, 
p .4064 . 
144, "Big Powers and the Indian Ocean", (Ed j t o r i a l ) , The H-^ndu. 
June 30, 1975. 
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t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of naval war can not be complete ly ru led ou t . 
Thus, one can sqffely p r e d i c t t h a t a nudlear explos ion by 
Pakis tan would i n i t i a t e an arms r ace which v;ould be very d i f f i -
c u l t t o c o n t r o l . Simul taneously to tJiis nuc lear t h r e a t i t i s 
a l s o Very s i g n i f i c a n t to note t h a t Pak i s tan i s one of the 
n a t i ons where army personnel have been t r a i n e d in F o r t D e t t r i c k 
146 in the United S t a t e s in chemical war fa re . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
a seven member U,S, m i l i t a r y exper t s team paid a tour r e c e n t l y 
in Pak-occupied Kashmir and inspec ted forward p o s i t i o n s and 
147 
m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s in the a r e a . Obviously, P a k i s t a n i 
regime wishes to convey sub t ly i t s nuc lea r ambi t ions and seems 
determined to u t i l i s e U.S. arms a g a i n s t I n d i a . Ind ia , i n 
response , f e e l s these t h r e a t e n i n g waves. 
The s e c u r i t y environment s p e c i f i c a l l y i n Indian sub-
c o n t i a n e n t became more d i s tu rbed from the new m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n -
sh ip between U.S. and China. The U.S. is a l s o p rov id ing 
modern weapons t o China, S t r a t e g i c a l l y , China i s I n d i a ' s 
p r i n c i p a l adve r sa ry . Apart from Pak i s t an , Washington i s now 
keen to a s s i s t China augment i t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y in 
d i s s r e g a r d of tlie f a c t t h a t i t can not bu t impinge on India 
145. Raymond W, Copson, "East Africa and the Indian Ocean: 
A Zone of Peace, "African A f f a i r s , V o l . 7 , N O . 3 0 4 J u l y 1977, 
p .339 , 
146. K.oubrahmanyam, "Pak Ploy To Hide Nuclear R e a l i t y , 
The Times of India , Ju ly 2 8, 1984. 
147. The Times of Ind ia , May 12, 1986. 
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s e c u r i t y . " Sj gn-- 'Ticant ly , thp U.S. admjn: s t r a t i o n i s also 
n o t incUn'='d, p e r h a r s no r t h e y can, t o dis-^nrane t>ie cl^ i n e s e 
and t h e P a k i s t a n i s ro s t o p UTO t n e i r m u t u a l rn iUtPr-y co-or^f^ra-
t i o n . A i o r i c a n s l i e l i e v e t h a t Si n o - P a k i s t ^ n i s m " l i t i r v c o -
o p e r a t i o n would p e r f e c t l y f i t i n t o t h e U . S . a n t i - S o v i e t 
crusOdel""^^ S t r a t e g i c a l l y t h e U . S . po i i c y - - ' ^ k e r s v i s u a l i s e 
t h a t a s t r o n g r ^ l a t i o - ^ s h i p \ J i th China would p rove i t s e l f more 
150 
e f f e c t i v e i n U . S . a n t i - S o v i e t c o n t a i n m e n t o b j e c t i v e s . 
The new momentum in t h e r e l a t i o n s o^ t h e U . S . and China has i t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n s on I n d i a n s e c u r i t y and I n d i a ca'^ no t i q n o r e t h i s 
t h r e e ten- 'na a x i s . 
In f a c t , t h e U . S . - i n t e r e s t s a r e s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t a c k e d 
vjjth i n t e r n a l economic l i b e r a l i s a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g moderni^.ati^^n 
in deCence , Industr^ ' ' / a a r i c u l t u r e , and s c i e n c e and t e c ' ^ n o l o g y . 
In o r d e r to s a t i s f y t h e s e i n t e r e s t s , t h e U . S . e x p e c t s huge 
c - n t r a c t s in C h i n a . P r e s i d e n t peagan b e l i e v e s t h a t American 
paT- t i c ipa i t i '^n i n C h i n a ' s m o d e r n i s a t i o n u n d e r t h e p r e s e n t 
r e l a t i v e l y more l i b e r a l Deng regime mus t o v e r a pe-^iod of 
1 4 8 . See^ Amri t Naha ta , " T h r e a t s t o Peace in t h e I n d i a n 
Ocean , " The P a t r i o t , November 7, 1 9 7 1 . 
1 4 9 . G i r - i l a l J a i n , "Problems With Uni ted S t a t e s . . . . , " o p . c i t . 
150 . The U . S . P o l i c y in Asia d e c i d e d in t h e summer of 1^71 
t o n o r m a l i s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China in t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e 
common s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t S o v i e t Expans ion ism and hegen-o-
n i s m " . I t - i l so he lped C ina r e v e r s i n g i t s p a s t o o l i c y 
in r e c o q n i s i n g as a meml t r of t h e U.N, 
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of t ime make i t m a n i f e s t t o t h e Ch inese what a d v a n t a g e t h e i ' e 
a r e i n e m u l a t i n g t h e American e x a n p l e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e U .S . 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n presumes t h a t c l o s e r S ino - U .S . t i e s a t a l l 
l e v e l s can o n l y f u r t h e r C h i n a ' s d e m o c r a t ! s a t i o n . 
^ t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o be aware of t h e flact t h a t China 
i s t h e most power fu l Asian S t a t e whose p r e s s u r e i s f e l t 
t h r o u g h o u t South and S o u t h e a s t A s i a . L i k e o t h e r g r e a t p o w e r s , 
Ch ina i s a l s o s e e k i n g k l i n k a g e s w i t h some s o u t h e r n Asian 
S t a t e w i t h i n t h e frame work of a c o n f i i c t u a l s i v i r o n m e n t . T h i s 
l i n k e d up China w i th ^ a k i s t a n a g a i n s t I n d i a . B e s i d e s , d e v e l o p -
i n g c l o s e p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c l i n k s wi th A f r o - A s i a n S t a t e s . T h e s e 
l i n k s e n a b l e d China t o e x e r t c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e as a l a n d 
p o w e r Over s o u t h and S o u t h e a s t A s i a . Now, '^nina i s d e v e l o p i n g 
151 
a s t r o n g c o n v e n t i o n a l n a v a l c a p a b i l i t y . I t can combine i t s 
m e n - r i c h l a n d and sea-pOwer t o add weigh t t o " i t s c o e r c i v e dep loyment 
152 i n t h e r e g i o n . The r e c e n t n u c l e a r l i n k s between China cjnd 
t h e U . S . , t h e r e f o r e , h e i g h t e n e d I n d i a ' s c o n c e r n which b e l i e v e s 
t h a t t h e l i n k s cou ld c e r t a i n l y add new d imens ions i n t h e s e c u r i t y 
e n v i r o n m e n t of t h e I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t i n p a r t i c u l a r and t h e 
153 I n d i a n ^cean r e g i o n i n g e n e r a l . 
Thus, t h e s t r a t e g i c c o n s e i s u s between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
and P a k i s t a n and s i m u l t a n e o u s l y wi th China have a c q u i r e d new 
1 5 1 . J . P . An and, "China And The I n d i a n Ocean A r e a , " IPSA J o u r n a l , 
Oc tobe r 19 73 . 
152 . See , J . N . Par imoo, "China P l a n s ^^ass ive P u r c h a s e of U . S . 
Arms, The Times of I n d i a , March 14, 19 8 4 . 
153 . U .S . Bajpayee , _ . . oP-.cHv p p . 108-109 , 
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sinews to change t h e ba lance of forces in the region to 
I n d i a ' s d i sadvan tage . The heavy bui ld-up on Qi ego Garcia by 
t h e U.S. has fu r the r d e t e r i o r a t e d the s e c u r i t y environment 
and the base poses se r ious t h r e a t to I n d i a s v u l n e r a b l e 
c o a s t l i n e . 
I n d i a has a 3,500 mi le (5,700 Km) c o a s t l i n e to d ^ e n d . 
Ind ian m i l i t a r y ej<perts, t h e r e f o r e , a r e not p a r t i c u l a r l y happy 
about the m i l i t a r y l o g i s t i c s i f t he r e i s a major crunch from 
155 
a super-power in the Indian Ocean a rea . I n d i a b e l i e v e s , 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e U.S. move to e s t a b l i s h a i r - n a v a l base a t 
156 Diego Garcia posed a t h r e a t to t h e s e c u r i t y of I n d i a . 
The Indian pol icy-makers b e l i e v e t h a t the i s l a n d of 
157 
^iego Garcia i s bound to a f f e c t I nd i a m i l i t a r i l y . S igni -
f i c a n t l y , ^iego Garcia i s only 1,000 miles away from Cochin. 
At the time of Indo-Pak h o s t i l i t i e s , no tab ly , i t took the 
154. Ind ia has to defoid i t s coas t a l waters and ocean t e r r i t o -
r i e s as t h e Andaman, Nicobars , Laccadives and Minocoy e t c . 
Ind ia has about 1264 i s l a n d s , i n c l u d i n g t i n y rocks , i n t h e 
Indian Ocean, out of which 418 a r e u n i n h a b i t e d ; See, Sans-
kashkher Sanyal, "Indian Ocean ^s so -Amer ican Lake," 
Motherland December 30, 1973. 
155. The Times of Ind ia , March 14, 1972; January 18, 1971; a l so 
s ee , Review of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Vol.XXI,No, 491, 
Sept . 20 m 19 70. 
156. S o c i a l i s t India , -Vol. VIII , No. 16, M j^-^h ^6, l974, p . 2; 
a l so see, Amrit Bazaar ^ a t r i k a , February 9, 1974; The New 
York Times, February 6, l9 75. The New York Times, March 
24, 1974. 
157. See, Batuk Gathani, "western I n t e r e s t in Indian Ocean, " 
The Hindu, November 8, i974: The Na t iona l Hera ld , /^^r i l 
29, 1973, May 13, 1973; The P a t r i o t , Apri l 29,1973. 
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U.S. f l e e t seven days to reach t h e Bay of Bengal, but now 
a f t e r the es tab l i shment of lUego Garcia base, i t might t ake 
158 two days on ly . 
In a d d i t i o n , the new U.S. -naval base a t Diego Garcia 
c o u l d enable t h e U.S. to command t r a d e and commerce in the 
Indian Ocean and prov ide l o g i s t i c s support t o i t s seventh F l e e t 
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i n t h e regiono In t r u t h , t h e U.S. i n t e n t i o n was to achieve 
some m i l i t a r y ob jec t ives which were bound t o c r e a t i n s t a b i l i t y 
160 
and m i l i t a r y injbalance in t h e reg ion , l e a d i n g t o arms r a c e 
among l i t t o r a l coun t r i e s and t h r e a t o i i n g t h e i r l a r g e r i n t e -
^ l 6 l 
r e s t . 
Obviously, Ind ia i s now ej^osed to t h e developments 
in the waters of t h e Indian Ocean and c o n s t r a i n e d as well i n 
terms of economic f l e x i b i l i t y and necessary pecun ia ry means 
for a successful o f fens ive on t h i s s co re . I n d i a , however, has 
a sense of c laus t rophobia and an apprehension t h a t , i t i s a t 
t h e r e c e i v i n g aid of e v s i t s in the v i t a l a rea in i t s c lose 
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v i c i n i t y . I nd i a always/ t h e r e f o r e , p r o t e s t e d t h e a i t r y of 
158. K. S. Jawatkar , op. c i t . , Po 179. 
159. Jack F u l l e r , "Date l ine Diego Garcia: Paved Over P a r a d i s e , 
"Foreican Pol icy , ^ a l l , ]977. 
160. See, L e s l i e H. Gelb, "Indian Ocean Arms Limi ta t ion Nego t i a -
t i o n s , "Dg2J£tmait_of_Sj;Laie_Buj^^^ Dec^nber 1978; a l so 
see , " I m p e r i a l i s t M i l i t a r y Bases And t h e Problem of 
s e c u r i t y and Development," Peace And 'So l ida r i t y , June 1975. 
161. William J . Bamds, "Arms Race and Arms Control i n t h e Indian 
Ocean," America, Washington D.C., October 14, 1972; a l s o 
see . The Hindu, Janaury 16, 19 7 1 . 
162. r^naranjan Bezboruah, U.S. S t re teqy In The Indian ^cean. 
New York, 1977, Po 195. 
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t h e U.S. t ask forces in t h e Indian Ocean, I nd i a a l so opposed 
j o i n t naval e x e r c i s e s by t h e NATO coun t r i e s which took p l a c e 
in 1974 in t h e Indian Ocean. I nd i a a l so expressed i t s d'^ep 
concern to t h e r ecen t v i s i t of "USS Ehte rpr i se" a t -^'drachi. Thus, 
I n d i a has always been ^ t r e m e l y concerned with the c o n t i n u i t y 
and increassing p r e s a i c e of t h e naval t ask fo rces of ex terna l 
powers, e s p e c i a l l y t h e U.S. in t h e Indian O^ean, I nd i a , 
t h e r e f o r e always be l ieved t h a t i t was not i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of peace 
155 t o expand/ s t reng then and acqu i r e bases in t h e Indian Ocean. 
In fac t / the ^iego "Garcia base has been r e s p o n s i b l e enough to 
c r e a t e t h e feelings of i n s e c u r i t y among t h e l i t t o r a l s and 
enhanced the super-power r i v a l r y . 
Indubi tab ly / the expansion of Diego Garcia as a major 
n u c l e a r base for the U.S. navy m i l i t a t e s aga ins t I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y 
p e r c e p t i o n s . 
Diego Garcia base, t h e r e f o r e , has served the American 
requi rements , t h e r e q u i r ^ n a i t s to s t o r e fuel , amunition and s p a r e 
p a r t S / ships and a i r c r a f t maintenance, bunkering, a i r c r a f t s t a g i n g 
163. S o c i a l i s t India, November 23, 1974, p . 27. 
164. The Hindustan Tjmes, November 23, 1975. 
165. The rimes of India , ^^ay 16, 1975; also s e e , "Riva l ry in t h e 
Indian Ocean," (Ed i to r i a l ) The Hindu, November 18, l9 74, 
l66o Dev Mur ark a, "Ford ' s Indian Ocean and Kreml in ," Amrita Bazar 
P a t r i k a , Septefnber 9, ]974; a l so s e e , Tapan Das, "Threat 
from Diego Garc ia , " Mainstream, October 16, 19 76, 
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and communication f a c i l i t i e s to the U.S. naval ships in the 
Indian Ocean. The U.S., in fact, has converted the Indian Ocean 
region in to a s a t e l l i t e of the secur i ty system of the major 
powers, iDOth as a launching arpa, as well as, a t a rge t area for 
nuclear systems. 
I t i s important to note tha t the presence of the nuclear 
weapons of the super powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y the U.S., does convert 
the region into a zone of poss ib le nuclear confrontation and 
therefore* poses a threa t to the securi ty of the Indinn Ocean 
s t a t e s including India, The Indian "^cean region, thexrefore, 
has become the focus of great i n t e r e s t because of the cold war 
r i v a l r y in i t s s t r a t eg ic -nuc l -a r and politico-economic dimensions. 
India i s well aware of the events leading nuclear isat ion 
and mi l i t a r i s a t ion of the subcontinent. There are two nuclear 
powers. China and the Soviet Union, in Ind ia ' s neighbourhood 
and in the v/aters of the Indian Ocean i s deployed the powerful 
task force of a th i rd nuclear weapon power-the United s t a t e s . 
The Indian Ocean area, therefore, continues to be a major concern 
with the increase in naval and mioitary presence of big powers* 
especia l ly the U.S. This pOses agreat threa t to the sovereignty 
and independence of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s , including India . 
In addition, Ind ia ' s concern had been heightened by a 
combination of Pakis tan 's nuclear programme and i t s feverish, 
accumulation of conventional weapons. Pakistan does not seem going 
173 
to give up e i t h e r i t s nuclear programme. With c lear mi l i tary 
overtones or i t s search for mi l i ta ry p a r i t y or even super ior i ty 
Over India with U.S., Chinese Saudia Arabia and Libya's ass is tance . 
The induction of sophisticated arms in Ind ia ' s neighbourhood and 
the mi l i t a r i s a t ion of the Indian ocean pose a danger to Ind ia ' s 
freedom on i t s f ron t ie rs . 
The exis t ing | 3.2 b i l l ion agreement between Washington 
and Islamabad/ which was signed in 1981, was intended to bols te r 
Pakis tan ' s defences following the Soviet pre3<a^ce in Afghanistan. 
While, the arms tha t Pakistan i s get t ing from the U.S. are not 
of the type tha t could be used over the mountains in Afghanistan 
Significantly/ the Pakistani Air Force has based the ^'-I6s close 
to the Ihdian ra ther than Afghanistan border and has never 
scrambled them to warn off Afgi-ianistan or Soviet a i r c r a f t . 
I t should be remember tha t Indian deLence commitments are 
la rger since i t had a longer border l i n e . The ^'-16 hot f ighter 
a i rc ra f t / improved TOW/ ^arrow/ H-90 e tc . deadly missiles/ 
including Harpoon missiles vulcan Phalanx a i r defence ^uipmoit / 
Mohauk bfettle field/ the ^awkeye early warning s y s t ^ for e t c . 
co l l ec t ive ly pose serious th rea t to Ind ia ' s sca t t e red s t r a t e g i c 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s . 
Besides/ super-po^-ers blind race for obtaining nuclear 
super ior i ty , Pakis tan ' s relentlassnuclear pursu i t has added 
167. The Financial TimeS/ October 1, l985o 
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a new dimension to I nd i a ' s secur i ty environment. Pakistan has 
taken full advantage of the continued Soviet presence in Afghani-
stan and the worsening s i tuat ion in '/test Asia to project i t s 
r o l e as a " f ront - l ine" s t a t e in the s t r a t eg ic perception of the 
U.S. The sophis t icated equipment being acquired by Pakistan, in 
fact/ are far beyond Pakistan 's leg i t imate defence needs and wil l 
bestow on i t an offensive c a p a b i l i t i e s . 
Security consideration of India, therefore/ i s now affected 
by the th rea t perceptions emerging from the p robab i l i t y of armed 
confrontation with Pakistan. Therefore/ the defence re^UJirements of 
India should be guided by quest ions, the protect ion of nat ional 
i n t e r e s t s in the t e r r i t o r i a l waters, the continental shelf and 
the exclusive economic zone and the broader questions of n e u t r a l i -
sing and decreasing as far as poss ib le the maritime threa t from 





The United Srates continues to pursue its foreign 
polif^ y objectives >s a global power. In this context, oiego 
Garcia to^ "iay, is an important object of noliT:i':o-''ailitary 
affair in many chanceries o^  the '••lorld. It is a site of a 
large new American operational -nilitary base with nuclear 
implic tions. in thruth, the U.S. has acquired overseas military 
bases largely out of consideration for its nuclear strategy. 
The Anericans callously threw out all the inha itants before 
takin-^ over the island from the British, Ho'-zever, ori-inally 
the island u-as part of the i^ rench Empire but later "as seized 
by the ~<ritishers. 
The U.3. plan to upgrade the facility at 'Jiego larcia 
into a fbll fledoed air-naval base v/as approved in July 1975 
after a great debate. The U.S. enfold designs was part of a 
wider strat.iny fomvlated as early os 1960 or even Ijefore. It 
v/as then v/hen the U.S. pentagon e.;per s began to realise the 
requirement for such a faciliry across '"he Indian Ocean, Diego 
Garcia was considered most suitable because of its central 
location and potential for a major military base, rather than 
simply to ser'/e as a site for an austere communications faci-
lity to replace the one in Sthlopia, However, the Diego 
Garcia build up links up a chain of island bases in the Pacific 
to allied bases all the way to South Africa. 
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In the ear ly 1970/ the U.S. Navy alleged growing 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean/ Consequently/ i t 
emphasized to build naval communications f a c i l i t y on Diego 
Garcia, Construction for th i s purpose s t a r t e d in March 1971 
and the s t a t ion became operational in the spring of 1973, 
Sooner/ the American s t r a t e g i s t s f e l t the ex is t ing 
arrangements insuff ic ient and unsat is fac tory . They proposed 
expansion of the f ac i l i t y at Diego Garcia so that i t could 
be converted into a "naval support base". I t was presumed as 
a logical corol lary to the e a r l i e r moves. In truth/ the U.S. 
Navy wished to see Diego Garcia become to the Indian Ocean what" 
Malta is to the ^"tediterranean." 
I t may be recalled tha t the Pacific, the At lant ic , 
and the 'Vditerranean were percievcd as areas of much higher 
p r i o r i t y by the U.S. policy makers. But spec i f i ca l ly of ter the 
f ierce Kiddle East Crisis in 1973, there were vic iss i tudes of 
firm str-ess on the secur i ty of the Persian Gulf. Sauth-.Vest 
Asia, especia l ly the Persian Qjlf, is the most crucial area 
of concern to the U.S. due t o the oi l and Arab-Israel dispute . 
The Americans have made i t c lear that any attempt by any outside 
power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be repel led 
by any means necessary, including mi l i ta ry force. 
However/ the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Indian 
^cean during the Bangladesh war in l97i and l a t e r , a t the time 
177 
of the West Asian oi l embargo fai led to a l t e r the course 
of events. The i l l~ fa ted attempt/ in addition, to rescue American 
hostages in Tehran, dramatic intrusion of Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan and ^ran-Iraq war following the Islamic Resolution in 
Iran, l e t the U.S. policy makers to characterise t h e i r policy 
as American weakness in grappling with these advert ies successfully. 
Later, the discovery of unlimited off shore o i l and a huge deposi ts , 
of precious nodules on the sea-bed enhanced s t r a t eg ic importance 
of the Indian <-'cean. ^ere i t is also important t o reniember tha t 
u n t i l 19 77, both the super powers had exhibited r e s t r a i n t and 
nei ther had sincerely . irapalled to the "vacuum" l e f t by the 
Bri t ish withdrawl from bases eas t of Suez. But the Soviet move 
in the Horn of Africa where the Soviets were backing Ethiopia 
against Somalia with active ass is tance from the cuban troops, which 
was held responsible for the emergence of second cold war, perple-
xed the super power connexion. In addition, the Soviets gained access 
t o the American bu i l t port at Ranh Bay in Vietnam provided an 
impetus to super power r iva l ry in the Indian ocean. 
The second cold war led the U.S. towards the expansion 
of the Diego Garcia base. The x runway has lengthened from 8,000 
feet to 12,000 feet ; the capacity of fuel s torage tanks were 
increased in order to manage for o i l and aviat ion fuel (640,000 
ba r re l s , 320,000 each) for a c a r r i e r task-group to operate in 
the area for about 30 days; the lagoon was dredged to a depth of 
4 5 feet su i table for naval task forces including nuclear powered 
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a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s of ^d.'?atts c l a s s ; and an e lec t ron ic communi-
cations s t a t i o n was also provided for rapid radio repla^, with 
ships and a i r c r a f t operating in the Indian ^cean. Significantly/ 
improvements in Diego Garcia were perceived tha t i t would make 
the base capable to function as an a l te rna t ive to the Subic Bay 
Base in the Phil ippines. 
Diego Garcia build up was jus t i f i ed in 'Washington primar-
i l y on five accounts: (a) the U.S. had gradually increasing 
in t e r e s t s in the l i t t o r a l s ta tes of the Indian Ocean and since 
i t was an cxjtside power, the mere option l e f t to the U.S. was to 
preserve i t s naval presence es tabl ishing a mi l i t a ry base in the 
area, (b) that the U.S. must diniinish or neu t ra l i se the steady 
growth of Soviet mil i tary a c t i v i t i e s in the region project ing 
i t s own forces there, pa r t i cu l a r l y in view of mi l i ta ry f a c i l i t y 
at Berbera to the Soviet Union, a small port superintending the 
entrance to the Red Sea. The U.S., on the basis of the photo-
graphs taken by a reconnaissance plane, argued tha t the Soviets 
were in a be t t e r posi t ion to conduct unlimited operations in 
the Indian '^cean area. Signif icant ly, Berbera is r ight on the 
t rade routes going through the Suez and coming out of the Persian 
Gulf. I t i s a l so r ight across from Aden, where the Soviets 
have valuable naval -a i r f a c i l i t y ; (c) that the base would 
pro tec t the western petroleum in t e r e s t by watching the sea 
routes leading to the -Persian Qjlf oi l supplies; (d) that i t 
would a s s i s t the U.S. mi l i tary forces in evacuating i t s c i t izens 
17 
in tirries of c r i s i s and in performing such other contingency 
purposes and last ly* ^&) that i t would promote s t a b i l i t y in the 
region, maintaining a balance of power in the area. 
The Americans were well aware in seventies that unlike 
the s ix t i es which witnessed the del icate 1962 Cuban Cr is i s , they 
no l©r>ger have itK^stery of the seao The ^oviet ^nion of 70s 
procured the capabi l i ty to project i t s power a l l over the globe 
which could well circumnavigate the '-'ceans of the world« In 
addition, the U.S. policymakers argued that the Soviet interven-
t ion in Afghanistan have placed Soviet forces now at the two 
Corners of the Near East-at the south west corner in the Saudi 
Arabian peninsula and in the Horn of Africa, on the one hand, 
and at the north-east comer in South-West Asia, on the other 
and hence the Soviets possess mi l i ta ry advantage in the area. 
The Washington off ic ia ls c l a r i f i ed that the U.S. bases and access 
f a c i l i t i e s are, therefore, aimed a t to intensify the trowess 
and punch of the U.S. ba t t leships in the Indian ^cean. ' 
^actual ly, the U.S. Navy is superior in fire-power, 
l og i s t i c s and operational capabi l i ty for extended per iods . In 
the Indian Ocean, spec i f ica l ly , the Soviet warships do'nt 
pose any thnsat to the U.S. navy. In s t r a t eg ic force composi-
t i ons , notably, only 25 percent of the ^oviet s t r a t eg i c warheads 
are submarine based while 50 percent of the U.S. warheads are 
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sea-based. The most glaring disadvantage of the •Soviet navy is 
that i t protect i t s fleet la rgely with the help of shore based 
a i r c ra f t u'hich obviously is unable to a s s i s t i t s f leet on the 
high seas, i-i/hile the U.S. has handsome number of arcf^r^s of por ts 
in the Indian ^cean. I t can also x rely on i t s European a l l i e s 
for th i s purpose which possess considerable naval strength in 
the area. The capabi l i ty of U.S, Navy for survei l lance, sea 
control and combat has also tremendously increased. 
The Reagan administration is further upgradinq the 
Diego Garcia base to f a c i l i t a t e deployment of the U.S. troops 
within a very short time on the Asian mainland. The la rger 
run. ay of the Diego Garcia base is now capable of handling a l l 
types of a i r c r a f t s including giant B-52 and ^'-111 aircraCts , The 
U.S. has u t i l i s e d B-52 bombers over the Indian Ocean on 24-have 
f l i gh t s , af ter the Soviet int^^rvention in Afghanistan, out of 
i t s Pacific '-'cean oase at Gaun to show the American flag in the 
area. The Diego Garcia base i s also used by Orion class spy 
planes for maintaining surveillance over the en t i r e area, inclu-
ding Indian 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has led to a resurgence 
of containment thinking in Washington. However/ the concept of 
the Rapid Deployment force was planned long before the interven-
t i o n . The R. D. F , , under the command of CentCom consists of 2,00,000 
men backed by another 100,000 in reseTTve. I t can use 15 a i r f i e lds 
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and por ts in Kenya, Qnan, Somalia, Egypt, Djibouti and now 
Karachio The U.S. is also working on designs to construct or 
expand i t s mi l i ta ry bases across West Asia and the Indian Ocean 
for the purpose of a^sfltinn American mili tary forces in the Area. 
The cost of the said five year plan, which beaan in 1983, is 
estimated over | 2 b i l l i on . Besides the R. D. F, , about 45,000 
marines are permanently s ta t ioned in the area covered by the 
CentCom. ^t provides tremendous mobility and s t r ik ing power t o 
U.S. navy.A'hile, the Soviet naval forces in the upper arabian 
sea are coirparatively aieagre, in the absence o£ mil i t ry bases 
or operational f a c i l i t i e s in the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s . 
'^••ost s igni f icant ly , the expansion of Diego Garcia as a 
major nuclear base mi l i ta tes against India 's secur i ty percept ions. 
The security of India depends upon the peace and s t a b i l i t y of 
the waters tnat wash the three sidei; of the Indian sub-continent. 
Ind ia ' s geo-pol i t ical compulsions caui:ed by Bri t i sh withdrawl, 
emergence of small and weak sovereian States and the entry of 
Superpower r iva l ry in the Indian ^cean are some of the important 
factors which have made i t e s sen t ia l for India to s incere ly 
defend i t s long coas t - l ine , i s landic t e r r i t o r i e s and oceanic 
i n t e r e s t s . I t is well understood tha t the superpowers want t o 
make the regional s ta tes as objects of t he i r s t r a t e a i c manipu-
l a t i o n s . 
There are cer ta in more ia,miediate challenges th^t are 
dis turbing and ser ious. One i s the arc of i n s t a b i l i t y along the 
1^ .2 
Indian ^cean where internal conditions offer mutual principal 
r i v a l , opportunity to take advantage of turbulence to oain 
t a c t i c a l object ives. The Indian * c^ean and the Gulf are areas 
of severe competition wnere conf l ic t s in contiguous s ta tes 
invi te the super powers to competitive naval demonstrations 
and to overt or clandestine in tervent ions . 
India is alarmed, therefore, at the development in the 
India Ocean. I t considers the Diego Garcia build up as a threat 
to i t s secur i ty . The cold war, factually, has come to India 's 
doorstep on sea and land. India views the growing mi l i t a r i s a t i on 
in th i s iBgion a revival of colonial designs. India has serious 
apprehensions about the Reagan administrat ion 's hot policy 
postures and plans to give more teeth to tne U.S. mi l i tary presence 
in the region. India believes tha t outside naval presence in the 
area i s , in fact des tabi l i s ing force in the reaion. 
The U.S. decision to arm Pakistan is a par t of i t s Indian 
^cean manoeurres. The U.S. huge task armada near the Gulf of 
Hormuz, the R.D.F, in West Asia and now the induction of Hawkeye 
and Harpoon in Pakistan 's forces can eas i ly disrupt India 's 
o i l supply. The route of Indian merchant ships from the Glilf 
runs from very near to Karachiport te sides, Dieqo Garcia is 
only 1,000 miles away from Cochin and the U.S. Fleet will take 
mere two days to reach the Bay of Bengal. The U.S. can also 
e f fec t ive ly demonstrate i t s capabi l i ty in any event of Indo-
Pak h o s t i l i t y . The U.S. ships usual ly entered into the Indian 
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Ocean through the ^^alacca S t r e i t s which pose permanent th rea t 
to Andaman Si Nicobar is lands. Most s igni f icant ly , India l ike 
others, has a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. At a time when 
the stock of land-based mineral resources are rapidly exhausting, 
the self-generat ing nodules lying around on the sea-bed and 
Ocean floor can yield v i r tua l ly inexhaustible mineral r iches . 
But i t s exploi ta t ion cal ls for maritime clout . The confl ict 
in the sa l t water surrounding India has reached a dani)erausly 
high pitcho If not adequately protected, Ind ia ' s maritime and 
mineral wealth can be eas i ly plundered. India, is therefore, 
doing i t s best to build blue-water navy so that i t can cope with 
t h i s new de ter iora t ing security environment. 
The Indiantrouble i s tha t American anns, to i^akistan 
can be turned against India in future as i t happened in the 
pa s t . Signif icantly, most of these weapons can not be used in 
the border of Afghanistan, therefore, invariably poses a d i rec t 
threat to Indiao 
In fact, Pakistan has emerged as a f ront l ine s t a t e in 
U.S. global po l icy . Tnis brought Pakistan a $ 3.2 b i l l ion arms 
aid package to "secure"itsborders with Afghanistan and thus 
introduced an en t i r e ly new array of weaponry in the regiono 
Weapon systems today get outdated faster than woman's fashion 
in Par is . In addition, Indian in te rpre t Pakis tan 's bid to get 
modern weapon technology as an attempt to upset the exis t ing 
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power equilibrium, for instance, Pakistan is feverishly t ry ing 
to develop a nuclear weapon and the U.S. has turned a blind 
eye' frcxn Pakistan 's nuclear t h rus t . India has widely sca t tered 
i n s t a l l a t i o n s . The nuclear threat both fran Diego Garcia and 
Pakistan, and the danger of a i r assault from the ^-]6s, co l l ec t -
ively portend India ' s secur i ty . The U.S. newly formed nuclear 
Co-operation with china has framed a U.S. Pakistan-China axis 
against India and hence agi ta tes India 's securi ty considerat ions. 
I t is important to remember, tha t the gifted armoury to 
Pakistan v/ilj i?eguire sophist icated in te l l igence feeding which 
is believed to be available through the Diego Garcia base and 
the U.S. Indian Ocean s a t e l l i t e s . If a par t of the in te l l igence 
gathered by a super power is made available to a th i rd "world 
country, i t would lead to a quantum jump in i t s mil i tary capabi l i ty 
both at the s t r a t eg ic and t ac t i ca l level? , -^ n^y such arrangements 
therefore, between the U.S. and Pakistan will have serious and 
manifold securi ty implications for India. 
In t ru th , Pakistan's s t r a t e g i c location requires Americans 
t o improve mutual security re la t ionship . The Soviet presence 
in Afghanistan allegedly poses a threat to western oi l supplies, 
therefore. South West Asia is perceived by the U.S. as a region 
of great vo la t i l i ty* Pakistan, obviously, becomes a l l the more 
v i t a l to the U.S. In addition, the U.S. is a lso concerned with 
the survival of the pro-west and conservative sheikhs in the 
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oi l rich ^ I f . In i t s grand designs, therefore, the U.S. has 
assigned a cer ta in role to Pakistan. 
Today, the world is dangerously s i t t i n g on the destruct ive 
stock pi les of nuclear armaments. However, nuclear asyrrmetry 
downgrades the conventional deterrant of a non-nuclear weaoons 
State and makes i t vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. The a b i l i t y 
to deter a nuclear, at tck, therefore, becomes the primary moti-
vation for India to acquire nuclear weapons, While the arms race 
in the subcontinent, which must surely cause India to reconsider 
i t s own nuclear option, can again lead to a war between India 
and Pakistan, of course, very di f ierent in character from e a r l i e r 
wars. 
India i s also threatened from space. The Indian '-^ caan is 
considered in Wasnington most sui table for launching under water 
nuclear attack on the nerve centres of the •Soviet land. Notably, 
the U.S. missi les has obtained through the ^iego Garcia base 
a most appropriate angle to hit - the Soviet Uniono In fact, the 
Indian Ocean and Diego Garcia have also i t s pecul ia r posit ions 
in U.S. space s t ra tegy. The super powers are keen to find out 
the ways in to exploi t outer space for indus t r ia l as well as 
mi l i t a ry purposes. The Reagan adniinistrat ion 's s t ra teg ic Defence 
I n i t i a t i v e (SDI) Project, a $ 26 b i l l ion research programme, 
popularly known as "Star Jar" programme has tremendously 
deter iorated the security environment in the region. The project 
1. Itecent nuclear leak in Chermobyl reactor of the USSR has 
raised new shock waves throughout the world. ..i«o see, S. Kumar, 
" We Are All Doomed Under the Nuclear Cloud," The Times of 
India (Sunday Review), May 18, 1986. 
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i s intended to invent technical capabi l i ty to destroy in te r 
continental miss i le in the boost phase. The pro jec t involves 
placing s a t e l l i t e s in space to detect an in te r -cont inenta l missi le 
a t launch and destroy i t through l a s e r beams in space, ^agan 
however argued tha t the proposed project is based on non-nuclear 
system that would threaten not human beings, but only b a l l i s t i c 
2 
miss i l es . To r eca l l , Diego Garcia will also be used in an a n t i -
s a t i l l i t e weapon system. Indubitably, the U.S. mi l i t a r i s a t ion 
th rus t in space is aimed at to take lead over the Soviet Union. 
I t will centainly accelerate the nuclear arms race in space. 
Thousand of s c i e n t i s t s and engineers warned tha t the proposed 
pro jec t will endanger peace and arms control by encouraging 
the ctevelopment of both additional offensive overki l l and an 
a l l out competition in a n t i - b a l l i s t i c missiles weapons. We have 
to rea l i se that everything we say about the future is going t o 
influence the future. I t was rel ieved that the super powers can 
fashion the i r des t in ies . The r e s t of the world must adjust 
i t s e l f to a complex se t of circumstances. But, the threat of 
nuclear winter would not be confined within the t e r r i t o r i e s , 
therefore , the en t i re world is la Ing under the th rea t of nuclear 
holocaust. 
2 . I n d i a Today, November 15, 1985, p> '^ 9o 
3 . "U .S . S c i e n t i s t s P ledge A g a i n s t SDl The Times of I n d i a , 
i^ a^y 15, 19 86. 
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Thus, tne genesis of p o l i t i c s of the Indian Ocean has 
been the cold war bipolar i ty of the two super powers. The fear 
tha t r ival may get the super ior i ty , is the soul of the cold 
war. But the only thing the super powers have to fe.i^ r isti-fear 
i t s e l f . Both of them should t ry to win mutual confidence. 
To sum, the United s t a t e s , through, always st icked fast , 
in p r inc ip le , to the policy of encouraging peace and s t a b i l i t y 
on internat ional platform. In theory, i t had been s ta ted that 
the U.S. policy is on the side of the angels. In t ru th , foreign 
policy in p rac t i ce , rarely corresponds fully to i t s broad 
statements of aims and p r inc ip les . I t is more appropriate to say 
tha t i t is Dased on calculations and compulsions of the national 
i n t e re s t s in the specific circumstances in which the decisions 
are made and actions are taken. But at the same time, the quest 
for peace in the Indian Ocean must be enccuraged. S t ab i l i t y 
and securi ty in the region i s a necessary p re requ is i t e for the 
development of the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of tne Indian ocean. The 
super pover 's prowling •'n the Indian Ocean area, therefore, 
must be co l lec t ive ly faced. Not everything t h a t i s faced can be 
changed but nothing can be changed un t i l i t i s faced. The 
i n t e r e s t of a nation may be ju s t i f i ed but i t can not ex i s t in 
the graveyard. The dead makes no demands and has no i n t e r e s t . 
The in te res t of the mankind must be preferred by a l l , therefore, 
a l l foreign mi l i ta ry bases must be eliminated, ^he process of 
mi l i t a r i s a t ion must be reversed. Ihe ent i re Indian ^cean region 
m 
188 
i s desperateJ y groping in the dark for solut ions to extremely 
complex internal or b i l a t e ra l problems. They must be ass is ted 
and not to ce exploited. 
I t can not be denied tha t great power r ivalry in the 
Indian "^cean threatens to intend upon the progress and developments 
of the l i t t o r a l and hinter land states of the Indian Ocean. 
That i s why the Sifected countries den:and the dismar:l-'nq of 
i l i t a r y bases in Diego Garcia, the res torat ion of Co'-'aos 
Archipelago to Mauritius and the iinmefiiete implcmentaticn of 
the 1971 U.N. declaration to make the Indian Ocean a zone 
of peace. 
Indian securi ty demands xVi^.'ith drav/al of menacing prese-
nce of foreign powers near Indian Coastal l i ne . 
The old colonial pov/ers/ Britain, France, the Netherlands 
and I ta ly l o s t control over the ocean af ter world war I I . The 
U.S., then work to upon i t s e l f to portect the v/estern in te res t 
with Diego Garcia as i t s pr inc ipa l naval base. 
The s t ra teg ic posi t ion and vast mineral resources of the 
Indian Ocean have raised the stakes in the region. 
This is l i t t l e t ru th in the claim of united s ta tes that 
i t s naval presence in the Indian Ocean ehhanced the secur i ty 
climate in the region and inhibi ted otherwise po ten t i a l l y unche-
cked hegemonic attempts. 
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Annexure I 
EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETt'^ EaSl THE GOVERNMEMT OF THE U>^ IITED KINGDOM OF 
GREAT aRITAlN AMD NORTHERN IRELA.ND AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
SPAPES OF AMERICA CONCERtUNG THE AVAILABILITY FOR DEFEMCH PURPOSES 
OF THE BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY 
NOo 1 
The Ambassador of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of America t o t h e S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e fo r F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . 
Note No. 25 
London, 30 Decsriber 1966 
• ^ r , 
I have t h e honor to f e f e r t o recen t d iscuss ion between 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the ^-bvernment of the United •^tates of America 
and the ^ve rnmen t of the United Kingdom of Great Br i t a in and 
Northern I r e l a n d concerning the a v a i l a b i l i t y , for t h e defa ice 
purposes of both Governments as they may ar ise / of the is lands 
of ^ e g o Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago, and 
the Islands of ^Idabra, FarQuhar, and Desroches cons t i tu t ing the 
Br i t i sh Indian Ocean Territory* hereinafter referred to as "the 
Territory", The United States Government has now authorized me 
to propose an agreement in the following terms : 
1) The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom 
sovereignty* 
2) Subject to the pirovisions s e t out below the i s lands 
shal l be avai lable to meet t h e needs of both Government 
2} r M 
f o r d e f e n s e . In o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e r e s p e c t i v e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s and U n i t e d Kingdom d e f e n s e a c t i v i t i e s 
i n t h e i s l a n d s a r e c o r r e l a t e d in an o r d e r l y f a s h i o n : 
a) In t h e c a s e of t h e i n i t i a l U n i t e d S t a t e s r e q u i r e m e n t 
f o r u s e of a p a r t i c u l a r i s l a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e g ^ v e m -
mpntal a u t h o r i t i e s s h a l l c o n s u l t w i th r e s p e c t t o t h e t i m e 
r ^ u i r e d by t h e U n i t e d Kingdom a u t h o r i t i e s f o r t a k i n g 
t h o s e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures t h a t may be n e c e s s a r y t o 
e n a b l e any such d e f e n s e r e q u i r e m e n t t o be met . 
b) Before e i t h e r Govemmoit p r o c e e d s t o c o n s t r u c t o r i n s t a l l 
any f a c i l i t y in t h e T e r r i t o r y , both Govemmants s h a l l 
f i r s t ^ p r o v e in p r i n c i p l e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t fo r t h a t 
f a c i l i t y / and t h e o p p o o p r i a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s 
of t h e two QDvemmaits s h a l l r e a c h m u t u a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y 
a r r a n g e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g s p e c i f i c a r e a s and t e c h n i c a l 
r e q u i r e m e n t s fo r r e s p e c t i v e d e f e a s e p u r p o s e s . 
c) The p r o c e d u r e d e s c r i b e d in s u b - p a r a g r a p h s (a) and(b) s h a l l 
n o t be a p p l i c a b l e i n emergency c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r i n g 
t e m p o r a r y u s e of an i s l a n d o r p a r t of an i s l a n d n o t i n 
u s e a t t h a t t i m e f o r d e f e n s e p u r p o s e s p r o v i d e d t h a t 
measures t o a s s u r e t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t s a r e 
t a k e n t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e Commiss ioner of t h e 
. t e r r i t o r y . Each ' ^ v e m m e n t s h a l l n o t i f y t h e o t h e r p r o m p t l y 
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of any emergency r e q u i r e m e n t s and c o n s u l t a t i en p r i o r 
t o such Use by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s " ^ v e m m o i t s h a l l 
be u n d e r t a k e n as soon as p o s s i b l e . 
3) The U n i t e d Kingdom Govemmoi t r e s e r v e s t h e r i g h t t o p e r m i t 
t h e u s e by t h i r d c o u n t r i e s of B r i t i s h - f i n a n c e d d e f e n s e 
f a c i l i t i e s , but s h a l l where ^ p r o p r i a t e c o n s u l t w i th t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s Government b e f o r e g r a n t i n g such p e r m i s s i o n . 
Use by a t h i r d coun t ry of U n i t e d S t a t e s o r j o i n t l y - f i n a n c e d 
f a c i l i t i e s s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o agreement between t h e U n i t e d 
Kingdom Government and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' ^ v e m m e n t . 
4) The r e q u i r e d s i t e s s h a l l be made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s w i t h o u t c h a r g e . 
5) Each Government s h a l l n o r m a l l y b e a r t h e c o s t of s i t e p r e p a -
r a t i o n , c o n s t r u c t i o n , m a i n t e n a n c e , and o p e r a t i o n for any 
f a c i l i t i e s deve loped t o meet i t s own r e q u i r e t n o n t s . Wi th in 
t h e i r c a p a c i t i e s , such f a c i l i t i e s s h a l l b e a v a i l a b l e f o r 
u s e by t h e f o r c e s of t h e o t h e r Goveminent u n d e r s e r v i c e -
l e v e l a r r a n g e m e n t s . However, t h e r e may be c e r t a i n c a s e s 
where j o i n t f i n a n c i n g s h o u l d be considexred, and i n t h e s e 
c a s e s t h e two Qovernments s h a l l c o n s u l t t o g e t h e r . 
6) Commercial a i r c r a f t s h a l l n o t be a u t h o r i z e d t o u s e n t L l i t a r y 
a i r f i e l d s i n t h e T e r r i t o r y . However, t h e U n i t e d Kingdom 
GovemniQit r e s e r v e s t h e r i g h t to p e r m i t t h e u s e in e x e r t i o n a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of such a i r f i e l d s , fcllowing c o n s u l t a t i o n 
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wi th t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o p e r a t i o n t h e a i r f i e l d s conce rned , u n d e r 
such terms o r c o n d i t i o n s as may be d e f i n e d by t h e two 
(x jvemments , 
7) For i t s d e f e n s e p u r p o s e s on t h e i s l a n d s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
GoverntDQit may f r e e l y s e l e c t U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t r a c t o r s and 
t h e s o u r c e s of ^ u i p m e n t , m a t e r i a l , s u p p l i e s , o r p e r s o n n e l , , 
excep t t h a t -
a) t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Gov e m m a i t and U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t r a c t o r s 
s h a l l make u s e of w o r k e r s from M a u r i t i u s and S e y c h e l l e s 
t o t h e maximum e x t e n t p r a c t i c a b l e , c o n s i s t e n t wi th U n i t e d 
S t a t e s p o l i c i e s , r e q u i r e m e n t s and s c h e d u l e s ; and 
b) t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s of t h e two 
Governments s h a l l c o n s u l t b e f o r e c o n t r a c t o r o r workers 
from a t h i r d c o u n t r y a r e i n t r o d u c e d . 
8) The exemption from c h a r g e s i n t h e n a t u r e o f customs d u t i e s 
and o t h e r t a x e s in r e s p e c t of goods, s u p p l i e s and ^ u i p m e n t 
b r o u g h t t o t h e T e r r i t o r y in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p u r p o s e s 
of t h i s Agreemoi t by o r on b e h a l f of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
Gbvemmoi t , U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n t r a c t o r s , members of t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r c e s , c o n t r a c t o r p e r s o n n e l o r d e p e n d a n t s , and 
t h e exempt ion from t a x a t i o n of c e r t a i n p e r s o n s s e r v i n g 
o r employed i n t h e T e r r i t o r y in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h o s e purp«-s-e«, 
p o s e s , s h a l l be such exempt ion as i s s e t o u t in Annex-I 
; d e l e c t e d ) t o t h i s N o t e . 
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9) The a r ranganents regard ing the exe rc i se of c r imina l 
j u r i s d i c t i o n and claims sha l l be those s e t out in Annex 
I I (deleted) to t h i s Note. 
10) "^"or the purpose of t h i s Agreement : 
a) "Cont rac tor personnel" means employees of a United 
S t a t e s c o n t r a c t o r who a r e not o r d i n a r i l y r e s i d e n t in 
t h e T e r r i t o r y and who a re t h e r e s o l e l y for t h e pu.rposes 
of t h i s Agreement; 
b) "Dependents" means t h e spouse and c h i l d r o i under 21 yea r s 
of age of a person in r e l a t i o n to whom i t i s used; and 
i f they are d ^ e n d e n t upon him for t h e i r support , t h e 
p a r e n t s and ch i ldren over 21 years of age of t h a t pe r son ; 
c) "i'iembers of the United Sta tes i 'orces" means 
i) m i l i t a r y members of the United S t a t e s Forces 
on ac t ive duty; 
i i ) c i v i l i a n personnel accompanying t h e United S t a t e s 
Forces and in t h e i r ejrploy who a re no t o r d i n a r i l y 
r e s i d e n t in t h e T e r r i t o r y and who a r e t h e r e s o l e l y 
for t h e purpose of t h i s Agreement; and 
i i i ) d^ende : i t s of t h e persons desc r ibed in (i) and 
( i i ) above; 
d) "United ^ t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s " means t h e a u t h o r i t y o r 
a u t h o r i t i e s from time to t ime au thor i zed o r des ignated 
by t h e United S t a t e s Govemmgit for t h e purpose of 
2?/x 
e x e r c i s i n g t h e powers in r e l a t i o n to whirh t h e exf>ression 
i s used; 
e) "United Sta tes c o n t r a c t o r " means any pe r son , body o r 
corpora t ion o r d i n a r i l y r e s i d e n t i n the United •States 
of -America, t h a t , by v i r t u e of a c o n t r a c t with the Uni ted 
S t a t e GovemrriGnt, i s i n the T e r r i t o r y ' for the purposes 
of t h i s ^qrosm&it, and inc ludes a sub-con t r a c t o r J 
f) "United Sta tes Forces" means the l and , sea and a i r 
armed se rv ices of the United S t a t e s , I nc lud ing t h e Coast 
" jua rd . 
11) The Uni ted S t a t e s ^vernment and the United Kingdom Govern-
ment contemplate t h a t t h e i s l a n d s sha remain a v a i l a b l e to 
meet the p o s s i b l e aefense needs of the two Governments for an 
i n d e f i n i t e l y long p e r i o d . Accordingly, a f t e r an i n i t i a l 
p e r i o d of 50 years t h i s 'Agreement sha l l con t inue « in fo rce 
for a f u r t h e r pe r iod of twnety years u n l e s s , not more 
than two years before ti.-^ &\d of t he i n i t i a l pe r iod , e i t h e r 
Government s h a l l have given n o t i c e of t e rmina t ion to the 
o the r , in which case t h i s agreemait s h a l l t e r m i n a t e two 
years from t h e date of such n o t i c e . 
I f the foregoing proposal i s a c c ^ t a b l e to t h e Government 
of t h e United Kingdom of Great Br i t a in and Northern I re land/ 
1 h-ive t h e '^onour t o p r o p o s e th.-it t ' ^ i s Note pn/l i t s '•^nnP>^es 
( d e l t e r i ) , t O ' ^ e t ' T "v'ith y o ' T r e p j y t o ti'-'^t e^ ' fp r t , sha ] 1 
c r n s t i t o t e ^n ^.ar^er^'pnt betv/oen t h e tv;o Governments v/-'lch 
sna] 1 e n t e r i n t o ior' '^e on t i c d a t e of yonr r e p l y . 
Acceot , S i r , t n e renev/cd a s s u r a n c e s oh my h i g h e s t c o n s i -
' ler ' ' t : '"n, 
DAVTD R .^UCE 
No. 2 
The S e c r e t a r y of S f t e ' o r F o r e i g n \\. " a i r s t o t ^ o 
•"iPhansador of the I 'nltGd i t t ^ s oi V ' o r j c a i 
F o r e i g n O f f i c e , 
London, 30 Decemoer, 1966, 
Your E x c e l l e n c y , 
I h -ve t h e i-'onour t o acknowledge r e c e i p t of y o u r n o t e Y{o. 
2 5 oi t"ie 3 0th ol December, 19 66, 4 h i c h r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : 
I h i v e trie honour t o in'* orm yoi^r e x c e l l e n c y t h ^ t t h e 
f o r e g o i n g p r o p o s a l i s a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e Government of t h e Un i t ed 
Kingdom of G r e a t B r i t a i n and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , who t h e r e f o r e 
a g r e e th%t y o u r E x c e l l e n c y ' s N o t e , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e Annexes 
( d e l e t e d ) t h e r e t o and t h i s r e p l y , s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e an Agreement 
be tween t n e two Governments wn ich s h a l l e n t e r i n t o f o r c e on t^-^is 
d a y ' s d a t e . 
I have t h e honour t o bg , w i t h t h e h i g h e s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , 
CHALFONT 
Sf^ '^RCE : J a w a t k a r K . S , , D i e g o G a r c i a i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Diplomacy 
P o p u l a r P r a k n s h a n , Bombay, 1983 pp - 30 3 - 3 0 7 . 
